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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
FROM WARRIORS TO WINGTIPS: THE LEADERSHIP TRANSITION OF 
MILITARY OFFICERS INTO THE PUBLIC SECTOR
For personal and financial reasons some retired military officers seek second careers 
in the public sector. In entering local government, they are leaving a unique organization, 
and encountering a very different organizational culture.
This study used grounded theory methodology to identify the key military leadership 
strategies and behaviors learned by military officers and to examine their applicability to 
local government. It focused on eleven retired naval and marine officers who served twenty 
or more years, attained a rank o f lieutenant commander or major and above, and had worked 
in local San Diego government at the mid-management or executive level less than six years. 
Findings were triangulated with literature and other research.
Participant data described rapid leadership development as a military priority shaped 
by early responsibility, education, mentoring and command experiences. Leadership 
practices include using a contingency leadership style, firm discipline, a controlled 
environment, straightforward communications, training and development, values, 
camaraderie building, a command presence, standard operating procedures and centrally- 
mandated change.
Retired officers needed to adjust some military leadership practices to respond to the 
organizational systems and culture o f  local government. In addition, each encountered
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stereotypes o f retired military officers that affected their image and capacity to influence 
their organization.
The retired officers interviewed identified strategies that aided them in succeeding in 
the public sector. These included: using a coaching style to lead staff following up on 
directives, actively managing performance, adopting a less direct communications styie. 
improving employee selection and development, creating ownership, actively working to 
change systems, building influence and political relationships, introducing change by 
influence, consciously developing their reputation and countering stereotypes o f military 
officers.
Some retired officers used strategies that were less successful. These included: using 
a direct communication style, using military jargon, assuming compliance, accepting and 
criticizing the status quo, developing an inner circle, expecting the executive to initiate career 
development and direct change, becoming frustrated, and failing to react to stereotypes.
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The face o f local government in the San Diego area is shaped in part by retired 
military officers who are attracted to local government employment for personal and 
financial reasons. While military organizational culture, training and experience provide 
a strong basis for building leadership skills, some of the resulting leadership practices 
may be unique to military needs and not suited to the culture of government 
organizations, i.e. the public sector. In this study, the experiences of retired military 
officers working in local government in the San Diego area will be examined to assess 
the extent to which leadership strategies and behaviors practiced in the military are 
transferable and applicable to leadership situations in local government.
Background of the Problem
Since 1990. over 30.000 members of the armed forces have retired annually from 
active duty (Veterans Preference. 1997). A study by Barnes (1984) showed that many 
military retirees settle in areas where they once served. In addition. Veterans 
Administration reports show that one-third of veterans retire to California. Florida and 
Texas, and these retirees generally settle in large cities and close to military facilities.
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San Diego has the third largest retired military population of any metropolitan area, 
measured at 40.500 in 1992 (Snyder. 1994).
The movement of military leaders into positions of leadership in government is a 
phenomenon noted over forty years ago by C. Wright Mills (1956). According to the 
400.000-member Retired Officers Association (TROA). this phenomena continues today. 
TROA identified government as one of the key areas for post-military employment 
(TROA. 1996. p. 9; Col. B. Buse. Director o f Officer Placement. TROA. personal 
communication. February 2. 1998).
At this time, there are no reliable informational sources on the number of retired 
military currently employed in local government nationally or in the San Diego area. 
There are conditions, however, which encourage employment in the public sector. Many 
retirees (defined as those with twenty or more years o f active service) are attracted to 
working in local government, since there are financial incentives for working in the 
public sector. For example, veterans may combine their service years with public 
employment years in computing retirement (Gordon. 1997). Unlike the federal 
government, state and local governments have no restrictions against multiple 
compensation -  receiving a government pension while earning a federal salary. In 
addition, local governments' hiring policies are more favorable to veterans than federal 
policies (Jacobsen. 1990). Thus, there are concrete reasons for retired officers to enter 
local government employment.
There are also non-tangible reasons for officers to enter government service. The 
prospect o f leaving the military is intimidating to many retirees as it represents a major 
life transition (Jacobsen. 1990: Savino & Krannich. 1995: TROA. 1996). Government
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employment can offer a comfortable transition to retiring military personnel as there are 
some surface similarities between the public sector and the military. As Jacobsen noted: 
In some ways government employment is the least disturbing form of career 
transition you can find. A familiar-looking treasury check arrives every payday, 
the working environment is reassuringly familiar, and except for the quirks o f the 
civil service system and the change in uniform it's almost as though you never 
retired (Jacobsen, p. 93)
Public employment can cushion the shock of entering civilian life. Thus, there are clear 
financial and emotional incentives for retiring officers who continue their work careers to 
enter local government.
Higher-ranking military officers (e.g., Lieutenant Commander and above in the 
Navy) typically have work histories reflecting high-level responsibility for complex 
operations, large staff and extensive budgets. With such strong work records, they often 
qualify to enter the public sector at mid-management to executive levels -  levels o f high 
positional leadership. Yet. military leaders are leaving a unique and deeply-instilled 
culture that has been central to their adult lives, and moving into positions of high 
leadership in the public sector which -  while having some surface similarities -  has a 
very different organizational culture.
Studies show that retiring military' personnel receive little or inadequate 
transitional support and are often ill-prepared for the passage to civilian life (Webb.
1990; Whelan. 1981). One factor may be that this major life transition occurs in mid-life 
(generally in the early forties to fifties) when other life transitions may be occurring. 
Another factor complicating this transition may be due to some of the social structures
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and aspects of military life learned over twenty years of military service that are not 
easily adapted to the corporate or civilian world (McClure. 1992: Masterman. 1988).
As retiring officers may devote between ten to twenty-five years to their second 
careers, successfully translating the valuable lessons in leading organizations gained from 
their military experiences to their civilian careers is critical to their effectiveness as 
public sector leaders.
Significance of the Study
With the end o f the Cold War and subsequent military downsizing, military 
officers are retiring in high numbers. It is reasonable to assume that some o f these 
retirees will seek employment in the public sector, bringing their experience, skills and 
beliefs to a new organizational culture. The military's Transition Assistance Program 
(U. S. Department o f Labor. 1998; Veterans' Employment and Training Service. 1995) 
focuses primarily on career assessment and job search skills, and does not adequately 
address the issues of assessing and adapting to new organizational cultures. In a study of 
122 retired naval officers done by Webb (1990). retirees criticized the military's 
transition program for failing to address the differences in managing and leadership 
between the civilian and military environments. The majority of the books and articles 
written about retired military entering civilian employment address the strengths such 
individuals bring to the workforce, but fail to address the very real issue of transition and 
adaptation (Bowers. 1996; Carrison & Walsh. 1999; Jacobsen. 1990: TROA. 1996: 
Whelan, 1981). This research project did not discover any transition assistance or 
executive coaching provided by public sector entities in the San Diego area to new
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employees transitioning from the military. One may conclude that retired officers have 
had to rely on their own wits or the support o f associates and mentors to analyze and 
adjust to a new leadership role in a new organizational culture.
During fifteen years as a public sector manager, this researcher has witnessed 
some former military officers who have successfully assumed leadership roles in the 
public sector, and some who have struggled in their endeavor to take on their new roles. 
These observations raised questions about whether there are unique aspects to the 
military experience that assist or hinder in fulfilling leadership responsibilities in public 
bureaucracies.
This research is, in part, a result from a pilot study done in the spring of 1998.
The preliminary data, based on four interviews with retired military officers holding 
leadership positions in the public sector, revealed that some military leadership behaviors 
did not always translate to the public sector. The indication is that retired officers may 
have to adjust some military practices and concepts to be successful as public sector 
leaders. Identifying these practices and concepts may have broader implications for:
• assisting retired military officers to successfully assume leadership positions 
in local government:
• improving military transition assistance programs for retiring officers;
• improving orientation and new employee support given to retired officers 
entering the public sector:
• and. more broadly, identifying general adjustments necessary for retiring 
officers to be effective leaders outside military settings.
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Purpose of the Study
The purpose o f this dissertation is to investigate the key military leadership 
strategies and behaviors learned by retired officers, and assess their transferability to 
leadership situations in local government. This study will employ a grounded theory 
approach based on qualitative interviews of recently-retired military officers currently 
employed in local government in the San Diego area.
Research Questions
The research questions explored in this dissertation came from the themes that emerged 
from a pilot study done in the spring of 1998. The research questions are as follows:
• What are the key leadership strategies and behaviors learned and practiced by 
military officers?
• Which o f these military strategies and behaviors are transferable to leadership 
situations in local government?
• What military strategies and behaviors are not easily transferable to leadership 
situations in local government?
• What adjustments assist retired military officers in transitioning into 
leadership positions in local government organizations?
• What are the implications for assisting newly-retired officers seeking to 
integrate into local government organizations?
The experience of retired officers will provide the richest data source for this information. 
The data collected will be analyzed and synthesized into a grounded theory -  where the 
significant themes revealed by the data are examined for their relationship to the core
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issue being researched. The data relationships are deepened by a review of relevant 
literature. The data and literature form the basis o f the resulting theoretical structure.
Assumptions of the Study
Any researcher brings a set of assumptions to any study. Responsible research 
acknowledges and refers to these assumptions, both to stay focused on the underlying 
purpose of the research and to perform an ongoing check to ensure the assumptions do 
not color data interpretation. The assumptions behind this study included:
1. A large number of military retirees seek second careers.
2. Local government is an attractive second career option due to the economic 
incentives and the familiar aspects of government structure and operations.
3. Officers with twenty or more years of experience develop a perspective on leadership 
which is uniquely flavored by their experiences and practices as military' officers, 
embedded in the strong culture of the armed forces and further reinforced by their 
mentors in the service.
4. Unique differences exist between military and public sector organizational cultures.
5. Some military strategies and behaviors may not translate well to the public sector.
Definition of Terms
The following are key terms used in this dissertation.
Leadership
There are a variety of definitions of leadership, delineated in more detail in 
Chapter Two. For the purpose of this study. leadership is defined as a social process.
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occurring in a time o f organizational change or stress, wherein leaders and followers 
work in concert to mobilize the human, material and intellectual resources needed to 
achieve a defined purpose.
Leadership is a multi-faceted phenomenon. The nature o f the situation drives 
which aspects o f leadership come into prominence. For example, in an emergency, a 
directive or command approach more effectively mobilizes resources in a rapid, 
consistent manner. In a policy environment, a collaborative approach involving 
stakeholders is more appropriate. Currently, the public sector is engaged in its most 
significant time o f change since the Progressive Era. There are proposals and pressures 
to adopt more businesslike practices, reform the civil service system and privatize 
services. Such change efforts require public sector leadership that is: transformational 
(Bums. 1979). informs and involves staff and stakeholders (Heifetz. 1994). defines and 
articulates its core values (Senge. 1990). and takes a collaborative approach that values 
diverse input (Bryson & Crosby. 1992: Chrislip & Larson. 1994).
Leaders
This researcher recognizes that organizational leaders may be found at every level 
of an organization, regardless of position, title or job duties. For the purpose of this 
research, only positional leaders will be studied. Military leaders have been defined as 
commissioned officers. 0-4  and above. Public sector leaders are those holding mid­
management or executive positions, as designated by their organizations' internal 
position classification systems.
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Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft
Gemeinschafi describes a type o f organization steeped in tradition, with strong 
values and beliefs, distinct levels of authority and w ell-defined individual roles. Strong 
loyalty and group cohesion characterize such organizations, e.g.. the military services. 
Gesellschaft describes more traditional, rational-bureaucratic organizations that are 
directed by goals, such as government agencies (Tonnies. 1887/1957). Tonnies' writings 
on gemeinschaft and gesellschaft influenced Max Weber's work on bureaucracy (1946). 
Organizational Culture
Organizational culture is a complex concept. Wise (1994) noted that 
organizational literature listed nearly eighty components o f organizational culture. The 
following theorists are most aligned with the researcher on the notion of organizational 
culture. Schein (1992) defined it as the basic assumptions shared by members of an 
organization. It encompasses the observed behaviors, norms, dominant values, 
philosophy, rules and climate of the organization. French and Bell (1974) identified both 
formal components of organizational culture (including the goals, technology, structure 
and finances) and informal components (interactions, group norms, feelings, attitudes and 
values). Organizational culture cannot be viewed as restricted to specific organizational 
components. It is infused and crosses over all organizational aspects. As Pacanowskv 
and O'Donnell-Trujillo (1993) viewed it. "Organizational culture is not just another piece 
of the puzzle, it is the puzzle. From one point of view, a culture is not something an 
organization has: a culture is something an organization is" (p. 126).
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Public Sector
The public sector consists of government organizations at the local, state and 
federal level. The local public sector includes cities, counties, joint-powers authorities 
and special districts. Special districts are government entities established to provide a 
specific service supported by a designated funding stream e.g.. fire districts, flood control 
districts and water authorities. Joint powers agencies address broader community issues 
and are composed of representatives of multiple government entities, e.g.. port 
authorities, government associations, and coastal authorities.
Fit
Fit describes the integration between the individual and the organization (Argyris. 
1964). Fit addresses the question of whether or not an organization can provide proper 
and sufficient motivators to satisfy an individual employee's needs and whether that 
employee can adapt to the job requirements and organizational culture (French. Caplan 
& Harrison. 1982).
Role
A role is the set of behaviors an organization expects its members to perform. A 
role defines the purpose of one's position, how that position is linked in the organization, 
the expected behaviors or norms and how those behaviors are connected to organizational 
values (Katz & Kahn. 1978).
Role Ambiguity
Role ambiguity occurs when an individual is uncertain about what behaviors, 
norms and values are expected in the organization (Burke. 1982). Role ambiguity can 
contribute to individual stress, particularly when the individual fails to understand the
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implicit norms. This can produce a resistance to change (Kahn. Wolfe. Quinn. Snoek & 
Rosenthal, 1964).
Definition of Military Terms
The following are key military terms used in this dissertation, listed in 
alphabetical order.
Captain's Mast
A term, deriving from the ancient tradition of piping the crew to assemble in the 
vicinity o f the main mast to witness punishment. It is a hearing conducted by the 
commanding officer to determine appropriate disposition o f alleged offenses under the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). Appropriate disposition may result in referral 
to trial by court-martial, award of non-judicial punishment (NJP) by the commanding 
officer or dismissal of the charge. Captain's mast is customarily preceded by an 
investigation into the circumstances by the executive officer.
High-Ranking Officers
The ranks for officers in the Navy and Marine Corps eligible as participants in this study 
include senior and flag officers. The comparisons in rank between the Navy and Marine 
Corps are contained in the following table:
Navy Marine Corps
Admiral (paygrade O -10) General (paygrade O-10)
Vice Admiral (paygrade 0-9) Lieutenant General (paygrade 0-9)
Rear Admiral (paygrade 0-8) Major General (paygrade 0-8)
Real Admiral (lower) (paygrade 0-7) Brigadier General (paygrade 0-7)
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Navy Marine Corps
Captain (paygrade 0-6) Colonel (paygrade 0-6)
Commander (paygrade 0-5) Lieutenant Colonel (paygrade 0-5)
Lieutenant Commander (paygrade 0-4) Major (paygrade 0-4)
Paygrades 0-5 and 0-6  are termed senior officers. Paygrades 0-7  and above are called 
flag  officers in the Navy or general officers in the Marine Corps.
The Institutional-Occupational Continuum
The Institutional-Occupational continuum is the theory proposed by Charles C. 
Moskos. that military organizations in this country are moving from a traditional 
institutional model with normative values o f duty, honor and country, strong 
organizational identity and a status system based on rank and seniority. In the 
institutional military, the organization plays a paternalistic, controlling role that extends 
to the spouse and family members. Moskos sees the services moving more toward an 
occupational military where individual commitment is driven by more market forces such 
as compensation and benefits, and less by an identification with the organization and 
one's role within it. In the occupational organization, individuals identify more strongly 
with their occupation (horizontal identification) than with the organization itself (vertical 
identification). There is growing reluctance on the part of spouses (who often have their 
own careers) and children to accept the extensive volunteer and social duties traditionally 
expected of them (Moskos, 1977. 1986. 1988).
Military Retirees
For this study, military retirees are defined as individuals who have served 20 or 
more years in a branch o f the armed forces and who receive retired pay.
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Abbreviations Used
The military uses a large number of acronyms and abbreviations that facilitate 
brief and precise communication within the services but are unfamiliar to much of the 




CPO Chief Petty Officer (paygrade E-7)
E-9* Master Chief Petty Officer
E-7 Chief Petty Officer
E-4 Third Class Petty Officer
Military Terms
CB Construction Battalion
NJP Non-judicial punishment administered at Captain's Mast
ROTC Reserve Officer Training Corps, a university-based commissioning
source for officer candidates 
SOP Standard operating procedure
UCMJ Uniform Code of Military Justice, similar to the civilian Penal Code
* The complete list of petty officer ranks ranges from E-4 to E-9.
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Delimitations and Limitations
The population of this study will be confined to retired Navy and Marine Corps 
officers, who served 20 or more years and attained the rank o f Lieutenant Commander or 
higher in the Navy or Major or higher in the Marine Corps. The participants must have 
been retired six years or less and have worked in a managerial or executive position in 
local government in Sain Diego County.
While many individuals in an organization act in leadership capacities, this study- 
dealt exclusively with those in positional leadership roles. As many o f the participants 
came from unfamiliar organizations, it was not possible to accurately identify individuals 
who fulfilled leadership roles outside of their formal positions.
A limitation of the study is that the pool of participants was composed entirely of 
white males, reflecting somewhat the demographics o f the military branches during their 
service as officers. The results, therefore, may not reflect the experience of women and 
non-white high-ranking military- officers.
The researcher has no military background and has thus relied on the repetition of 
similar themes and experiences (data saturation) and the expertise of committee members 
and subject matter experts to confirm that the data are sufficiently grounded to supply the 
basis for a theory.
This research focused solely on the self-described experiences of retired officers. 
It. therefore, does not necessarily address the effectiveness of the retired officers in their 
leadership roles in the public sector as perceived by others. Such a study would require 
the input of subordinates, peers and superiors (i.e.. 360 degree feedback) as well as long­
term observation of the participants in their roles. This approach was initially considered.
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but rejected during the proposal phase due to the difficulty in gaining permission and 
access to such data.
Finally, the grounded theory method focuses solely on the core element being 
researched; therefore, other themes revealed in the data gathering were not explored if 
they did not relate to leadership.
Outline of the Dissertation
Chapter One provided a summary overview of the dissertation, along with 
background information on the key terms, limitations and assumptions o f the study.
Chapter Two is a review of the literature, focusing on the core issues underlying 
this study. The literature review examines the common threads and differences between 
the organizational cultures of the military and o f public bureaucracies. It also considers 
the nature of major life transitions, such as retiring from the military after twenty or more 
years and beginning a second career. Finally it discusses the nature of leadership and its 
role in guiding public organizations through the current climate of significant 
organizational change.
Chapter Three describes the research methodology of this study. It addresses the 
rationale for selecting a grounded theory approach and describes the process for the 
research, interv iews and data analysis.
Chapter Four contains the descriptions of the participants and the research results 
concerning military leadership, focusing on the central themes.
Chapter Five contains the research results related to applying military leadership 
strategies and behaviors to the public sector.
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Chapter Six presents the findings and the recommendations for future research. 
In this chapter, the central themes from the data are woven into a grounded theory that 
describes the nature o f military leadership as described by the participants and what 
aspects translate well to the public sector. This research will hopefully inspire further 
inquiry.
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CHAPTER TWO 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Overview
The previous chapter provided a brief explanation of the purpose of this study -  
identifying the lessons in leadership learned by retired military officers and examining 
their experience in transferring these principles while serving in leadership positions in 
local government. It summarized the economic and personal reasons for retired officers 
to enter public sector employment and cited results from a pilot study, which suggested 
that not all military leadership strategies and behaviors translate well to the public sector. 
This chapter contains a focused review of the related literature thus providing a more 
comprehensive examination of this subject.
An underlying assumption of this study is that, while government and military 
organizations share some common history and characteristics, there are also substantive 
differences between the cultures of the military and the public sector. What follows in 
this chapter is. first, a review of the development of this nation's public and military' 
bureaucracies. The focus is on the common roots of the military and the government 
bureaucracies: the political attitudes that shaped them: their growth in scope and 
professionalism: and the formation o f their formal structures in the era of reform. 
Secondly, this section contains separate examinations of their informal organizational 
cultures and highlights some of their differences in cultural type, values, goals, missions.
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and citizen input as well as current organizational challenges. Next, there is a review of 
the primary issues of career and life transition, followed by an examination o f the current 
change environment facing military officers transitioning to the public sector. Finally, 
there is an examination of the nature of leadership and its central role in managing public 
sector change.
The Intersection of Public and Military Bureaucracies
There are strong parallels between many o f the formal aspects o f military and 
government organizations because they share common roots as the first large-scale 
organizational structures. The key "modem’* management concepts originated in ancient 
governments and military operations: the Egyptians developed centralized systems (1600 
BC); the Chinese wrote about planning, directing and controlling principles (1100 BC) 
and standard operating procedures (500 BC); and the Greeks (325 to 175 BC) wrote 
about hierarchy, delegation, job descriptions, and motion studies (George. 1972). 
According to Rickover (1971):
Bureaucracy antedates modem democracy by centuries. It persists in our society 
because no one has yet invented an instrument equally efficient in performing 
tasks -  on a continuing basis — that require coordination of the efforts o f large 
numbers of people, with different kinds and degrees of professional expertise 
relevant to the job at hand, especially when their work must be closely 
intermeshed, (p. 150)
The hallmarks of contemporary public and military bureaucracies were outlined by Max 
Weber (1946) as centralized functions, standardized roles, unity of command, centralized
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decision-making, standard operating procedures, closed boundaries, and reliance on 
hierarchical authority. Thus, for centuries, there have been parallels in the formal aspects 
of government and military organizations. The differences between the two are more 
pronounced in their informal culture.
There are existing parallels between this country's public and military 
bureaucracies that go back to their roots. The principles o f colonial government and 
society were: "divided political power, local autonomy, civil control over the military, 
and fear of power” (Carp. 1984. p. 14). The dominant colonial issues o f religious and 
regional differences fueled the development of isolated, fragmented local government. 
Local political leaders were generally from wealthy families and many served unpaid, 
establishing an expectation that government service was a noble obligation and that 
government functions should cost little (Carp. 1984). Colonial opposition to the British 
founded a suspicion of centralized authority -  whether administrative or military (Beach 
and Carter. 1997). The writings of John Locke (1690/1986) and others were used to 
support the creation of a small government with limited power. A fear and mistrust of 
the military is evidenced in the Continental Congress's refusal to grant the military' the 
proper authority to feed and clothe its forces -  resulting in ragged and starving Colonial 
troops that went from town to town both fighting and begging supplies. The founders 
preferred military sacrifices to expanding both the power and the scope of government 
and the military (Carp. 1984).
The first era of national government, roughly 1789 to 1829. saw public 
administrators as the guardians of the new democracy. Washington spoke o f “fitness of 
character” as the criterion for those in government employment. Family background.
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education, honor and esteem were the basis of what Frederick Mosher calls, "the 
government of the gentlemen," where landed gentry formed the pool o f possible 
employees (Mosher, 1982. pp. 58-60). Class was the basis of both government and 
military service, wherein the positional leaders were from the aristocracy and public 
service was regarded as an honor and obligation. Military service itself was often 
considered a family tradition (Van Riper. 1971).
Thomas Jefferson, a strong opponent of a standing army, was an unlikely 
champion of the creation of the first military academy. West Point. However. Jefferson 
was deeply concerned with the exclusive Federalist/aristocratic makeup o f the Army. He 
created West Point to draw middle class and Republican factions into the military in 
order to guard against creating a military that was an exclusive body, which enforced the 
interests of the wealthy (Crackle. 1987).
Opening up public service to the common man was a notion promoted by Andrew 
Jackson. He based his actions on two principles: a view that government "by the 
people" meant that "the people" ought to work in the government, and a belief that 
government work was so simple in nature that it did not require an established 
administrative workforce:
The duties of all public officers are. or at least admit of being made, so plain and 
simple that men of intelligence may readily qualify themselves for their 
performance: and I cannot but believe that more is lost by the long continuance of 
men in office than is generally gained by their experience, (quoted in 
Richardson. 1897. p. 1012)
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In Jackson's view, it was better to exchange some degree of professionalism to ensure 
against a government administered by the elite. This notion of sacrificing efficiency for 
the sake of other objectives has been central to public sector conflicts during subsequent 
eras. Jackson's intent of a government o f the common people became known in the late 
1800*s as the "‘Spoils System." Political patronage existed at all levels of government, 
but particularly within city politics where ward bosses dispensed political jobs and favors 
as rewards (Huberman. 1960). In addition, a great number of the bureaucratic positions 
turned over with each election, resulting in disarray and a loss of institutional knowledge 
within government agencies (Van Riper. 1971).
Jackson and some o f his successors had a similar disregard for the military.
While the territory of the United States tripled in size within 50 years after the War of 
1812. its military was slashed (Porter, 1994). The military fell into disarray prior to the 
Civil War. due to poor support. Public anti-government sentiment was documented by de 
Tocqueville (1848/1945) who noted that Americans chose to keep their government poor 
and unfunded to keep it from becoming too strong.
At the time of the Civil War. there was an army of just over 16.000. almost 90% 
of which was stationed on the western frontier. There were three million militia on 
paper, though the President could only call up units for a maximum of three months, and 
their training consisted largely of “annual picnics." (Dupuy & Dupuy. 1960. p. 23). The 
military promotion system was staid and careers moved at a “meticulous crawl." Future 
leadership positions relied on "avoiding innovation in personal life or in military duties" 
(Mills. 1956. p. 183). The Navy had only 90 craft, many of which were wooden sailing 
ships. Only forty-two were in commission and none of the fleet were modem armor-clad
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vessels used by European fleets (Dupuy & Dupuy. 1960). The early years o f the Civil 
War highlighted the poor preparation and performance of the military as well as the weak 
national loyalty o f the servicemen. O f the 1.036 Army officers and 1.300 Navy officers. 
286 and 322, respectively, resigned — mostly to join the Confederate forces (Op. cit.).
The Civil War had showcased some o f the inadequacies within the military and 
government administration. The government's spoils system practice of appointing 
political allies to administrative positions allowed politicians to exercise substantial 
control over both the design and the implementation of policy, further broadening the 
power o f politicians to use their offices for patronage. By the late 1800s. there was 
political corruption at all levels o f government, with scandals such as Teapot Dome and 
Tammany Hall demonstrating that public jobs and services were available for money and 
political support (Huberman, 1960). Government administration was largely in the 
hands of bureaucrats selected more for political cronyism than for professionalism 
(Ingraham. 1995: Mosher. 1982).
The post-war Navy was clinging to an old mission focused on protecting 
commerce, and consequently could marshal little political support outside of wartime.
By 1881. the United States Navy's fleet was considered inferior to the Chilean Navy 
(Clark. Stevens. Alden & Krafft. 1927). With the writings, lectures and political 
influence of Alfred Thayer Mahan, the Navy turned from a reactive focus on commerce 
protection to embracing a new mission — creating a battle fleet that would make the 
United States a geo-political force in the era o f '‘Manifest Destiny" (Hagan. 1991).
As the new century approached, it was broadly recognized that the large scale and 
complex issues o f an increasingly industrial nation with international interests required a
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professional and ethical administration in both the military and the government 
(Ingraham. 1995: Mosher. 1982; Nelson. 1982).
Public outrage over government corruption and ineptitude grew to where, 
beginning in the 1850‘s. large public protests were held to reform the personnel system. 
The movement for a professional civil service system followed the reform model 
promoted by Alexis de Tocqueville in Europe. Reform efforts were fought by some local 
and national politicians in the United States (White. 1935). The assassination of James 
Garfield in 1881 by Charles J. Guiteau. a disgruntled civil servant who sought a better job 
in the presidential administration, galvanized the American government reform 
movement. Abolitionists and Progressives (who led one wing of the movement to 
establish a professional and non-corrupt public administration) adopted a high moral tone 
focused on ethical reform: “The abolition o f the spoils system . . .  [is] second in 
importance only to the abolition of slavery" (from a 1893 speech by abolitionist Wendell 
P. Garrison, quoted in Nelson. 1982. p. 121).
At the same time, the scientific management movement was pulling reform in the 
direction of efficiency, defined as the use of business practices and expertise (Nelson. 
1982). The proponents of scientific management argued that government functions 
required trained professionals who made decisions and otherwise performed their tasks in 
accordance with “autonomous, abstract standards" (Nelson. 1982. p. 125). One of their 
key proponents w as Woodrow Wilson who called for the establishment of a profession of 
public administration based on the principles of business (Wilson. 1887).
Abolitionists, led by Henry Adams. Wendell Garrison. Charles Schurlz and others 
were committed to government reform because such political actions as the Kansas-
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Nebraska Act challenged the morals of government by strict majoritarianism. They 
spoke of reintroducing the ethical government seen during the 18th century (Nelson.
1982). The reforms they championed established: strict purchasing and contracting 
regulations, standard operating procedures and competitive, merit-based selection and 
promotion systems. Such reforms involved strict procedures and multi-layered checks 
and balances to guard against corruption and favoritism. The systems created were 
intentionally inefficient because their proponents saw ethics as the greater good:
The question whether the Departments at Washington are managed well or badly, 
is in proportion to the whole problem [of corruption] an insignificant problem 
after all. Neither does the question whether our civil service is as efficient as it 
ought to be, cover the whole ground. The most important point to my mind is. 
how we can remove that element of demoralization which now the prevailing 
mode of distributing office [political nepotism] has introduced into the body 
politic. (Charles Schurtz. in a speech to the United States Senate. January 27. 
1871. quoted in Nelson. 1982. p. 121)
The scientific management proponents introduced the business models of creating 
smaller institutions (agencies), narrow scopes, specified job duties, specialized functions, 
and separate accounting systems (Nelson. 1982). These systemic reforms in personnel, 
procurement and budget affected both administrative government and the military. 
Personnel
One of the most significant government reforms of the Progressive Era was the 
Pendleton Act of 1883, which sought to remove political patronage from the personnel 
system and protect the rights of public employees. Based on the British model, it forms
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the basis for all contemporary public personnel systems -  jobs are specifically defined: 
positions are advertised publicly; candidates are evaluated by pre-established criteria: and 
employees are selected based on merit. Further, the system protects employees from 
dismissal without cause (Van Riper. 1971: White. 1935). These federal efforts were 
precursors of personnel reform in key cities and states as well.
Most o f the forces for the Civil War. World War I . and the Spanish American 
wars came from volunteer militia (Mills. 1956: Stillman. 1996). There were problems 
with the leadership and technical expertise of some generals and admirals who were 
promoted based on seniority or political connections rather than merit. Secretary of War 
Elihu Root spearheaded military personnel reform on the heels o f the Pendleton Act.
Root established a unified personnel system and education requirements for officers 
(Mosher. 1982: Stillman. 1996).
Personnel reforms occurred in advance of unprecedented growth in government 
and the military. Public bureaucracy grew during the Progressive Era. New Deal and 
World War II eras in response to increasing citizen demand for services. The growth of 
the military parallels this general government expansion (Porter. 1994). At the turn of 
the century, the military branches consisted of the War Department and the Navy -  both 
established in the 1780s. With the entrance of the United States into World War II. the 
modem military bureaucracy was bom. Between 1941 and 1945. over twelve million 
men and women served in the armed forces and 147 bureaucratic agencies were formed 
to serve the war effort, including the Selective Service. The National Security Act of 
1947 created the Department o f Defense, the Air Force and the Central Intelligence 
Agency. Other military agencies were formed to administer military humanitarian efforts
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such as The Marshal Plan as well as efforts related to the developing Cold War 
(Stillman. 1996).
Budgeting
The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 was the first reform in public budgeting. 
It took a rational approach to budgeting and pursued standards of efficiency by focusing 
on the expenditure side (Schick & Harry. 1982). Subsequent attempts at budget reform 
were a response to the complexity and cost of military weapons and Cold War programs 
(Schick & Harry. 1982: Stillman. 1996). They were often first initiated in the military, 
then applied to general government.
Recognizing that the long-term development of complex and costly weapons 
systems required the highest quality in decision-making. Secretary of Defense (1961- 
1965) Robert McNamara instituted what he viewed as rational approaches to budget and 
program evaluation. He believed that his system — Program Planning and Budgeting 
Systems (PPBS) — would control the process and would lead to "correct" decisions 
emphasizing "cost-effectiveness analyses" in managing the military (Roherty. 1970).
Many criticized McNamara's cost-effectiveness approach as discounting combat 
readiness and the protection o f the forces and his focus on very specific objectives as 
failing to examine the larger question o f mission -  as evidenced in his decisions during 
the Vietnam War (Hadley. 1986: Palmer. 1978: Roherty. 1970). McNamara's practices 
and the PPBS system also brought civilians and political appointees further into decision­
making roles in the military (Hadley. 1986: Palmer, 1978) which has subsequently 
demanded more political skills from its uniformed leaders (Wilson. 1989).
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The budget and program evaluation reforms of the last thirty years -  such as 
PPBS. Management by Objectives (MBO) and Zero-Based Budgeting (ZBB) -  all 
followed this same rationalistic approach and opened the door to political involvement in 
decision-making and micro-management of programs (Schick & Harry. 1982: Stillman.
1996). These reforms occurred in both the military and public sectors.
Contracting and Procurement
The United States government has contracted for goods and services since the 
Revolutionary War. Charges of overpricing, excessive overheads, fraud and nepotism 
have plagued contracting since its inception (Carp, 1984). In the 1880s. the Progressive 
reformers challenged favoritism in the granting of contracts, that led to the development 
o f parallel systems within both the military and administrative government: competitive 
procurement, precise contract specifications and sealed bids (Kettl. 1993). The 
hallmarks of the reforms in personnel, budgeting, contracting and procurements are still 
in place after nearly 100 years.
Clearly, there are similarities between government and military bureaucracies. 
They share fundamental structures and practices common to most large-scale 
organizations. They share the public's concern over their role, their power and their cost. 
They share a common history in their rise in complexity and professionalism. They share 
common systems of personnel, budgeting and procurement resulting from the reforms 
introduced in this century. These similarities between administrative government and the 
military are principally in what French and Bell (1974) identified as the formal aspects of 
organizational culture: the differences between these organizations lie largely in the 
informal aspects.
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The Nature of Military Culture
Organizational culture is a system of backgrounds, norms, values and beliefs that 
are shared among group members (Schein. 1992). French and Bell (1974) include in 
their notion o f organizational culture the formal or overt features of an organization 
(goals, technology, structure, and finances) as well as its informal aspects (interactions, 
group norms, feelings, attitudes and values). Military sociologists and historians have 
examined the informal aspects of military culture.
The Navv's Organizational Culture
The roots o f the United States Navy originated with the Revolutionary War over 
the necessity o f protecting commerce. Problems with Barbary pirates led the reluctant 
Constitutional Convention in 1787 to establish the federal authority to create a navy, over 
the objections of those concerned with the cost and who felt it gave too much power to 
the central government. The controversy was carried to Congress, which finally 
established a navy in 1794 (Hagan. 1991). While West Point was founded in the 1700s 
under Jefferson to teach battle strategy and tactics, the United States Naval Academy was 
not founded until 1845 -  Navy culture held that seamen learned at sea. not on land. The 
changing technology (steam propulsion) forced a change in philosophy, as the need for a 
more developed engineering background was recognized (Clark, et al. 1927: Hagan.
1991). The role of the Navy changed with the theories of Alfred Thayer Mahan. 
(1890/1987). redirecting the Navy toward developing large warships and engaging in 
fleet-centered combat and large-scale operations. With the fall of the Soviet Union in 
1989. the United States Navy has faced a re-examination of its '‘battle group" strategy.
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since, for the first time, no other country seems capable of assembling a credible naval 
threat (Hagan. 1991).
The Navy has several distinct communities or subcultures including: the "brown 
shoes" (aviators), the "black shoes” (surface ship sailors) and felt shoes (submariners). 
The commanding officer o f an aircraft carrier is traditionally an aviator. There is an 
historic, intra-service rivalry among these communities, revealed in debates on how to 
best implement the Navy's overall mission (Hadley, 1986; Halperin. 1974). Officers 
with "brown shoe” background fight for appropriations for more aircraft and carriers, 
while "black shoe” admirals seek more surface ships (Halperin. 1974). Despite these 
subcultures, the Navy retains an integrated personality because of its mission (Hadley. 
1986).
With its seagoing missions, the Navy is unique among the services. The amount 
of travel makes it the least insular (Hadley, 1986) and the essence of the ship experience 
gives a unique independence to naval officers:
Onboard ship, hierarchy is powerful and actions are constantly monitored, but 
among ships there is a freedom of action and degree of isolation from the rest of 
the military (and society at large) that is much greater than what a typical army 
officer experiences. (Wilson. 1989. p. 58)
The shipboard experience is self-contained, and the actions of senior and flag officers are 
not monitored and scrutinized to the degree that land-based forces are. Thus, the Navy's 
high-ranking officers operate in an environment o f relative independence, flexibility and 
isolation. Naval officers generally put in more time away from their families than those
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in the other services, yet many avoid Pentagon assignments -  perhaps because the naval 
officer values autonomy (Hadley, 1986).
The Marine Corps’ Organizational Culture
The Marine Corps is part of the Department of the Navy and constitutes the land 
component of sea combat. The Continental Marines served in the Revolutionary War and 
were disbanded until officially established in 1789 to fight the Barbarv pirates (Moskin. 
1977). Initially, the Corps was the least-funded service, often threatened with extinction 
by Congress and was frequently caught in a turf war between the Navy and the Army 
(Krulak. 1987). It evolved into an expeditionary force that prides itself as an elite corps 
willing to undertake the dirtiest, most dangerous duty. As retired Lieutenant General 
Victor H. Krulak, USMC. wTOte:
In a century and a half evolved an elite, almost mystical institutional personality. 
Partaking variously of pride, aggressiveness, dedication, loyalty, discipline, and 
courage, this complex personality was -  and is -  dominated by a conviction that 
battle is the Marines' only reason for existence and that they must be ready to 
respond promptly and effectively whenever given an opportunity to fight.
Finally, they came to accept, as an article of faith, that marines must not only be 
better than everyone else but different as well. (Krulak. 1987. p. 3)
The Marine Corps has a strong organizational culture unmatched by fewr private or public 
sector organizations. As an amphibious force, its culture also differs from the Navy's. 
Marine officers are subject to much more control and oversight than their counterparts in 
the Navy (Hadley. 1986). As with other service branches, the Corps struggled as an
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organization after the Vietnam War. but refocused itself on combat readiness in the late 
1980s (Ricks. 1997).
Informal Military Organizational Culture
While each service has a unique culture, there are also shared aspects of military 
service -  informal military culture. Informal military culture relies on community and 
organizational identity as the glue that binds it. Ferdinand Tonnies (1887/1957) referred 
to this type of organizational form as gemeinschaft. Such organizations are distinguished 
by their strong, common beliefs and values, deep traditions, well-defined roles, 
traditional forms o f authority and strong cohesion. The traditions of the modem military 
pre-date the formation o f nation-states. In his seminal work on the military. The 
Professional Soldier. Morris Janowitz (1960) identified the post-feudal roots o f the 
modem armed forces, when loyalty to one's lord was transformed to loyalty and serv ice 
to one's country. Serving as a military leader was a calling and obligation of the 
aristocracy.
Its contrasting organizational form, gesellschaft. characterizes an organization 
which is created to achieve a specific end. These organizations — such as government 
bureaucracies -- fit the rational, machine model and are driven by instrumental values 
(Weber. 1946). Shils (1981) in his work on tradition in society, wrote that the rise of 
bureaucratic rationalism beginning in the 19th century was an attempt to move away from 
tradition which was seen as binding individuals. Government was seen as the agent of 
rational change:
Government alone . . .  is counted upon to act rationally, to disregard old ways and 
to choose those means which will attain the desired ends with a minimum of
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waste . . . .  No other institution has powers over the entire range of society; 
government alone can make the entire society rational. Otherwise society would 
be in a chaos arising from the rational self-seeking actions of individuals or it 
would be a thicket of irrational, traditional rules, or it would be both at the same 
time. (Shils, 1981. pp. 288-289)
Government has both the resources and power to move societies away from what is 
conceived o f as an excessive attachment to traditions and old ways and toward 
rationality. The military, while also embracing rational organizational practices, retains 
its long-enduring orientation toward authority, standards of conduct and commitment to 
values. The military actively seeks to preserv e the traditions of its institution, amidst 
societal pressures toward legal-rationalism.
Modem military sociologist Charles C. Moskos (1977. 1986. 1988) further 
developed this concept in his Institutional-Occupational organizational continuum that is 
used extensively in military literature (Appendix A). As an institutional organization, 
the traditional military is driven by its core values, identified by military' sociologists as 
duty, honor, self-sacrifice and country (Janowitz. 1960; Nve. 1986; Dunivan. 1994). 
Members see their careers as service, a calling, sometimes a family tradition. Individuals 
have a strong identification with the institution itself -  i.e.. a vertical identification. 
Military’ members as well as their spouses and families are an integral part of the military 
community. The organization is very’ paternalistic in its relationship with members, 
controlling large aspects of their lives (Moskos. 1988).
The building of organizational identification and unit cohesion is essential in an 
organization where individuals must be willing, when necessary or on command, to
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ignore instincts o f self-preservation and put themselves in harm's way. New recruit 
orientation is a key tool for instilling military culture — what Strauss and Corbin (1990) 
called context. One tool used to build cohesion at boot camp and officer training is basic 
training. According to McCloy & Clover (1988). the goal o f basic training is to 
"deindividualize" or break down individuals, and then remold them so they bond them as 
a unit. Schein (1965) observed that:
Organizations socialize their new members by creating a series o f events which 
serve the function of undoing old values so that the person will be prepared to 
learn new values. This process o f undoing or unfreezing is often unpleasant and 
therefore requires strong motivation to endure it or strong organizational forces to 
make the person endure it. (p. 6)
During this intense, often unpleasant experience, cooperation and group behavior are 
rewarded. The end o f basic training is marked by a rite of passage that signifies bonding 
and acceptance into the group (McCloy & Clover. 1988). Initiation rituals help identify 
those suited to military life. The willingness to adopt an institution's identity suggests 
that many are likely to have high affiliation needs (McClelland & Burnham. 1976) which 
helps support military camaraderie.
The strongest example of this is in the Marine Corps. Marine boot camp uses lack 
of sleep, total adherence to a rigid application of rules (including the proper way to hold a 
cafeteria tray), dependence on the drill instructor, repetition and increasing difficulty, 
danger and unpleasantness of tasks to build institutional identification. Boot camp 
culminates in '‘Warrior Week" where cadets "enter as civilians and come out as Marines" 
(Ricks. 1997, p. 132). The goal of Marine boot camp is to instill unquestioning
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obedience, a sense o f history- and identification, and a Marine standpoint. Ricks (1997) 
followed and interviewed Marines through basic training. Key changes the Marines 
themselves noticed were their new sense of identity and camaraderie with other Marines, 
and their changed view o f civilian life, which now appeared "obnoxious." lacking 
"politeness” and “nasty-” (p. 231). The Corps, perhaps more than the other services, seek 
to set its members apart as an elite and bonded corps, with a separate identitv 
intentionallv forged by the organization.
Military officers may have undergone basic training if they were promoted 
through the enlisted ranks. Other paths to commissioned officer status are the military 
academies. the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC). the Reserve Officer Corps 
(ROC), and Officer Candidate School (OCS). Each o f these involves varying degrees of 
immersion into military culture. Formal military education trains officers in military 
norms: both in their tasks and in how to transmit military values (Peck. 1994).
Colonel William D. Henderson. USA (1985). a combat commander and instructor 
at the National Defense University, defined camaraderie as that phenomenon occurring 
"when the small group, the organization and the leader come together.” ensuring that the 
group functions cohesively (p. 9). According to Henderson, the military builds 
camaraderie through the following: mission, policies and resources that support the small 
unit, and “structural characteristics [which] de-emphasize individualism within the 
soldier” (p. 10). The goal is to induce the individual to see his/her unit as the primary 
group (p. 162).
The hierarchical structure of the service defines duties and roles, but also sets the 
structure for command and obeying orders. The military has a blend of teamwork and
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the military places on obedience. "A Message to Garcia" relates a story of a man 
accepting responsibility to deliver a message to someone only known as “Garcia” located 
somewhere in the mountains o f Cuba, without hesitation or question:
My heart goes out to the man who does his work when the “boss” is away, as well 
as when he is at home. And the man who. when given a letter for Garcia, quietly 
takes the missive, without asking any idiotic questions . . .  The hero is the man 
who does his work -  who carries the Message to Garcia. (Hubbard. 1899. p. 3) 
Over 100 million copies o f the pamphlet are said to exist, giving it the largest circulation 
of any document in the world. Its popularity within the military points to the value the 
military places on unquestioned obedience and the importance of carrying out orders.
Significant organizational changes in the armed forces which began in the 1950s 
(Janowitz. 1960) were tremendously accelerated in the post-Vietnam era of the 1980s and 
1990s. The traditional military culture has been challenged by fundamental changes in 
the role of the military from its conventional war-fighting missions of combat readiness 
and unit cohesion toward more peace keeping and humanitarian missions (Dunivan.
1994: Moskos. 1977). The transition to all-volunteer forces (AVF) and the broad 
expansion of civilian staff has shifted the military away from its traditional role as a 
“vocation” toward an “occupation" (Moskos. 1977. 1986. 1988). The change in racial 
composition of the forces and the broadening roles of women in the military have 
challenged the military's reliance on homogeneity to create unit cohesion (Dunivan.
1994). In addition, the technological complexity of the weaponry and equipment requires 
both more organizational and cross-unit dependency. It also gives line commanders
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control of significant firepower, which has forced a shift o f the locus of control 
downward within the organization (Demchak. 1991).
This shift in military culture is addressed by Moskos (1977. 1986. 1988). who 
stated that the military is shifting from an institutional (gemeinschaft) model toward a 
more occupational (gesellschaft) model. Increasingly, there is more self-interest on the 
part o f recruits and personnel who are attracted to more immediate benefits such as pay. 
training and assistance with a college education. Compared to the 1960s. the personal 
lives o f those in the service are more separate from the institution -  off-base residency, 
outside employment (by both members and spouses), less involvement of spouses, etc. 
Individuals have more of a horizontal identification with their profession, e.g.. engineers, 
computer technicians (Moskos. op. cit.). Military personnel are seeking more of a voice 
in their work and their careers. At the same time, the civilian defense workforce is 
expanding while the military is downsizing, which further pushes the military culture 
toward occupationalism (Moskos. 1988). Officers in the services during this period 
experienced significant organizational change.
Another significant change in the military is the growth in importance of 
technology. One of the strengths of the military is technological development. Space 
technology, micro-circuits, computer and software architecture, robotics, simulation and 
modeling, fiber optics and superconductivity are just a few of the military technological 
developments which have advanced scientific and commercial arenas (Demchak. 1991; 
Stillman. 1996).
According to Demchak, (1991) the introduction o f complex technology has 
changed the military. There is a higher knowledge requirement, increasing the training
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investment and the cost of turnover. Expenses have increased, which can produce risk 
aversion as the cost per individual weapon platform increases dramatically. More 
occupational specialties are needed, creating interconnected groups that do not fully 
understand the capabilities and functions of each other. The complexity has increased to 
where malfunctions are less predictable creating more uncertainty. The movement 
toward complex technology creates a loss of internal expertise and unit self-reliance and 
more reliance on vendors and manufacturers (Demchak. 1991). The organizational 
dangers are that the technology can drive the mission (Wilson. 1989) and limit flexibility 
and adaptation while increasing control (Demchak. 1991).
Military leadership development
The biggest mistake in my life was taking a military education.
General Robert E. Lee. quoted in Janowitz. I960, p. 230. 
Establishing group norms requires: 1) set beliefs about what is appropriate and 
required behavior for group members; 2) a commonality o f beliefs among the majority of 
members; and 3) visible, institutional support for the belief, generally through a process 
of rewards and sanctions (Katz & Kahn. 1978). As discussed earlier, the military uses its 
orientation and education system to create a gemeinschaft organizational culture of 
defined group norms, group identity and instilled values.
The education of career officers is a continuous process that extends over the 
entire career. There are established education and experience expectations of those who 
attain senior officer status, sometimes referred to as "ticket punching." Promotions are 
often dependent upon length o f service, specific experiences (both command and staff 
assignments), military schools and a graduate degree, as well as having a high-level 
mentor and acquiring visibility (Moore and Trout 1978). In the 1970s. the services
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revised their formal evaluation and promotion system (Peck. 1994). The importance of 
the evaluation has increased as downsizing has reduced the number o f high-ranking 
positions. The “up or out" system requires that individuals be selected for promotion in 
accordance with a strict time standard in order to remain on active duty.
The real teaching o f military leadership occurs in two places. The first is the 
educational opportunities given to promising officers which usually involves technical 
education and formal military schooling that provides the basis of norms for the officer 
corps (Peck. 1994).
The second source of development is the special role of senior officers in 
mentoring junior officers. A key task of senior officers is the development of the next 
generation o f senior officers. By coaching, via assignments and through example, senior 
officers attempt to instill the importance of chain of command, loyalty, carry ing out 
orders, and moral responsibility (Montor. McNichoIas. Ciotti. Hutchinson & 
Wehmueller. 1987).
Janowitz (1960) identified three types of military leaders: the heroic leader, the 
military manager and the military technologist. While technology is cutting edge in the 
armed forces, the heroic leader is still held in the highest esteem. Legendary military 
heroes fall into two categories: the traditionalists -  managerial types such as Eisenhower. 
Omar Bradley, and George Marshall: and the iconoclasts such as Frances Marion. U.S. 
Grant. Jeb Stuart. Douglas McArthur. Hyman Rickover, Billy Mitchell. Ernest King and 
Holland M. Smith (Janowitz. 1960).
So while the military' values and rew'ards obedience and compliance with standard 
operating procedures (SOP’s), its organization and culture value the rebellious archtype.
R e p ro d u c e d  with perm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r th e r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
39
Many of these hero leader figures brought innovations in tactics and technology to the 
services, fitting Weber's notion o f ‘’charismatic authority" which displaces the static and 
traditional and then becomes the establishment itself (Weber. 1946: 1947). Yet. as the 
military becomes more dependent on technology, the role of the military manager 
increases. Combat performance, however, generally carries more weight in promotions.
In summary', the key features of military informal culture include strong values 
and beliefs, traditions, defined roles, a strong organizational identity', a chain of command 
and emphasis on loyalty, unit cohesion and camaraderie. This culture is instilled in 
officers through the formal education process, through experience and through the 
mentoring by senior officers.
The Culture of Government Organizations and the Role of Public Administrators
It is erroneous to say that there is a single government organizational culture. 
Government is a network of distinct subcultures -  such as environmental agencies, law 
enforcement, social sendees and health (Ban. 1995: Wilson. 1989). Yet. there are some 
aspects concerning the nature of government that affect the culture o f public agencies, 
regardless of level, location or mission:
America has a paradoxical bureaucracy unlike that found in almost any other 
advanced nation . . . .  We have a system laden with rules: elsewhere that is a sure 
sign that the bureaucracy is aloof from the people . . . .  We also have a system 
suffused with participation . (Wilson. 1989, p. 377)
While the military is part of the government, there are key differences between the 
organizational cultures o f public agencies and the military.
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A review of the literature revealed that the essence o f public sector organizational 
culture is an historic and continued tension centered in these key areas: conflicting 
values, changing missions and vague goals: a fragmented, mechanistic structure: a 
personnel system centered on patronage versus merit: a neutral versus activist role for its 
administrators; and a budgetary system based on resource efficiency (rationalism) versus 
programmatic outcome (politics). Modem government was forged within the context of 
these tensions in the era o f scientific management. The strength of that legacy remains 
almost 100 years later.
Conflicting Values. Changing Missions and Vague Goals
Goals are central to an organization, defining both the identity of the organization 
and what it does. They determine the boundaries for its members and its relationship 
with other organizations. (Thompson. 1967). An organization's values guide its 
direction, decision-making and priorities. Public organizations have traditional values 
that are often in competition with each other: efficiency, the public good, effectiveness, 
ethics, social equity and responsiveness. In the military, the values of duty, honor and 
country converge. In government, its key values are often in conflict.
Presidential advisor and theorist Luther Gulick promoted “efficiency as axiom 
number one in the value scale of administration" during the 1930s and 1940s (Gulick & 
Urwick. 1937. p. 192). Efficiency ensures that public monies are spent well and focuses 
on productivity measurements (Brudnev & Morgan. 1988). One of the problems in 
discussing efficiency in a government setting according to Dalton and Dalton (1988) is 
that there is no agreement on what "efficiency" is. Different approaches to efficiency -  
maximizing outputs, managing inputs and processes, and supply and demand — have been
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used to measure productivity in government (Dalton and Dalton. 1988). The method of 
evaluating efficiency can shift for political reasons or with the frequently changing trends 
in government budgeting systems. As Wholey noted (1983). government agencies often 
select efficiency measurements that easily generate numbers rather than utilizing 
measurements that are most important for managing performance and results.
While Gulick promoted efficiency as the primary value for government, the 
public good would appear to be the value most aligned with the mission of government. 
There are two problems in using the public good as a basis for decision-making. First, 
the public good can be difficult to define. Some see the public good in utilitarian terms 
(Locke. 1690/1986: Mill, 1863/1951) -  as that which maximizes benefits for the most 
people -  while others see the public good as that which advances us as a civic society 
(Bellah. 1992: Bellah. Madsen. Sullivan. Swidler & Tipton. 1991) or as that which 
benefits society's poorest (Rawls. 1967). Secondly, the public good can conflict with 
efficiency. Government entities often design intentionally inefficient programs to 
promote a public good -  such as in the 1980's when government agencies were mandated 
to use a new. more expensive and poor quality product (recycled paper) to create a 
national market.
Effectiveness means that programs achieve their intended results. Determining 
the effectiveness of government programs is a challenge, as most social programs have 
long-term results that are difficult both to measure and to analyze for causal relations, 
e.g.. improving education, making neighborhoods safer, improving the health of children, 
etc. The challenge o f measuring outcomes makes it difficult to control and improve 
processes (Wilson. 1989). This is further complicated by the condition that most
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programs have multiple outcomes (Dalton & Dalton. 1988). Effectiveness 
considerations may, at times, indicate that more money be spent to increase results or to 
reach more people, when efficiency measurements point to making another choice -  e.g.. 
concluding that identifying and immunizing the last 3% of children carries too high a 
cost. These quality versus quantity conflicts often occur in budget debates.
The ethical standard of government service is not just to act within the law. but 
that actions be above the appearance of impropriety. Ethics has taken primacy over 
efficiency in the design o f the civil service system and the contracting and procurement 
system. These systems were designed with intentional inefficiencies considered to be 
worth the price to ensure ethical government -  such as the multiple steps of the employee 
selection process and the redundant checks and balances in the procurement system 
which safeguard against nepotism. American government has historically chosen an 
approach of legalistic and procedural controls (rules and fear o f punishment) over one 
promoting ethical values (Ban. 1995; Bellah. 1992).
Responsiveness addresses how well the government reflects the will o f the 
stakeholders. The problem with the democratic safeguard of participatory democracy is. 
as James Madison noted in Federalist 10. there is no single will o f  the people:
[When] you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less 
probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the 
rights o f other citizens: or if such a motive exists, it will be more difficult for all 
who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with each other. 
(Hamilton. Jay & Madison. 1788/1961)
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The United States is. by design, a pluralistic system with competing interests and this 
ongoing competition “define[s] the alternatives of public policy" (Schattschneider. 1975. 
p. 138). In Madison's time the ‘‘variety o f parties and interests" were solely white male 
landowners. Today, they include the complete spectrum and full complexity o f society.
Particularly since the 1960s, social equity has been the driving value behind some 
government programs addressing race and gender issues. The New Public 
Administration movement (Waldo. 1971; 1984) argued that government administration 
has an activist role to play in engineering opportunities for the less advantaged. In 
government, social equity concerns can take precedence over efficiency considerations 
such as when policies designate a specific percentage of contracts for minority and 
women-owned business versus to the lowest bidder.
Competing values coupled with vague missions allow the focus of public agencies 
to shift with political considerations. For example, an environmental agency can find its 
mission change from strictly enforcing regulations to making an area more business- 
friendly. At other times, vague direction from elected officials leaves administrative staff 
with broad discretion but also positioned to receive the blame for poorly perceived social 
programs (Yates. 1982). These competing values and vague mission and goals are a key 
difference between the organizational cultures of the military and the public sector.
Public Administrative Structure -  Fragmented and Mechanistic bv Design
The approach to public administration was strongly influenced by scientific 
management theorists and government consultants. Fredrick Taylor (1916/1987) and 
Henri Fayol (1916/1987). Their approach was further developed and articulated by 
British military officer Lyndall Urwick and Luther Gulick (1937) who were advisors to
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Franklin Roosevelt. They adhered to the classic “machine model" of bureaucracies with 
centralized structures, unity of command, and specialization of functions. Gulick brought 
these principles to his work on the Brownlow Commission in 1937. which overhauled 
federal agencies into separate functions determined by purpose, process, clientele, 
material or geography to maximize efficient delivery o f services.
This led to agency proliferation on every level o f government — from federal 
down to local government -  and resulted in a pluralistic bureaucracy that promotes 
agency competitiveness (Dahl. 1956; Dilulio. Garvey & Kettl. 1993; Yates. 1982). This 
fragmentation among agencies persists today, reinforced by funding policies that promote 
agency rivalries and a proliferation o f  programs that address the same issues. It 
contributes to duplication o f services provided by a confusing array o f agencies involved 
in a single function (Dilulio. et al. 1993; Yates. 1982). Collaboration and joint action are 
complicated by the multiple agency approvals needed to carry out action (Pressman & 
Wildavsky. 1973). The result is the opposite of efficiency and rationality.
Some of the standard behaviors of public organizations include protecting one's 
turf, prolonging existing programs indefinitely and avoiding controversy (Yates. 1982). 
To conserve their power, public bureaucracies often cling to old missions, maintain 
narrow, agency-focused perspectives, and rely on standard operating procedures and 
traditional alliances when the times call for new strategies and reaching out to new 
constituencies (Allison. 1971; Dilulio. et al. 1993). Agencies may respond to the need 
for new programs by simply creating new procedures (Yates. 1982). Thus, the structure 
of government contributes to a fragmented, competitive approach to problem solving and 
a proliferation of procedures and regulations. While there is certainly some competition
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and rivalry among the branches of the military, the dominant drive within all military 
branches is to support the defense of the country and the assigned mission.
Public Personnel Systems — Patronage Versus Merit
The roots o f the public personnel system are in the scientific management notions 
o f ‘"breaking down the work of an organization into narrow ly defined positions, each with 
clearly delineated responsibilities" (Ban. 1995. p. 193). The products o f the public 
personnel system are: a proliferation o f job classifications, rigidity in a manager's 
staffing options, lengthy hiring processes and an expectation of a lifetime career as noted 
by White, writing in 1937: “By a [government] career service. I mean a life-w'ork. an 
occupation w hich one normally takes up in youth, with the expectation of advancement, 
and pursues until retirement” (p. 7). Traditional practice within government has been to 
promote staff from within so there is both institutional history and the motivation of a 
career ladder (Ban. 1995: White. 1937).
There are aspects of government service that are attractive to security-motivated 
individuals -  the prospect o f career employment, benefits, a guaranteed pay scale and job 
protection. A concern within the public sector is also attracting staff oriented toward 
innovation and risk-taking. The ongoing issue is how' to motivate staff toward high 
performance when there is little tie between pay and performance and when it can take 
over a year to terminate an employee with civil service protection for poor performance 
(Ban. 1995: Dilulio. et al. 1993).
Pugh (1991) wTote that government is a unique blending o f “bureaucratic ethos" 
focused on organizational efficiency as good government and "democratic ethos” focused 
on values of citizenship and social equity. Perry and Wise (1990) hypothesized that there
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may be motivational needs centered around values of service which draw individuals to 
careers in the public sector. Ting (1997). using data from the Survey of Federal 
Government Employees conducted with over 56.700 federal employees in 1991-1992. 
found that 'The notion of serving the public had no effect on the job satisfaction of public 
employees" (p. 320). He also found commitment to public organizations was interrelated 
with job satisfaction, but could not establish a causal relationship.
Gabris and Simo (1995) surveyed 150 employees from the private, public and 
non-profit sectors and found that public employees had the lowest job satisfaction rate. 
They also found no significant difference in levels of motivation toward community 
service among the three sectors. Neither of these studies found any evidence of a public 
sector motivation, nor did the researchers identify any such evidence in their review of 
other research efforts, though there is admittedly limited research in this area. Thus, 
while there are certainly public employees who are drawn to government employment 
based on the notion of service, there does not appear to be the same "service to your 
country" attraction in public employment as there is in the military.
The Role of Public Administrators -  Neutrality versus Activism
In the 1880s. Woodrow Wilson called for the establishment of public 
administration as a profession, emphasizing scientific business practices and the 
separation of politics and policymaking from administration. Administrators were to act 
based on rational analysis while elected officials gave legislative and policy direction 
based on political considerations (Wilson. 1887). Utilitarian phrases such as 
"maximizing benefits" guided administrative decisions (Rosenbloom & Ross. 1994).
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Herbert Simon (1947) and Dwight Waldo (1948) critiqued both the neutrality 
principal and the scientific management approach. Simon wTote that administrators could 
not make rational, neutral decisions because they were limited by incomplete 
information, particularly regarding consequences, and by their own capacities to absorb 
the amount of information relating to complex social and political programs. Operating 
under conditions o f what he termed “bounded rationality." administrators needed to also 
rely on values as a basis for decisions that would benefit the public. Both Waldo and 
Simon criticized "economy" and “efficiency" for failing to provide sufficient direction as 
operational values. They also viewed hierarchy and centralization as at odds with the 
democratic principles o f access and responsiveness. Simon concluded that, operating in a 
political environment with limited information, public administrators could, at best, 
produce “satisficing" public policies -  ones that satisfied political leaders and were 
sufficient to address some aspects of programmatic needs (1947).
The neutrality debate continues today in the area of policy implementation. The 
difference is between those who hold that public administrators should strictly implement 
and evaluate programs in keeping with the original intent of the authorizing legislation 
(Lowi. 1979: Mazmanian & Sabatier. 1981; Thompson. 1975). and those who believe 
public administrators need the authority to address pragmatic implementation and to be 
responsive to their customers (Lindblom & Woodhouse. 1993: Majone & Wildavsky. 
1979; Wilson. 1989). According to Lindblom & Woodhouse:
Policymaking often proceeds through trial and error, and the street-level 
bureaucrats who work with a program every day are in a much better position to 
observe feedback and perceive what is not working than are elected officials far
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removed from the scene. Information generated in the process of implementing 
programs constantly pushes policy in new directions, and administrators rather 
than top officials are the primary' implementers. monitors and interpreters of the 
trials, errors and error corrections. (1993. p. 63)
Politicians, special interests and administrators form what Sabatier (1988) has called the 
“iron  Triangle" of public policy, which operates on competing perspectives. Special 
interests promote their parochial views. The role of bureaucracy is to take the long-term 
view of problems, yet it also protects its own turf and interests (Wilson. 1989: Yates.
1982). Politicians are responsive to the current situations by legislating policy and (at 
times) by micromanaging implementation. As such, they are often at odds:
Understandably [government bureaucrats] see themselves as experts in their 
fields, yet many of the constraints on them are the work o f  people they regard as 
uninformed amateurs [legislators and other politicians]. . . .  If people outside 
government think they are the victims of irrelevant obligations and prohibitions, 
they should see what those inside have to put up w ith.. . . (Kaufman. 1977. p. 26) 
The conflicting perspectives of different agencies involved in a single issue as well as 
civic input further complicate the situation of public bureaucracies, though this is critical 
to the democratic process:
Although one can easily make sport of the public sector as “chaotic" and 
“disorganized." those features can contribute to government's openness and 
effectiveness in the broadest sense of increasing the popular support for a regime. 
(Golembiewski. 1985. p. 17)
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The pulling and hauling of the conflict is intended to bring balanced perspective to issues. 
As a result, public administrators work in a daily atmosphere of competition and conflict 
where citizens have ready access to their organizations. In contrast, many military 
officers who are not stationed “within the beltway" in Washington DC are distanced from 
congressional pressure and defense industry lobbying.
Public Budgeting and Decision-Making: Rationalism or Politics?
Charles Lindblom (1959) took Simon and Waldo's critique of rationalism further. 
He recognized that government decisions are based on limited information and on 
political will -  what he called “the science o f muddling through.” Thus, administrators 
are operating in an arena of responding to short-term political conditions with 
incremental decisions. Programmatic direction is adjusted on an ongoing basis, both to 
gauge outcomes and public political reactions.
Inspired by Lindblom. Aaron Wildavsky (1974) debated the rationalist approach 
by incorporating incrementalism to perceptions of public sector budgeting. Wildavsky 
argued that budgets are political not rational documents. Budgets essentially reflect 
incremental changes based on what is amenable to change and what will stir a minimum 
of attention and controversy. Because individuals are cognitively limited, stated 
Wildavsky. incrementalism serves the public good.
Wildavsky's view is bom out in the actions of government. In reality, public 
agencies and programs, once established, take on a life o f their own and are difficult to 
disband, regardless o f their contemporary usefulness (Kaufman. 1976). As Wildavsky 
found, public managers have identified successful ways of avoiding cuts, enhancing 
programs and increasing funding in a budgeting process that he observed is more game
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than rationality. In practice, the plethora o f agencies makes it difficult to coordinate and 
integrate programmatic efforts, and operating in an environment of limited resources 
helps create interagency conflict (Wise. 1994).
This is an area where public agencies and the military culture are very similar.
The military shares this incremental approach to budgeting, and there are military 
weapons and programs funded past the time of their strategic usefulness. The military is 
also bound by the limitations of knowing and analyzing all the factors critical to decision­
making. Further, the different branches of the service are at times competing for the 
same budget allocations, and replicate programs unnecessarily.
Differences Between Government and Military Organizational Cultures
The military has a strong organizational culture that pre-dates the creation of the 
United States government. The centrality o f hierarchy/chain of command is a mainstay 
in this culture where orders are generally obeyed. Administrative agencies have multiple 
authorities with overlapping jurisdictions. The "iron triangle” o f the legislature, 
government agencies and interest groups ensures that there is no certainty o f which will 
prevail. Every decision, every' policy is political and the process is public. Directives are 
obeyed because of the power currently possessed by their initiator. Directives may not be 
adhered to because of the discretionary power o f agencies and the independence of staff.
The mission in the military has traditionally been clear -  to protect and defend the 
nation and its interests. The goals of specific operations are generally related to this 
overarching mission. This clarity has diminished in recent years with the undertaking of 
more humanitarian missions and limited engagements such as Somalia and Bosnia. Yet.
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agencies, where missions are quite broad and often change with the election o f  new 
legislators and the shifting of power among interest groups. Public sector goals are not 
clear to staff when the enabling legislation is vague, when the goals change with political 
fortunes or when conflicting values further muddy the true goals o f a program and even 
communicate to staff that there are no true goals to a program. While military officers 
have generally experienced the completion o f missions and perhaps some level of 
victory, public programs are ongoing and results are difficult to measure. The public 
arena prevents the effective implementation of controversial programs, and public 
administrators must settle for "satisficing” (Simon. 1947).
Military personnel can recite the values of duty, honor and country. These values 
are instilled in basic training and reinforced throughout a military career. Other public 
agencies must juggle the shifting values of efficiency, effectiveness, the public good, 
ethical government, social equity and responsiveness. Traditionally, the public sector 
uses a legalistic, compliance approach to ensuring its employees adhere to policies, 
directives and ethical practices rather than infusing values in its staff.
Many military personnel were attracted to join and remain in the service because 
of a sense o f patriotic duty and because of the culture and values of the organization. 
There is a strong organizational identification, loyalty and sense o f camaraderie within 
one's unit and with other members of the service branch. There are varied attractions to 
public sector employment: a sense of public service, job security and stability and good 
benefits. There is generally a stronger identification with one's profession rather than the 
organization. Military discipline is far stricter than the civil service system.
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Ferdinand Tonnies identified two types of organizations: gemeinschafr where 
tradition and strong organizational identity build a strong, cohesive organization and 
gesellschafi. where the organization exists to cany out a specific function. While the 
modem military is transitioning to more o f a gesellschafi organization, it remains largely 
true to its traditions. Despite some changes in the military, there remain key differences 
between the organizational cultures of government agencies and the military.
While government shares bureaucratic structures and the notion o f public service 
with the military, the informal cultures of the two sectors are quite distinct. Government 
operates in an open, visible arena with extensive citizen and legislative involvement. Its 
informal culture is that of a more rational, occupational bureaucracy {gesellschafi).
These differences may affect the transition of military officers into the public sector.
Transition to the Public Sector
Career changes represent a significant adult transition, especially when there is a 
"role shift," which sociologist Naomi Golan (1981) defined as "relinquishing one set of 
social rules and taking on another" (p. 19). When individuals are challenged by a 
transition, they may experience difficulty in separating from the past, in making and 
carrying out decisions and in weathering adjustments.
The issue o f “fit" — integrating the individual and the organization -  is a key issue 
in organizational effectiveness (Argyris. 1964). The concept of "fit" addresses whether 
or not the job can supply sufficient motivators to satisfy the employee's needs and 
whether the employee has the abilities to adapt to the job requirements (French. Caplan & 
Van Harrison, 1982). A lack o f fit between the person and the work environment is an
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important predictor of strain in the individual (French. 1973: French. Rogers & Cobb. 
1974; French. Caplan & Van Harrison. 1982).
Organizations are a system o f roles that are communicated and clarified via 
approval, disapproval, rewards and sanctions (Katz & Kahn, 1978). The process of 
socialization to a new organization is learning the “norms, values and role behaviors” 
expected o f organization members in certain positions (Klauser & Groves. 1994. p. 191). 
Role ambiguity occurs when the individual is uncertain as to what is expected in the 
organization (Burke, 1982). In retiring from the military, retirees are leaving familiar roles 
that they have accepted since entering the service. Many retired military officers settle into 
jobs very similar technically to those in the military. However, entering the civilian 
workforce may present significant role ambiguity as the retiree is unfamiliar with the new 
organization's culture, or even its basic ground rules (Jacobsen. 1990). If the ambiguity is 
unresolved, an individual can experience stress over his/her role in the organization and 
become resistant to change, especially in periods of uncertainty (Kahn, et al. 1964).
The success of individuals in transitioning into a new organization depends on 
their tolerance for ambiguity and their high need for affiliation, which causes them to 
seek out those contacts that can teach them the informal culture of an organization 
(Klauser & Groves. 1994). For a successful transition to occur, “the will to change has to 
overcome an impulse to restore the past, to resist the change" (Golan. 1981, p. 16), but a 
frequent consequence of role stress is an attempt to return to the past. Research has 
shown that an individual in role stress during change and transition will more often revert 
back to earlier behaviors and attempt to preserve the past (Kahn, et al. 1964; Marris,
1974). Further, Glass (1977) found that among Type A personalities -  which describes
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many military officers — there was a stronger need to control their environment as a 
response to role ambiguity.
The transition from military to the public sector environment is potentially a 
stressful one. Retirees are leaving behind a unique cultural environment they have 
experienced for over twenty years and entering a significantly different culture. Those 
having difficulty’ in making this transition might respond by trying to recreate military’ 
structures and practices in their new work environment- Leadership can alter the culture 
in an organization through modeling, rewards or sanctions (Bass. 1985; Kouzes and 
Posner, 1987; Schein, 1992).
A gap between the individual's expectations and the realities of the organization 
can also affect job satisfaction (Kahn, et al, 1964). Many retiring officers experience an 
initial loss of salary and level of responsibility in their civilian career transition. The 
transition preparation they receive from the military and their orientation upon entering 
the public sector may play a crucial role in their successful adaptation and career 
satisfaction. Unfortunately, the curriculum of military's Transition Assistance Program 
(U. S. Departmcr.; of Lab c 1998: Veterans' Employment and Training Service. 1995) 
focuses primarily on career development areas such as skill assessment, resume writing, 
interviewing and job search skills. The program does not adequately address the issues 
of assessing and adapting to new organizational cultures. In a study of 122 retired naval 
officers done by Webb (1990). retirees criticized the military's transition program for 
failing to address the differences in organizational expectations of the military versus and 
civilian sectors.
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No study was found addressing the differences between military and public sector 
organizational cultures. The majority o f the books and articles written about retired 
military entering civilian employment address the strengths such individuals bring to the 
workforce, but fail to address the very real issue of transition and adaptation (Bowers. 
1996; Carrison & Walsh. 1999; Jacobsen. 1990; Savino & Krannich. 1995; TROA. 1996: 
Whelan. 1981). This research project did not discover any transition assistance or 
executive coaching provided by public sector entities in the San Diego area to new 
employees transitioning from the military. One may conclude that retired officers have 
had to rely on their own wits or the support o f associates and mentors to analyze and 
adjust to a new leadership role in a new organizational culture.
Significantly, this major career transition is occurring at mid-life. There are some 
researchers who maintain that personality dynamics are fairly constant through adulthood 
(Costa & McCrae. 1989). Others (Erickson, 1982; Gould. 1980; Levinson. Darrow.
Klein. Levinson. & McKee. 1978; Peck. 1968) have found mid-life to be a potential time 
for personal reassessment and sometimes crisis. If a mid-life transition is already 
occurring, a career transition can produce additional stress and complications (Levinson, 
et al. 1978). As the public sector is currently in a state of flux and disruption, this could 
increase the strain on transitioning officers.
Reforming, Reinventing and Reducing the Public Sector
Government has never been under greater pressure to innovate. Call it 
reinventing, reengineering, paradigm shifting, or plain old change, the bottom
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line remains the same: government must produce more with less and satisfy the 
customer while doing it. (Light. 1994. p. 63)
The public sector has recently been under intense criticism to reform. There are system- 
wide efforts to make government more business-like by focusing on customer service, 
empowering employees, reengineering processes, introducing market factors such as 
incentive pay. bonuses and competition, and dismantling public bureaucratic systems 
such as civil service, competitive procurement and program budgeting (Goldsmith. 1997 
Kettl. 1993: 1994; Osbourne & Plastrik. 1997).
The tax reform movement, e.g.. Proposition 13 in California, and the election of 
"outsiders’* such as Presidents Carter and Reagan were the early signals of a broadening 
dissatisfaction with government (Ban, 1995; Eggers & O ’Leary. 1995). According to 
Kettl (1994). the perceived failure of the social programs o f the 1960s and the well- 
publicized scientific failures (e.g., Three Mile Island, the Challenger disaster) contributed 
to a decline in faith in experts and technology to solve problems:
The problem was not just a failure of government, although problems in some 
areas were manifest. Rather, the public was less confident that any strong power, 
public or private, could understand or cope with the huge uncertainties 
surrounding public problems, (pp. 28-29)
Growing public dissatisfaction with government’s ability to solve problems became a 
mandate for change. Osbourne and Gabler's Reinventing Government (1991) became a 
best seller and spawned a movement. Osbourne and Plastrik (1997) defined reinventing 
government as:
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the fundamental transformation of public systems and organizations to create 
dramatic increases in their effectiveness, efficiency, adaptability and capacity to 
innovate. This transformation is accomplished by changing their purpose, 
incentives, accountability, power structure and culture" (pp. 13-14).
Osbourne and Plastrik outlined five key strategies for government reinvention which 
have been embraced at the federal level by Vice President Gore's National Performance 
Review (1993) as well as by state and local reform efforts.
The "core strategy” is similar to Peters and Waterman's (1982) formula to "stick 
to the knitting” by focusing on core competencies. In a throwback to Woodrow Wilson, 
it argues for a separation of legislative policymaking from bureaucratic policy 
implementation. The "consequences strategy” embraces managed competition for 
agencies to force efficiencies and performance incentives for employees such as bonuses, 
merit pay and gainsharing. The "customer strategy” introduces accountability by 
allowing public customers a choice, and implements customer quality-assurance practices 
from the private sector. The "control strategy" focuses on lifting internal systemic 
barriers particularly in recruitment, appointments, retention, discipline, promotions, 
procurement and budget. The "culture strategy" is an organizational development 
approach to changing government culture from a hierarchical monopoly into flexible, 
responsive, efficient organizations.
The key changes proposed focus on instituting business practices, forms of 
privatization, a customer service orientation, broader citizen involvement and input, and a 
new public personnel system.
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Running Government More Like a Business
Part of the drive to run government more like a business is frustration over the 
ineffectiveness of some social programs. Part o f it is a classical capitalism belief in 
competition as the key to efficient organizations:
The absence o f competition has a devastating effect on efficiency. With some 
heroic exceptions, government has performed as one would expect a monopoly to 
perform: with little innovation, little regard for customer welfare, and escalating 
costs . . . .  We know the productive power of competitive markets. The challenge 
is to extend markets throughout government. (Eggers & O'Leary. 1995. p. 97) 
There are some benefits to introducing the private sector model into government. 
Managed competition has created rewards for innovation and risk taking and some 
competitive efforts have profoundly streamlined public operations and saved substantial 
tax dollars (Goldsmith, 1997: Osbourne & Plastrik. 1997). As risk taking is not generally 
rewarded in the public arena (Golembiewski. 1985). competition can force dramatic 
reengineering.
While it is difficult to measure the outcomes o f social programs, government can 
often benefit by adapting private sector evaluation systems. Traditionally, government 
has measured what is easy to measure (Wholey. 1983). Government budgets also focus 
on inputs and expenditures rather than results. Identifying and using true efficiency 
measurements would improve management and performance in government 
organizations (Brudney and Morgan. 1988).
What Eggers and O'Leary fail to take into account are the differences in the roles 
of government and business. According to Riddle (1988 ) and Dilulio and associates
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(1993). government is not subject to market pressure but political pressure. Supply and 
demand do not work in an environment where demand for sendees far exceeds what 
citizens are willing to pay in taxes.
Business practices, moreover, do not provide all the necessary solutions. One 
practice that has improved some government programs is taking a multi-agency, multi­
discipline approach to the complex problems of society (Kettl, 1994). The success of 
such an approach often depends on non-competitive, collaborative practices across 
agencies and merging funding streams. A prime example of such initiatives are family- 
focused programs involving social service, schools, police, mental health, probation, 
employment and public health agencies.
Privatization and Public/Private Partnerships
Privatization in government can take many forms. It may involve: transferring 
assets to the private sector (e.g., airports and landfills): ending a government monopoly in 
providing a service (e.g.. private jails and fire departments): complete outsourcing: and 
introducing a public and private competitive bidding process (or "managed competition") 
where government employees bid against private companies to win a contract and retain 
their jobs (Wise. 1994).
The argument for privatization is that private competition creates pressure to seek 
efficiencies. Competition between government and private providers (e.g.. school 
vouchers) can create incentives for quality service and shrink costs (Goldsmith. 1997: 
Osbourne. & Plastrik, 1997). Those arguing for outright privatization do not see the issue 
as reinventing government, but as cutting government (Eggers & O'Leary, 1995: 
President's Commission on Privatization. 1988).
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The real problem is really threefold. First, government is too big. Second, 
government is too centralized. Third, government management is embedded in 
politics, and is therefore inherently limited in efficiency. (Eggers & O 'Lean-.
1995, p. 150)
The small government movement is mired in both sincere efforts to improve government 
and political trends with their roots in Mill. Locke and Jefferson. Public sector leadership 
is caught in the middle.
In truth, the United States has contracted for services since the Revolutionary 
War. The Progressive reformers challenged favoritism in the granting of contracts in the 
1880s that led to the system of competitive procurement, precise contract specifications 
and sealed bids. Proponents see advantages to private contracting for public services: 
freedom from regulations imposed on public organizations, the ability to specify and 
control services, freedom to implement performance incentives and ability to dismiss 
low-performing contract employees (Goldsmith. 1997). The call to increase the 
contracting out of public services is being criticized by those also examining the 
problems in government contracting (Dilulio. et al. 1993: Kettl. 1993).
There are some challenges in government contracting due to the differences 
between the public and private sectors. As previously noted, government does not 
operate in a market situation. Supply and demand are not effective as public “market" 
forces. There is a limitless demand on government services. Secondly, government often 
requires unique services. On the local level, there is often a lack of qualified bidders. 
Thus, once a relationship is established, government agencies seek to retain a specific 
vendor even at the expense of the "arms length" relationship historically established to
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guard against favoritism. Third, the requirements of competitive bidding means there is 
no guarantee that performance will lead to a renewed contract. This creates incentives 
for government contractors to maximize profits in the short term by cutting comers and 
by under-performing (Kettl. 1993). Finally, government also provides services that are 
often difficult to measure (Wilson. 1989). It therefore often focuses on measuring the 
input side o f its contracts, such as number of staff hours provided or clients seen, rather 
than quality o f the outputs and results achieved (Kettl, 1993).
Aside from market imperfections, there are strategic concerns in contracting that 
public sector leaders must consider. There is a danger that contracting can result in a loss 
of expertise within government. Government agencies can lose their capacity to manage, 
oversee and evaluate their contractors (Kettl, 1994). Secondly, widespread contracting 
can result in what Kettl called, "government by proxy." where the contractor is -  without 
true accountability -  responsible for representing the public interest and for responding to 
stakeholders. Government becomes distanced from those it is to serve (Dilulio. et al. 
1993; Kettl, 1993).
Changing to a Customer Service Orientation
Citizens are dissatisfied with a "monopoly" attitude by public agencies. As the 
sole provider of some services, government agencies have historically focused on the 
inputs o f their programs -  the amount of resources expended -  rather than the satisfaction 
of their customers. In fact, the word "customer" was seldom utilized in government just 
ten years ago. Now government agencies are re-defining their service in terms of 
satisfaction, examining not just what is delivered, but how. Agencies are seeking 
feedback, utilizing surveys and other new measurements (Osbourne and Plastrik. 1997).
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The customer service paradigm has produced some landmark changes in agencies such as 
courthouses and motor vehicle departments that formerly designed operations for their 
internal convenience, but the customer focus is not an easy fit for all of government.
Part of the challenge in transforming to a customer-driven operation is that 
government has multiple customers with conflicting agenda. The direct service recipients 
seek responsiveness: partners in service provision (other agencies, private social service 
agencies) seek effectiveness: those doing program oversight (legislative staff and elected 
officials) seek accountability and taxpayers seek efficiency (the best use of their money) 
and responsiveness. It is unclear how public agencies are to balance the different 
measurements as well as the different customer goals (Dilulio. et al. 1993). In a 
"saticficing’" environment, no customer is truly satisfied.
Additionally, some government agencies have a difficult time translating their 
roles in enforcement or technical areas into the new language of public service providers. 
For example, is the prisoner the ''customer” of a jail guard? Some in the public sector 
have criticized the customer orientation for promoting individual benefit (what is good 
for the individual) rather than partnership and public/private collective effort (what is in 
the interest o f society) (Barrett & Greene. 1998).
Broadening Citizen Involvement
In the public sector, according to Golembiewski (1985). success is measured in 
political terms. A goal in citizen involvement is the "doctrine of equality" (Yates. 1982) 
which is expanding the number and breadth of the stakeholders at the table. Citizen 
access to public agencies has been broadened through citizen oversight committees, 
public hearings and regulations that expand access to information such as open meeting
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laws (Anderson. Newland & Stillman. 1983). Broader public input can improve the 
identification o f problems and options and improve decision-making (Bryson & Crosby. 
1992; Chrislip & Larson. 1994; Elmore. 1982). Unfortunately, the professional “guild” 
mentality o f some technical experts can lead to discounting citizen and legislative input 
(Golembiewski. 1985; Yates. 1982).
The result o f  expanded citizen access is that more stakeholders bring more issues 
to the table. Input from the external environment expands the organization's boundaries. 
The agency response is to broaden its mission, and expand its programs, rules and 
processes (Yates. 1982). The organization may also be compelled by political decisions 
to take on non-core tasks which dilute talent and resources (Wilson. 1989). These 
broadened organizational boundaries add complexity to leadership tasks such as decision­
making.
The Changing Relationship of Government and its Employees
To be a successful, modem bureaucracy, government organizations must shift 
from being compliance organizations that rely on rules and policies to direct and control 
its employees, to becoming organizations that promote independent decision-making 
based on shared values and ethics (Wilson. 1989). Key to this is the human resources 
system.
The tradition of government employment is stability and job security. Since the 
reforms of the Progressive Era. there has been a "covenant" relationship of sorts between 
government and its employees. In exchange for long service and compliance with rules, 
government employees worked within a system where: the classification system defined 
their job and promotion ladder; the step advancement system rewarded their longevity of
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service: the hierarchy defined their responsibility: and the civil service system protected 
them from capricious employment actions by political leaders and appointees. The 
public personnel system is cited by many as a key problem in transforming government 
organizations:
The civil service system is the crux of government's most enduring performance 
problems. There is a need to reduce or. where possible, eliminate personnel rules 
and work regulations that sap public employees' productivity, making careers in 
public service unattractive to talented, energetic potential candidates. (Dilulio. et 
al, 1993, p. 64)
The scientific management belief in specialization of jobs and the progressive belief in 
standardization o f personnel procedures to remove discretion and favoritism may have 
worked a century ago when the goals of government were simpler. Public personnel 
management has been broken for decades.
Now there is a movement to rebuild the human resources system with a mix of 
proposals: broadbanding, which collapses multiple job classifications into a single broad 
job description with a wide band o f pay; performance-based pay systems: incentive 
systems such as merit pay and gainsharing: decentralization of human resources systems: 
and flatter organizations with authority given to work teams. Some radical initiatives 
have eliminated civil service rights entirely (Walters, 1997).
The potential o f managed competition, outsourcing and layoffs has broken the 
covenant o f job security, affecting employee morale. The government is now the only 
sector in the nation with rising unionization. So. while many government agencies are
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changing, there often remains a need to rebuild employee trust to create an atmosphere 
that will support, not fight, organizational change (Ban. 1995).
Public personnel reforms also need to consider the broader goals o f governments. 
Contractors often save money by paying less in wages and benefits and by relying on part 
time contract or temporary workers (Goldsmith. 1997). As government has a larger 
interest in the viability of the local economy and the creation and retention of living wage 
jobs, hiring low-wage contractors can conflict with the larger interests o f government 
entities (Marcelli & Joassart. 1998).
The proposals to change government carry both promise and problems. Some of 
the complaints about the public sector are endemic to large organizations, others are 
unique to democratic government:
All complex organizations display bureaucratic problems of confusion, red tape, 
and the avoidance o f responsibility. Those problems are much greater in 
government bureaucracies because government itself is the institutionalization of 
confusion (arising out of the need to moderate competing demands): of red tape 
(arising out of the need to satisfy demands that cannot be moderated): and of 
avoided responsibility (arising out of the desire to retain power by minimizing 
criticism). . . .  Many, if not most, of the difficulties we experience in dealing with 
government agencies arise from the agencies being part of a fragmented and open 
political system. (Wilson. 1989. pp. 375-376)
Given the realities of public administration in a participatory democracy, organizational 
change can be challenging.
R e p ro d u c e d  with perm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r th e r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
66
The Difficulty of Organizational Change in the Public Sector
According to Golembiewski (1985), there are factors about the structure and 
habits of the public sector that make organizational change difficult to facilitate. 
Structurally, there are multiple authorities (the “Iron Triangle") and multiple avenues o f 
influence. There is continual interplay and shifts in power among the legislature, 
executive branch, agencies, courts, media and special interests. The chain of command 
also has competing identities and interests — labor/management, career service/political 
appointees, technician/manager, etc. The election-term focus of many politicians steers 
efforts toward quick results, creates rewards for risk-averse behavior, and alters program 
goals with electoral change (Golembiewski, 1985). These factors diminish the chances 
of agreeing upon a decisive plan for change.
The practices of government also limit the success of change efforts. The 
multiple layers of review and approval inhibit delegation and the development of 
innovative practices. The need for standardization and legal compliance steers public 
organizations to cling to past practices. The need for security and secrecy restricts open 
communication within the organization. Finally, public leaders have fewer resources, 
less control over management o f their staff and less rewards for innovation 
(Golembiewski. 1985). These factors make it easier to maintain existing structures and 
practices than to perform the difficult work of transformational change.
Leadership
Public sector organizations are clearly in a time of transition, uncertainty and 
organizational change. The very nature of government and what it ought to do (its
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mission and core functions) is under public debate. With increased privatization, 
growing citizen involvement and the changing employment relationship within the civil 
service system, government is fundamentally changing. It is necessary for government to 
go from a culture o f compliance to a culture of performance. There are disagreements as 
to whether leadership can change organizational culture. Perhaps leadership alone cannot 
do it. but I would argue that leadership has a central role in the success of such an effort.
The risk of turning to leadership is that there is no universally accepted definition 
of leadership (Bums. 1979; Rost. 1993). Rost outlined the historical trends of the 
twentieth century views of leadership. The great man theory espouses that leaders are 
great men who shape history through their actions and intentions -  espoused as early as 
Plato’s notion of the philosopher-king (1956). Leadership involves knowing the proper 
path, and obtaining the control and authority needed to ensure followers do the wishes of 
the leader (Bennis and Nanus. 1985). Charismatic views o f leadership (Conger and 
Kanungo. 1989) and servant leadership (Greenleaf. 1977) are offshoots of the great man 
theory. These are leader-centered views, wherein the leaders shape the vision, values, 
goals and direction of the change. In a similar vein, trait theory (Bass. 1985; Stogill.
1974) focused on identifying the common traits that good leaders shared. This was 
prominent in the 1950s and 1960s. and reemerged in the 1980s.
Group theory focuses on leadership as a facilitative process particularly involving 
divergent views. It promotes broad input within groups in contrast to the control aspects 
o f the great man theory . In the 1940s, it addressed small groups; contemporary group 
theory encompasses the importance of forging consensus among stakeholders (Bryson & 
Crosby, 1992; Chrislip & Larson, 1994).
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Behavioral leadership examines what behaviors in combination constitute 
leadership. Many o f these theorists shared a normative approach that established a "one 
right way’* that constituted good leadership such as McGregor's Theory X and Y (1960) 
and Blake and Mouton's managerial grid (1964). But this normative approach did not 
retain its dominance in leadership theory. The experience o f the sixties demonstrated that 
there was a wider variety o f human and group behavior. The contingency/ situational 
theory o f leadership held that the leader had to change styles, depending on the 
circumstances (Fiedler. 1967: Hershey and Blanchard. 1988).
The 1980s was a confusing period as many basic societal assumptions were 
challenged including national superiority. Having failed to win a war and been held 
hostage literally and economically in the Middle East, the county sought new directions 
for leadership. A profusion of literature on leadership was produced, much of it having 
little to do with actual leadership. Leadership was organizational "excellence" (Peters 
and Waterman. 1982); it was -  drawing from the work of Weber (1947) — charismatic 
(Conger. 1991: Conger & Kanungo. 1989): it was doing management well (Bennis.
1989). The field returned to trait theories (Kouzes and Posner. 1987) and tried to 
identify the great man or woman who could lead.
This begs the question, if there is no single vision of leadership, what vision most 
closely fits with the needs of the public sector? James McGregor Bums (1979) produced 
one of the seminal scholarly works on leadership and set the stage for others to follow.
He took a multidisciplinary approach utilizing psychology, history and political science 
to examine leadership. Bums defined leadership as "the reciprocal process of mobilizing, 
by persons with certain motives and values, various economic, political, and other
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resources, in a context of competition and conflict, in order to realize goals independently 
or mutually held by both leaders and followers" (p. 423). Bums distinguished between 
two types o f  leadership: transactional and transformational. Transactional leadership is a 
reciprocal process that includes bargaining or exchanging one thing for another. Leaders 
and followers are involved in a limited relationship centered on exchanging support, 
goods, money, etc. The relationship ends when the transaction is over. This definition 
recognizes that there are situations in an organization when members must work toward a 
goal assigned by another layer o f an organization and there may be varying levels o f 
personal commitment to that goal. Bums saw this as the typical leadership in 
bureaucracies. Transformational leadership involves influencing change by addressing 
the wants, needs and motivations of the followers and well as the leader in an effort to 
achieve a common purpose. Such leadership occurs within a condition of conflict and 
change. What makes transformational leadership unique, however, is that it elevates both 
the leaders and followers. The public sector is in the midst o f  profound change and 
requires transformational leadership.
As Heifetz (1994) wrote, the most difficult challenge to leadership is posed by 
situations requiring “adaptive change" when there is no clear “technical fix" (p. 75). In 
such situations the “authority must look beyond authoritative solutions" and inform and 
mobilize others toward a solution rather than directing change (p. 87). According to 
Heifetz, one o f the key tasks of leadership is to pace the change to keep the stakeholders 
from being overwhelmed and disheartened as well as to provide a “holding environment" 
when necessary to provide a buffer.
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Examples where this has not occurred are within the County of San Diego and the 
San Diego Unified School District where short-term, outside executives entered the 
organization, unilaterally mandated change and triggered incredible staff resistance. In 
the case o f the County, the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) formed “tiger teams" that 
excluded affected departments and stakeholders, sidestepped citizen input and ignored 
state legal requirements for union involvement. While the CAO improved the County's 
bond rating, he also triggered lawsuits, and instituted a flurry of simultaneous 
reengineeerings. process automations, downsizings, outsourcings and managed 
competitions. The CAO found a more lucrative position in the private sector within two- 
and-a-half years, leaving behind an organization tom with labor unrest and low morale.
The San Diego Unified School District hired a superintendent with no experience 
in education. He excluded District staff from the improvement process, hiring outside 
consultants to draft a reform program. His failure to involve teachers and administrative 
staff led to a wave of resistance by the very staff tasked with implementation his changes.
The public sector faces change that is directedfrom the political realm and 
special interest groups and requires leadership that will honestly inform employees o f  
what is coming, involve them in the process and expend influence to guide and pace 
change at a survivable rale.
Bass (1985). Rost (1993) and Yukl (1989) saw leadership as an influence 
relationship among leaders and followers. Change in the public sector cannot be 
successfully imposed from the outside or from the “top down." Successful leadership in 
the public sector must involve influence rather than coercion.
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To change the organizational culture requires leadership to cultivate a shared 
vision (Selznick. 1957; Senge, 1990) and to clarify and articulate the organization's 
values. Values are the guideposts for large-scale change as well as daily decision­
making. Leadership can affect organizational culture by what it articulates, pays 
attention to. rewards, punishes and models (Bass. 1985: Kouzes and Posner. 1987: 
Schein. 1992: Tichy and Devanna. 1986). With a history o f competing values and a 
political arena continually shifting directions, the public sector needs leadership that 
defines, articidates and lives the mission and values o f  the organization.
Affecting change in a shared-power arena requires collaboration (Bryson & 
Crosby. 1992; Chrislip & Larson. 1994). Government agencies must seek and be 
responsive to the views of elected officials, a host of interest groups and to its own staff. 
Involving a broad, non-traditional. heterogeneous group of stakeholders can better define 
problems, identify more options and improve the decision-making (Etzioni. 1986:
Kan ter. 1983: Morrison. 1992). Successful public sector change needs collaborative 
leadership and a belief in the value o f  diversity.
While there is no universally-accepted definition of public sector leadership or 
leadership in general, the nature of what is needed to successfully steer public 
organizations through the coming turbulent period is more evident. The public sector is a 
unique entity, composed both of its formal structure and its organizational culture. Some 
structural and cultural aspects are shared with the military and some are unique. For 
military officers currently transitioning into leadership positions in the public sector, the 
key question is which of the military leadership practices and beliefs they carry with them 
will be effective at this critical time o f systemic change as well as personal change.
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Summary
This review of the literature revealed that both the military and public 
bureaucracies in this country have a shared history. Since its origins, the nation has 
feared a military and a government that were too large or too powerful. The size, 
authority and public perception of the military and of public agencies have risen and 
fallen somewhat in tandem. In addition, both sectors shared parallel reform efforts in the 
areas of personnel, budgeting, purchasing and procurement. There are some differences 
in their formal cultures: the military' has a strict chain of command and hierarchy while 
public agencies have overlapping jurisdictions and discretion in carrying out assignments.
The differences lie primarily in the informal culture of these two organizations. 
Informal military organizational culture encompasses strong traditions and the core 
values o f loyalty, cohesion and camaraderie -  a gemeinschaft culture -  with some 
differences between the Navy and Marine cultures. Public agencies generally operate as 
rational bureaucracies -  a gesellschaft culture. The key differences identified between 
the organizations are in the areas of: clarity of values, mission and goals: inter-agency 
rivalry', fragmentation and competing missions: public service as a motivator: and the 
predominance and influence of special interests, citizens and elected officials.
The differences between these two organizational cultures may cause difficulties 
for military officers transitioning to leadership roles in the public sector. The challenge 
of this transition is compounded by the fact that it is occurring in midlife, that the 
transition assistance provided by the military does not prepare officers for these issues 
and that significant change is occurring in the public sector.
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The central reforms sought in public organizations are to adopt business practices, 
to privatize some functions and services, to adopt a customer-service orientation, to 
expand citizen involvement and reform the civil service system. The type o f leadership 
needed in the public sector today is transformational leadership that involves and informs 
staff, paces its rate of change, defines and is driven by values and seeks a collaborative 
approach to organizational change involving diverse stakeholders.
The literature review revealed that there has been little examination of the 
differences between the cultures of military and government bureaucracies, and that there 
is a lack of knowledge about how the lessons o f military leadership (its strategies and 
behaviors) translate to the public sector. The next chapter will address the methodology 
used to study these issues and the actions taken to construct a theory' of this phenomenon.
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CHAPTER THREE 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
Overview
The purpose of this research is to investigate the key military leadership strategies 
and practices learned by retired officers and determine their transferability to leadership 
situations in local government. The first chapter provided an overview of the 
dissertation, along with background information on the key terms, limitations and 
assumptions of the study. The second chapter reviewed the core literature related to the 
organizational cultures of the military and public bureaucracies, the nature of major life 
transitions and a discussion of leadership and its role in guiding public organizations 
through the current climate of significant organizational change. This chapter describes 
the research methodology of this study -  the history of the project, the rationale for 
selecting a grounded theory approach and the research process of interviews, data 
analysis and triangulation.
Overview of Methodology
This research project utilized a grounded theory approach to investigate the 
leadership strategies and practices learned in the military and how well these lessons 
translated to the public sector. The data were collected by interviewing recently-retired 
Navy and Marine Corps officers (at paygrade 0-4  and above) who worked in mid­
R e p ro d u c e d  with perm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r th e r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
75
management to executive positions in the public sector. Some o f the methodology of the 
study was selected as a result o f a pilot study done in the spring o f 1998. The goal of the 
study was to interview between ten and fifteen subjects. Subjects were located by- 
contacting the human resources sections of twelve cities, the county, seventeen water 
districts and the Port Authority. At larger entities such as the County and the City of San 
Diego, the human resources sections of the specific departments were contacted 
separately. The researcher also ran a notice in the local publication o f the Retired 
Officers Association (TROA). Participant interviews were centered on. but not limited 
to. a standard list of questions. These core questions were based on the results o f a pilot 
study done in 1998. Interviews generally lasted between ninety minutes and three hours. 
Interview transcripts were coded and analyzed for patterns and trends. The data were 
utilized to create a grounded theory that was triangulated with qualitative and quantitative 
literature on military leadership and government organizations.
Pilot Study
In the spring of 1998, the researcher did a pilot study that involved interviewing 
four retired military officers who worked in local San Diego government: two who 
retired from military service within the past two years and two who had retired and 
subsequently worked in the public sector for more than five years. The primary goals of 
the pilot study were to identify the leadership strategies and practices learned in the 
military and to investigate whether the retired officers perceived that these lessons were 
transferable to their positions as local government leaders. Secondarily, the pilot was a 
test of methodology: to determine whether a qualitative approach would yield adequate
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data, to determine what populations were appropriate sources of data and to uncover 
appropriate core interview questions.
The participant interviews revealed some beginning elements of a grounded 
theory on military leadership and its applicability to local government organizations. In 
particular, the data uncovered some areas o f difference between the cultures of the 
military and government sectors that required adjustment on the part of retiring military 
officers entering the public sector. The participants identified differences between the 
context o f the sectors and the conditions in which the two sectors operate -- what Straus 
and Corbin (1990) called intervening conditions (pp. 101-104). These contexts and 
conditions require different strategies on the part of those in leadership positions in the 
military and the public sector.
Specifically, key differences between military and public sector cultures were 
identified in the areas of: clarity of mission, amount of control and decision-making 
authority of positional leaders, the amount o f camaraderie and independence among staff, 
the nature of staff and organizational loyalty, the nature of authority within the 
organization, and the dominant communication style. This study explores the importance 
of these issues while remaining open to discovering additional factors.
The process of the pilot study itself affected the methodology of this project. The 
pilot study identified potential areas of difference that form the basis for this research.
The spring 1998 interviews suggested that recent retirees had a richer perspective on the 
applicability of military leadership concepts and behaviors to the public sector than did 
those who had been retired longer. Thus, the pilot has shaped the criteria for the selection 
of participants for this study. Finally, it also served to suggest questions that successfully
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both in the service and in the public sector. (See Appendix B.)
Reviewers of the pilot study commented that there are key differences in the 
experiences of officers in the different service branches. At their recommendation, the 
scope o f this study has been limited to the Navy and the Marine Corps as they are the 
most prominent service branches in the San Diego area. As the Marine Corps is a part of 
the Department o f the Navy, this researcher expected to find some similarity between the 
experiences of Marine and Naval officers.
This project was organized in several phases to adequately address the research 
questions. The first phase involved locating retired military officers in middle 
management and executive positions in local San Diego government. The second phase 
involved interviews with these retired military officers to identify their perceptions of key 
military leadership strategies and practices and how well these apply to leadership 
situations in local government. The third phase involved comparing these factors with 
other research done with military officers (e.g., Ulmer. 1997; Yukl & Van Fleet. 1982) 
for possible triangulation.
Research Methodology
Research Design. Phase 1 — Locating Participants
Locating retired military officers fitting the participant profile working in San 
Diego local government presented a challenge. The human resources (HR) directors of 
eleven cities, seventeen water districts and the Port Authority were contacted directly. 
They were sent a participant profile and asked if their entities had hired any mid- 
managers or executives within the last six years who were retired military. As these
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entities generally had less than 250 employees and less than 20 managers and executives, 
it was relatively simple for the HR directors to determine if anyone fit the profile. The 
directors then either provided the necessary contact information or contacted the potential 
participants themselves to gauge their interest in the project before supplying their names 
and work phone numbers.
At some of the larger entities (the City of San Diego and the County o f San 
Diego), the HR directors of departments where the skills and background required were a 
strong match for military background (e.g.. engineering, information technology, 
facilities management, human resources, security, financial management, planning, 
budgeting and purchasing) were contacted directly to determine if their staff contained 
potential participants.
The researcher placed a notice in the newsletter of the local chapter o f The 
Retired Officers Association (TROA) soliciting participants for the study. In addition. 
County Office of Veterans Services and the Veterans Center were also contacted to 
identify potential participants.
Research Design. Phase 2 -  Participant Interviews
While much of early leadership research involved quantitative methodology 
(summarized in Clark and Clark. 1990). the very nature of leadership may best be 
addressed by a qualitative approach (Conger. 1998: Parry. 1998). In this study, the 
research questions concerning the leadership strategies and practices learned in the 
military were researched using the grounded theory method first developed by Glaser and 
Strauss (1967). Data were gathered through interviews with individuals who fit the 
participant profile. Participants were asked some of the core questions (see Appendix B),
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though the format was not limited to these questions. The researcher probed for deeper 
meaning and explored tangential themes that arose during the interview process. 
Interviews generally lasted between ninety minutes and three hours. Interviews were 
tape recorded and transcribed in total. The data were analyzed through a multi-level 
coding process involving: open coding to initially labeled themes within an interview 
transcript: axial coding to uncover and define themes and categories: and then theoretical 
or selective coding to uncover the relationships and connections among the categories 
and to construct a theory grounded in the data. Military leadership strategies and 
practices and their applicability to the public sector emerged from the relationships 
revealed during data gathering and analysis.
There are numerous definitions of leadership. However, there are common 
themes that appear in much of leadership literature. Leadership scholars often describe 
leadership in terms of influence rather than coercion (Bass. 1985; Rost. 1993; Yukl. 
1989). Leadership is often seen as a transformational process (Bass. 1985; Bums. 1979; 
Rost. 1993) that occurs in an environment of change (Bass. 1985; Bennis and Nanus. 
1985: Rost. 1993). Thus, while there is no universal definition of leadership, it can be 
argued that leadership is seen as a social process that involves influence within a social 
system (Yukl. 1989).
A qualitative approach better addresses social phenomena than quantitative 
methodology (Geertz. 1983). and may be particularly suited to examine a phenomenon 
such as leadership (Conger. 1998; Parry. 1998). Grounded theory was explicitly 
designed to examine basic social processes (Glaser. 1978) such as the instilling of a 
culture. Much of qualitative research is based on the in-depth interview, or what Kahn
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and Cannell (1957) called “a conversation with a purpose" (p. 149). In the interview 
process, the researcher opens herself to the texts o f the participants which constitute a 
“thick description" (Geertz. 1983. p. 42) o f their life experiences.
A solid qualitative study requires that a methodology guides the data collection 
and analysis, and that the variables identified in the study and their interactions be deeply 
embedded in the data (Marshall & Rossman. 1989). The grounded theory approach, 
pioneered by Glaser and Strauss (1967). attempts to integrate the various categories and 
their properties uncovered in the research into a theory. This method seeks the 
connectedness o f ideas and thus lends itself to a systematic study of phenomena 
(Charmatz. 1983). The grounded theory approach uses qualitative research as a basis for 
generating theory.
In grounded theory, the data gathering and analysis occur simultaneously as an 
interactive process, described by Glaser (1978) as theoretical sampling:
Theoretical sampling is the process o f data collection for generating theory 
whereby the analyst jointly collects, codes and analyzes his data and decides what 
data to collect next and where to find them, in order to develop his theory as it 
emerges. This process of data collection is controlled by emerging theory, 
whether substantive or formal . .  . Through comparing the data as it (sic) is 
collected, the researcher creates more abstract levels of theoretical connections.
In short, theory is gradually built up inductively from the progressive stages o f 
analysis of the data. (pp. 38-39)
The researcher concurrently interprets data, sharpens his/her analysis and improves the 
data collection. Thus, the product and process of the research emerges from the data.
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rather than from theoretical frameworks. In this project, the pilot study sharpened the 
data collection process, shaped some of the interview questions and generated some 
initial categories for data analysis.
In grounded theory methodology, there is generally no preset number of 
participants or length to the study. Interviewing continues until saturation o f the data 
categories is reached. Theoretical saturation, according to Glaser, occurs “when in 
coding and analyzing, both new properties emerge, and the same properties continually 
emerge as one goes through the full extent of the data." (1978. p. 53). Saturation is 
achieved when new subjects provide repetitive information and little new data are 
revealed.
Data are verified through further observations and by reading beyond the confines 
of a single discipline, e.g., military sociology. Literature provides what Glaser and 
Strauss (1967) termed a “theoretical sensitivity" which engenders more insight in a 
researcher and develops a broader capacity to interpret the data. The goal of the research 
is a further interpretation of process rather than a final truth, because sociological 
processes and culture are in motion (Charmatz. 1983).
The data are analyzed through a process called coding. Coding is creating 
categories for the interpretation of the data. It is a multi-step process. In initial or open 
coding, transcripts are read and reread to break down the data into discrete phenomena.
In this research project, line-by-line coding was used. The phenomena are given initial 
labels then reviewed and placed into categories. Themes are revealed, though they may 
not make sense as part of a system. The coding may also reveal new areas of inquiry not 
originally in the researcher's conceptual frame. Axial coding is a second level analysis
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that groups data, builds categories and defines what they are and are not. This level often 
identifies the central theme of the data, the context in which it occurs and the intervening 
conditions that affect the strategies. Theoretical or selective coding conceptualizes how 
the categories relate to each other and to the core category or central theme. This is the 
process that generates theory (Charmatz. 1983: Glaser & Strauss. 1967: Strauss & 
Corbin. 1990).
Strauss and Corbin (1990) developed the specific methodology for grounded 
theory used in this project. There is a core category, the phenomenon to which all the 
categories relate, and causal conditions that are the events and incidents that lead to the 
phenomenon. The phenomenon occurs within a context (such as organizational culture), 
may be affected by intervening conditions. These conditions are managed by action or 
interaction strategies that lead to consequences which in turn may lead to new causal 
conditions.
Research Design. Phase 3 -  Triangulation
The transferability of military leadership strategies and practices to the public 
sector was investigated by participant interviews and by examining both quantitative and 
qualitative literature on the organizational culture and recent developments in the public 
sector. The emergent military leadership data were analyzed for a fit with the literature 
on government organizations. Thus a mixed method or multimethod approach was 
employed in this project.
A common rationale for a multimethod approach is the acknowledgement that 
every research method has characteristic strengths and weaknesses. Combining methods 
allows building on the strengths of each method while compensating for the flaws and
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limitations o f individual methods (Brewer & Hunter. 1989). The qualitative data 
gathered in this study have been analyzed against existing studies concerning leadership 
behaviors o f military officers. A multimethod approach was used for triangulation and 
complementarity purposes (Greene. Caracelli. & Graham. 1989).
Triangulation consists of using different methods to address the issue of "rival 
causal factors" — whether another variable may be producing the result measured 
(Denzin, 1970. p. 28). Webb. Campbell, Schwartz and Sechrist (1966) and Morse 
(1991) stated that using multiple methods can give researchers more confidence in their 
findings. Complementarity is examining different facets of the same phenomenon. 
Bryman (1988) offered as an example that "quantitative research can establish 
regularities in social life while qualitative evidence can allow the processes which link 
the variables identified to be revealed" (p. 142). In this case, the comparison of this 
study's results with quantitative findings may broaden the understanding of the 
categories.
Some qualitative researchers critique mixed method research (Guba & Lincoln. 
1994). Yet. grounded theory has a strong connection with quantitative methods through 
the background and influence of its co-developer. Barney Glaser. In addition, grounded 
theory researchers — because they aim to build theory with generality via qualitative 
methodology (Strauss & Corbin. 1990. p. 23& 24) -- may have an obligation to seek solid 
triangulation, which a multimethod approach can provide.
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Validity, Reliability, and Generalizability in Qualitative Research
Evaluation presents one of the ongoing unresolved issues in qualitative research. 
Guba and Lincoln (1994) identified four key perspectives among qualitative researchers. 
The positivist view is that the criteria for quantitative and qualitative research should be 
the same. Both should consider internal validity, external validity, reliability and 
objectivity with the aim of verifying hypotheses. Postpositivists maintain that there 
should be similar criteria for qualitative research while maintaining that hypotheses 
cannot be proved, but only shown to be probable. Critical theorists — who emphasize 
action or praxis, and transformation -  focus on societal structures and historic context. 
Constructivists focus on deep understanding o f texts and reconstruction o f the multiple 
realities of the participants and discuss the authenticity and the trustworthiness of the 
research. This group includes the feminist scholars who encompass empiricist, standpoint 
and cultural/ethnic studies (Guba and Lincoln. 1994). Some researchers reject the notion 
of evaluation as antithetical to the nature o f qualitative research (Smith. 1987). Others 
propose that an entirely new set of criteria needs to be established for evaluation (Denzin 
& Lincoln. 1994).
Many of the discussions concerning qualitative evaluation center on differences in 
epistemologv and ontology. Unfortunately, the polemic over qualitative evaluation has 
not brought consensus on approach and methods by either quantitative or qualitative 
researchers (Shaddish. Cook & Leviton. 1991). It is this researcher's opinion that the 
lack of generally recognized evaluation standards for qualitative research may have 
contributed to what some see as reluctant acceptance of qualitative research by some 
quantitative researchers and journals (Brewer & Hunter, 1989: Bryman, 1988).
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The approach taken in this project is to produce results that set a direction for 
change. As such, an underlying concern is adopting solid research methods that are 
acceptable to those interested in this research, notably retired military officers. It may be 
more difficult to present persuasive qualitative findings to those with backgrounds in the 
hard sciences, such as engineering and information technology. In order to both reach 
this audience and follow good qualitative practices, I have chosen to utilize the approach 
of Hammerslev (1992. p. 64) who wrote that qualitative research should be evaluated on 
whether: 1) it generates theory; 2) it is "empirically grounded and scientifically credible" 
3) its findings can be generalized and reproduced; and 4) it accounts for the researcher's 
effect and the research strategy. To these ends, this study uses grounded theory 
methodology, examines validity, reliability and generalizability and addresses researcher 
bias and effect.
It has been my intent to incorporate bridging words into this qualitative 
assessment to better reach my target audience, as recommended by Michael Patton 
(1997) who wrote:
To stay out of arguments about objectivity. I talk with intended users about 
balance, fairness, and being explicit about what perspectives, values and priorities have 
shaped the evaluation, both the design and findings, (p. 282)
To address the potential concerns of its audience, the design o f the methodology- 
used in this research includes some features seen in quantitative research. The hope is 
that such methodology will produce results that are more likely to be accepted and 
utilized .
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Validity
Johnson (1997) is one theorist who advocated incorporating quantitative concepts 
into qualitative research. Johnson used descriptive validity to address the factual 
accuracy of the researcher: interpretive validity to describe how accurately the 
participants’ views, experiences, intentions and thoughts are reported and understood by 
the researcher: and theoretical validity to address the degree to which the research theory 
or theoretical explanation elucidate the data. While some qualitative theorists would 
certainly object to the use o f Johnson's quantitative terms. I align myself with those who 
agree that the concepts of validity and reliability are important to address, using the 
procedures unique to qualitative research (Creswell. 1994: Merriam. 1988; Miles and 
Huberman. 1984).
Johnson further suggested enhancing descriptive validity' through the use of 
reflexivity (ongoing self-review and critique), negative case sampling (seeking data that 
do not fit the theory'), and multiple observers to reduce researcher bias. This research has 
used field notes (Punch. 1994: Van Manen. 1990) both to document participant 
observations and as a tool for reflective practices. In addition, interviews involved 
probing for negative examples from participants to reduce the opportunities for "shaping" 
the content of the interviews.
Johnson (1997) also recommended use of verbatim quotations and participant 
feedback, or what Lincoln and Guba (1985) called "member checking" to enhance 
interpretive validity. Verbatim quotations have been used liberally throughout this 
dissertation. In addition, participants were afforded the opportunity to review interview 
transcripts and request changes if they felt their beliefs and experiences were not
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accurately reflected. Johnson cautioned that participants alter transcripts to put 
themselves in the best light. Transcript alterations were to be reviewed with committee 
members when there was any question regarding the possible motivation for such 
changes, though this did not occur.
Finally. Johnson recommended enhancing theoretical validity by any o f the 
following methods: spending sufficient time with subjects, doing field observations, 
using theory triangulation (Denzin. 1970). negative case sampling, and peer and 
colleague discussions. In this study, the researcher was not afforded the opportunity to 
do field observations with the participants. Research practices employed, however, 
allowed interviews to extend without a prescribed time limit, incorporated theory 
triangulation o f both qualitative and quantitative studies, and utilized dissertation 
committee members and subject experts for peer review.
Reliability in Qualitative Research
Reliability in research addresses the accuracy of the researcher's methods of 
measurement, particularly aimed at whether or not results are replicable. Replication can 
increase confidence in a study's findings (Cook & Campbell. 1979). Yet. this presents a 
problem in qualitative research, which is based on varied lived experience and relies on 
recollection and interpretation. Its reliability depends on the quality o f "the human 
instrument” (Merriam. 1988, p. 171).
Lincoln and Guba (1985) stated that qualitative researchers should focus on the 
internal validity of their methodology, which they linked to reliability. They further 
stated that researchers should use terms like “dependability" and "consistency" (p. 288) 
rather than "validity."
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To enhance the dependability o f their work. Goetz and LeCompte (1984) 
recommended that researchers examine and discuss their assumptions about the research 
topic, utilize triangulation, and create a written audit o f their data collection, category 
development and decisions. Well-constructed field notes, they concluded, aid others 
interested in replicating the study.
These three methods -  a discussion of researcher assumptions, triangulation and 
field notes — were utilized in this research project.
Generalizabilitv
Generalizability is related to theoretical validity. The generalizabilitv of 
qualitative research is often considered suspect because it utilizes small samples and non- 
random sampling techniques. In addition, some qualitative researchers are opposed to 
generalizability. Clifford Geertz (1983) wrote that qualitative theory generated must 
"stay close to the ground’* (p. 56) addressing the culture one has studied. "The essential 
task of theory building here is not to codify abstract regularities but to make thick 
description possible, not to generalize across cases but to generalize within them"
(Geertz. 1983. p. 56).
A more expansive approach was taken by Wolcott (1995) who stated that: "Every­
man is in certain respects a) like all other men. b) like some other men and c) like no 
other man" (p. 173). He wrote that generalizability could be warranted in some 
circumstances. Morse, on the other hand, saw theoretical results applying "to all similar 
situations, questions, and problems, regardless o f the comparability of the demographic 
composition of the groups" (1999, p. 5).
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Merriam (1988) identified the following four historic approaches to 
generalizability in qualitative research. Cronbach (1975) described all research as being 
working hypotheses that are continually revised and changed by additional research 
involving different communities and circumstances. Erickson (1986) found that 
qualitative research produces some concrete universals — wherein the lessons of one 
situation instruct us about others. In the naturalistic generalization approach (Stake. 
1978). the researcher or evaluator assists the stakeholders in seeing howr other research 
may apply to their own circumstances. This is similar to reader or user generalization 
(Walker. 1980) u'here the writer provides enough information to allow readers to draw 
their own conclusions about the applicability of research findings.
There is little agreement among grounded theorists concerning generalizability. 
Charmatz (1983) argued that the theory generated fits the situation studied, while Glaser 
(1978) stated that the researcher should seek a theory that transcends the situation studied 
through the use and integration of disparate sources.
This research project does not seek to find a single truth but rather to offer 
multiple representations of the military leadership experience and transition to the public 
sector and then examine how those experiences are linked to formulate a theory.
Participants
Selection of Participants
Proper selection of participants aids in any study's credibility. The participant 
profile encompasses individuals who: retired from the military with 20 years or more 
years of service, commanded staff in both operational and non-operational activities, and 
achieved the rank of Lieutenant Commander or above in the Navy, or Major or above in
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the Marines Corps. These selection criteria are intended to identify participants: who are 
relatively well-steeped in the military organizational culture in terms of experience, 
education and training; who were shaped by both the field and the bureaucratic aspects of 
the military: and who achieved some career success and. thus, may be positive about and 
value their military experience. Participants must have retired from the military within 
the past six years and have worked in local government in the San Diego area with the 
expectation that this group may still have a recent perspective on both military and local 
government experience. The initial intent was to obtain between ten and twenty subjects 
who met the selection criteria.
The population has been specifically defined, and the methods used to locate 
participants were designed to cast a wide net to identify' participants within the San Diego 
area. The population interviewed represented the recently retired military community 
working in local government. There is no evidence that the population interviewed is 
unique to the San Diego area, thus it is possible research results may be general izable.
The Relation between Researcher and Participant
There is a debate among qualitative theorists regarding the appropriateness of an 
outside researcher examining a community in which she is not a member. This is based 
on the constructivist theories that see reality as constructed individually rather than 
existing objectively (Heidegger. 1962). These constructions can be loosely held by 
individuals or groups and are based on social phenomena and experience (Guba and 
Lincoln, 1984). Some argue that the texts of participants are deeply embedded in their 
unique cultural context, and therefore only researchers who share the life experience of 
the participants can both: 1) access the deeper layers o f this experience through a




common bond and 2) adequately interpret these data. Thus, the role o f the researcher is 
to interact with participants during the investigation based on their uniquely shared or 
standpoint epistemology. Many women, non-white and immigrant researchers 
(Anzaldua, 1987: Collins, 1991; Smith 1987) hold this position.
In part, this view springs from the reaction of non-majoritv communities to being 
"studied about" and is an effort to reassert their unique voice and perspective. As 
African-American feminist bell hooks wrote:
Often this speech about the "Other" annihilates, erases: "no need to hear your 
voice. Only tell me about your pain. I want to know your story. And then I will 
tell it back to you in a new way. Tell it back to you in such a way that it has 
become mine, my own. Re-writing you, I write myself anew. I am still author, 
authority.. ."  (1990. pp. 151-152)
A critical element in standpoint epistemology is to restore the authentic voice of non­
dominant communities who have traditionally been studied through an outside cultural 
lens resulting in an outsider's interpretation and judgment on the participants and their 
communities (Denzin. 1997: Fine. 1994). The potential for "betraying" the participants 
in a research project is always there. According to Miles & Huberman: "It is probably 
true that, fundamentally, field research is an act of betrayal, no matter how well 
intentioned or well integrated the researcher. One makes public the private and leaves 
the locals to take the consequences" (1984. p. 233). Fundamentally, the researcher is 
always an outsider, trying to entice participants to reveal more and more o f themselves.
The ethics of entering a research situation as an outsider can begin to be addressed 
by avoiding deceptive models wherein subjects are not informed of either the true nature
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of the research or the position of the researcher and by adapting a collaborative approach 
to research (Punch. 1994). In a collaborative model, subjects are fully informed and are 
partners or "stakeholders" in uncovering the processes being examined (Guba and 
Lincoln. 1989).
In the case of this study, the retired officers were fully informed o f the nature of 
the research and protected through the ethical review process performed by the Human 
Subjects Committee of the University of San Diego. The Committee reviewed and 
approved the proposed research methods prior to the data gathering portion of the 
dissertation process.
One of the dissertation committee members is a retired Navy Captain with 
organizational development experience in the private sector who assisted with reviewing 
the content of the interviews and subsequent theory building for relevance with his own 
knowledge of the military. In addition, a retired senior officer, an active duty officer and 
a civilian Navy retiree with almost 30 years of service served as subject matter experts in 
reviewing the military aspects o f the research.
This study involved a phenomenological approach and. as the researcher has no 
personal military background, she had to open herself to understanding the military 
leadership experience through the words and on the terms o f the interviewees (Van 
Manen. 1990). The participants' texts formed the basis for the analysis. The researcher's 
non-military background necessitated requesting clarification and explanation of military 
terms and processes. This prompted participants to reflect more deeply and uncover 
meaning as they sought to translate military culture into civilian terms.
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The essence of the research is a dialogue into the nature o f leadership in the 
military. In this area, the researcher is acknowledged to be an outsider, an "other." and 
fulfilled the roles o f inquiring, recording and compiling the data, then integrating it into a 
theory. In reviewing the applicability of the experiences and theories o f military 
leadership to local government, the researcher straddled the border of "outsider" as a 
civilian, and what Fine (1994) calls "outsider within" as a researcher with fifteen years 
experience w'orking in government organizations. In this area, the researcher could 
access organizational experiences of how the actions of retired military officers have and 
may appear to their civilian colleagues within the public sector.
Protection o f Subjects
Participants in the study are volunteers identified from the pool of retired military 
officers working in local government. They signed a consent form that informed them of 
the process and of their rights. (See Appendix C.) Three key precautions were taken to 
protect the subjects of this study. First, the identity of the participants remains 
confidential. Pseudonyms have been used and the participant descriptions are general 
enough to conceal identities. Secondly, all participants were given the opportunity to 
review the transcript of their interviews to ensure that their identities remained 
confidential and to ensure the transcript reflects their intended meaning. Finally, all tapes 
and transcripts have been kept in a home office and will be destroyed one year after the 
research was completed. All of these precautions were reviewed and approved by the 
Committee on the Protection of Human Subjects of the University o f San Diego.
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Limitations
The demographic profile o f the participants is largely white males. While the 
racial and gender makeup of the armed forces has become more diverse, the population 
o f this study entered military service over twenty years ago. The profile o f the study's 
participants is analogous to their cohort group.
The requirement that participants be retired six years or less narrowed the number 
o f potential participants who fit the study's profile. During the search to locate 
participants, many candidates for the study fit all o f the criteria except for retirement 
time. This element of the participant profile, however, was important to finding 
participants with a fresh perspective on the transition from the military to the public 
sector.
The research was limited to positional leaders and did not study the experiences 
o f those performing informal leadership roles. It was also limited to the perspective o f 
those interviewed. The data do not account for the views o f those working with retired 
military officers regarding how well they have made the transition to the public sector 
and their leadership effectiveness.
One of the limitations o f qualitative research is that any attempt to interpret and 
explain the data is. by necessity, taking a reductivist approach (Geertz. 1983). Grounded 
theory in particular requires the researcher to focus on the core category. Grounded 
theory does not presume to create a comprehensive theory, only to explain a 
phenomenon. Therefore, the researcher must set aside i: formation that does not relate to 
the core category. Such data may be utilized for another study (Glaser, 1978).
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Finally, the researcher's lack of personal military experience, albeit while 
contributing a governmental organizational perspective, has no doubt placed some 
limitations on the breadth of interpretation and analysis. To this end. the researcher 
invites those with military background and public sector experience to utilize this study 
as a basis for further study and dialogue on this topic.
Summary
This chapter described both the methodological process and the rationale for 
selecting the process. It reviewed main theoretical approaches to validity, reliability, and 
generalizability in qualitative research and defended the approach taken in this study.
A qualitative approach was chosen because it is generally better suited to the 
investigation and analysis o f a social process such as leadership influences. The intent of 
selecting a grounded theory methodology was to generate a valid theory that is credible 
and of use to other researchers as well as to retired officers. The data were triangulated 
with qualitative and quantitative literature on military leadership and government 
organizations for triangulation and complimentarity purposes.
The methodology of this study was examined for validity, reliability and 
generalizability. Validity was addressed through the use of reflective field notes, 
interview techniques that probed participants for negative examples, verbatim quotations, 
participant review of transcripts and triangulation. Reliability was addressed by- 
reviewing researcher assumptions, triangulation and field notes. The results of the 
research may be generalizable because there appears no evidence that the retired military 
population in San Diego has unique characteristics that would affect the results, and
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because the research explored a multi-faceted view of military leadership and transition 
experiences.
The goal of this research has been to produce results that are credible to the 
potential audience, which includes retired officers. The credibility of grounded theory 
research, according to Glaser (1978) is based on: whether the data f i t  the categories: 
whether the evolving theory is relevant in that it explains, predicts and interprets what is 
happening: and that the theory is modified to account for additional research and changes 
in the social processes studied (pp. 4-5). The selection of methodology hopefully fulfills 
the criteria for reliability.
The next chapter will present the data gathered, the categories revealed by the 
data analysis and the resulting theory. In addition, the theory will be reviewed against the 
existing research and literature on military leadership and public sector conditions.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
DATA GATHERING AND ANALYSIS 
Overview
The first chapter provided an overview of the purpose o f this research — to study 
the leadership strategies and practices learned by military career officers and their 
perspectives and experiences regarding the applicability o f military leadership to their 
subsequent careers in the public sector. The second chapter reviewed relevant literature 
dealing with areas of the organizational cultures of the military and the public sector, life 
transitions, the nature o f organizational change and current change trends in public sector 
organizations. The last chapter discussed the methodology used in this study: the pilot 
study that was a precursor to this research, the rationale for selecting a qualitative 
research approach and grounded theory methodology, and a description of the research 
steps and protocol.
This chapter will describe the actual research process, the data analysis process, 
the key themes identified in the participant data, the relationship of the data categories 
and a description of the emergent theory on the nature of military leadership.
Detail of the Research Events
The research design described in Chapter Three contained a theoretical 
framework for good qualitative research. What follows is a description of the research
R e p ro d u c e d  with perm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r th e r  rep roduction  prohibited w ithout pe rm iss ion .
98
experiences: the process details and the researcher's practices. This section also includes 
descriptions o f the participants — sufficient to present their standpoint, while protecting 
their identity.
Theoretical Sampling
As noted in Chapter 1. the participants interviewed for this study were retired 
military officers who served twenty or more years in either the Navy or Marine Corps, 
achieved a rank o f Navy Lieutenant Commander or Marine Corps Major and above, had 
been retired less than six years ago. and were working in local government at a mid­
management or executive level in the San Diego area. One o f the main challenges of this 
research project was locating participants who fit such a narrow profile. The initial three 
participants were located with the assistance of other retired officers. The County Office 
of Veterans Affairs supplied other leads. Initially, the intent was to locate additional 
participants by giving presentations at the executive and mid-management meetings of 
local government agencies. However, one of the human resources directors o f a local 
city volunteered that she could easily review the records of the mid-managers and 
executives hired within the last six years and identify any who met the criteria. She 
suggested using this method with other entities having smaller work forces to expedite 
the research process and minimize the organizational impact.
This process worked well with every public entity contacted except for the 
County of San Diego and the City of San Diego, which have 17.000 and 9000 employees 
respectively. Neither maintains data on employed veterans by classification level. In 
these cases, the personnel of specific departments within these two entities were 
contacted directly. The departments were selected because their core tasks matched some
R e p ro d u c e d  with perm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r th e r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
99
of the technical proficiencies found in the military such as engineering, information 
systems, environmental management, purchasing, contracting, finance and human 
resources. Over 90% of the public organizations contacted assisted the researcher.
In each case the human resources directors were sent an overview o f the studv. 
(See Appendix D.) In some cases, they preferred to contact any potential participants 
themselves to gauge interest, rather than supply the name and work phone numbers of 
staff without obtaining their permission. It is not known, therefore, if any potential 
participants refused to forward their names. Each person who spoke with the researcher 
agreed to be interviewed. In all. eleven participants were found who met the criteria. 
Description of Participants
The material that follows is based on interviews with eleven white, male retired 
military officers over forty years o f age. Each spent between 20 to 30 years in the 
service. Six are graduates of the Naval Academy. All but three o f the participants served 
in combat or in forward areas. Two are retired marines and the rest are retired naval 
officers. The sample includes three aviators, two ship commanders, six engineers, and 
one submariner/aviator. All were retired less than six years at the time of their interviews 
and worked in mid-management or executive positions in local government.
Pseudonyms are used throughout this paper. The participant descriptions are as follows.
"Bob" was drafted after three years of college. He chose to join the Marine Corps 
as a pilot. He flew almost 400 F-4 combat missions on his first tour in Vietnam and 
helicopter missions on his second tour. Bob had a diverse military career lasting over 25 
years. He served as a captain in aviation squadrons, directed aircraft maintenance and 
flight training operations, was executive officer of two air bases, worked in advanced
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weapons research and development, was personnel officer for a large command and 
worked on contingency planning for joint forces operations. One of the plans he worked 
on was used in Operation Desert Shield. In his five years since retirement, he worked 
briefly as a corporate and charter pilot, then became director of a regional airport.
■‘Dan” was in the Navy nearly 30 years and served in both Vietnam and Desert 
Shield. He led construction battalions (known as CBs) and worked in public works, 
facilities maintenance, contract management and construction. He had the opportunity to 
be on the leading edge of some of the military's major changes in recent years. He had 
one of the first male/female CB battalions and also took the women in his unit into 
combat regions in Desert Shield. He had worked for a local environmental agency for 
less than two years.
“Frank" is an engineer who served in the Navy nearly 25 years. He had both 
combat and field experience and commanded construction battalions. In his early 
twenties, after completing ROTC. he was given command of over 250 men in Vietnam.
His largest command was over 2400 military and civilian personnel. He oversaw the 
construction of buildings, bridges and other major projects, leading some projects in 
forward areas including Central America and Africa. He had one assignment leading a 
Marine rifle battalion. At the time of the interview, he was working in local government 
as head of a design and engineering operation. He left government before the conclusion 
of this research for a private engineering firm. He had worked less than two years for 
local government.
“George" attended the Naval Academy and became a Marine Corps aviator in the 
post-Vietnam era serving nearly 25 years. He was a helicopter pilot and also served as a
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flight school instructor, commanding officer of a squadron, aviation safety officer and 
ground safety officer. He earned Master's Degrees in Management and Environmental 
Management. He claims to have had a “quiet” career as an aviator. He was on combat 
alert for less than six months but never flew in combat. As he stated. “No one ever shot 
at me.” He had worked in management for a iocal environmental agency less than two 
years.
“Les” was in the Navy for 30 years. The bulk of his first 23 years were spent in 
shipboard assignments. He worked briefly in Washington in defense communications, 
then finished his last six years in shore assignments. He closed his career as the 
commander of one of the Navy’s largest bases. At one time his staff numbered 1100 
personnel. He attended Annapolis and the Naval Postgraduate School, earning a Master's 
Degree in Communication Management. After retirement, he became a shipping and 
import operations manager in local government where he had been working less than a 
year at the time his interview was conducted.
“Paul" attended the Naval Academy, receiving a degree in Civil Engineering. 
During his career of over 20 years, he worked as an engineering officer onboard ship, 
served as an admiral’s aide, directed facilities management operations, managed 
construction contracting, led a construction battalion and directed a base closure project. 
While administrating construction contracts, he supervised a mixed staff of both military 
and federal civil service. He had directed a project and contract management unit in the 
public sector for about two years.
“Ralph” joined the Navy in anticipation of being drafted, and was trained as an 
electronics technician. He served on a nuclear submarine as an enlisted man, where he
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attained the rank of third class petty officer (E-4). His ship patrolled in the Atlantic 
Ocean, staying submerged for as long as 72 days. He was selected for Officer Candidate 
School and was commissioned an ensign. He is the only one of the participants to have 
been selected for officer training from enlisted ranks. He became an aviator and trained 
in helicopters. He taught at helicopter flight school, managed helicopter maintenance 
operations at sea during two assignments, directed anti-submarine warfare groups and 
served on the staffs o f four admirals. He had worked in airport management for over 
three years.
“Sam” attended the Naval Academy and served in the Civil Engineer Corps. He 
led a CB battalion in Vietnam. He eventually led a total o f three battalions, directed a 
nuclear defense research and development project, served as an admiral’s aide, ran public 
works operations, directed a CB school, managed construction projects and coordinated 
contract administration. He served nearly 30 years and received three engineering 
degrees while in the Navy. He was a public works director in local government for 
almost five years, but resigned and went to work for a private firm before the conclusion 
of this study.
“Steve" served 20 years in the Navy in construction, contracting and public 
works. He was a direct appointment, joining the Navy after attending college in the post- 
Vietnam era. He did not attend Officer Candidate School, but rather attended a six-week 
officer training program. He spent 18 of his 20 years directing federal civil service 
employees. He never served in a forward area or aboard ship. He joked, “I know very 
little about ships, other than they tie up to piers and we have to [provide facilities] to
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them.” He is a public works director and had worked in local government for about two 
years.
“Ted” had his first command as a junior officer, leading a minesweeping unit in 
the Mekong River in Vietnam. He is unique among the participants in that he did not 
have a veteran chief petty officer to assist him in his first leadership assignment. 
Afterwards, he left the Navy briefly (for less than a year) and then returned because he 
“missed the esprit de corps.” In his thirty-year career, he commanded a guided missile 
destroyer and two amphibious squadrons. He had only two shore assignments. His 
education is in Engineering and Systems Analysis. He also trained a number o f women 
junior officers though none served under him aboard ship. He had worked in the public 
sector for over three years at the time o f his interview.
“Will” led a construction battalion in Vietnam and continued to serve in the Civil 
Engineer Corps in construction battalions, public works, facilities management and 
contract management. He served on an admiral's staff and as executive officer o f a base. 
His career spanned over 25 years. He had worked for just over five years in the public 
sector at the time of the interview.
Limitations of the Participant Pool.
All the participants are white males, which is reflective of the majority o f the 
officers in this cohort. Only one submariner was located. As previously noted, all the 
participants interviewed were Navy Lieutenant Commanders and Marine Corps Majors or 
above. No flag officers that met the criteria were located. Just two of the participants 
were in the Marine Corps.
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Table 1: Personal Profile of the Retired Military Officers By Years of Service.
Attendance at the Military Academy. Area Warfare or Staff Specialty and 











Years in Local 
Government
Bob 24-27 No Aviator Vietnam 5-6










George 24-27 Yes Aviator None 
(on alert)
1-2
Les 28-30 Yes Ship & base 
command
Vietnam >1
Paul 20-23 Yes Civil
Engineer
None 1-2





Sam 28-30 Yes Civil
Engineer
Vietnam 5-6
Steve 20-23 No Civil
Engineer
None 1-2
Ted 28-30 No Ship & base 
command
Vietnam 3-4
Will 24-27 No Civil
Engineer
Vietnam 5-6
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The Data Analysis Process
According to Strauss and Corbin (1990) the theoretical sensitivity o f grounded 
theory research is enhanced by ongoing contact with related literature to shed meaning on 
the data being collected and by a rigorous analysis throughout the research process.
During this research project, field notes were taken on an ongoing basis that identified 
commonalties across the interviews, new emergent patterns, questions concerning 
apparent errant data, possible connections to research and literature and contrary 
information across some participant interviews. At times, these field notes shaped 
subsequent interviews, identifying additional concepts to pursue. One such concept 
concerned stereotypes that retired military experienced in the public sector. This 
subtheme was not an original field of inquiry but was raised in one of the interviews and 
proved to be a rich area for investigation with subsequent participants. The field notes 
also assisted with coding and analysis.
Each interview was taped and transcribed verbatim. Over 400 pages o f transcripts 
were analyzed line-by-line for themes and coded initially for substance and concept. A 
second level of coding -  axial coding -  was used to group data. Then theoretical coding 
was performed to identify relationships. In each case, the words of the participants were 
sources of coding labels. Concepts and key quotes were grouped by theme clusters, and 
complex ideas were placed within multiple clusters.
Preliminary maps of the concepts and theme clusters were created and color- 
coded on large chart paper. Some of the precepts of “mindmapping” (Rose. 1985) were 
utilized to draw connections, relationships and patterns between the data concepts. 
Ultimately, a wall of chart paper began to reveal the enfolding theory.
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Analysis of the Data: The Organization of Key Themes
There are two separate grounded theory analyses contained in Chapters Four and 
Five. The first addresses the phenomenon o f military leadership: the second is the 
phenomenon o f the applicability o f  military leadership principles to the public sector. 
Both these analyses are based on the experiences of the retired military' officers 
interviewed for this project and triangulated against other qualitative and quantitative 
data.
Five key theme areas emerged on the core concept of military leadership: i ) 
leadership development, 2) leading people, 3) leading processes. 4) decision-making and 
5) leading change. The key theme areas that emerged on the core concept of applying 
military leadership principles to the public sector are described in the following chapter. 
Each of these themes related to conditions within the organizational context and involved 
specific strategies and structures.
Description of the Key Themes of Military Leadership
The core category of military' leadership is a complex phenomenon. To describe 
military leadership as a singular entity' is to simplify its nature at the expense of meaning. 
The goal of qualitative research is to attempt a "thick description" of the chosen category 
(Geertz. 1983). To access its core requires acknowledging the breadth o f experience that 
is military leadership. The research method used in this work is grounded theory, which 
encompasses tracing relationships among data categories discovered during the research 
process to build a theory. The basic relationships that build the structure of a grounded 
theory, as identified by Straus and Corbin (1990) are: the central phenomenon studied.
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the causal conditions, the context, any intervening condition, corresponding structures 
and strategies, and the consequences. From here new causal conditions are likely to 
emerge, affecting the phenomenon or creating new phenomenon. These are not linear 
relationships but interwoven systems. The consequences in this case are the leadership 
lessons learned by officers. This experience has not been the same for all the 
participants, so. while the lessons described here may not be shared by all. they are 
intended to represent a broad picture o f the phenomenon of military leadership.
Causal Condition: The Possibility o f Combat
According to Strauss and Corbin (1990). causal conditions are "the events or 
incidents that lead to the occurrence or development of a phenomenon" (p. 100). In the 
military, the causal condition is the possibility of combat. The traditions have evolved 
and the structures and practices of the military have been created to prepare for this 
prospect. According to Paul. "It's said that the military doesn't do anything except go to 
war and train for war. You can argue that just about everything we do in the middle -  
from peace time to war — is training."
Each participant agreed that, generally speaking, military leadership practices 
vary, depending on whether the unit is involved in an operational or administrative 
assignment. An operational assignment might involve combat, a training exercise, a 
submarine patrol, a construction project in an unsecured area and a shipboard or foreign 
deployment. An administrative assignment might involve facilities management, 
civilian-military construction, research and development, or ship repair and refitting. 
Regardless of the immediate setting, an officer must always have the knowledge and
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confidence that his staff will obey orders despite the danger level. Les explained that in 
an operations environment:
I don’t want them to hesitate . . .  when [I’m] saying **I want you to take this ship 
in here where they’re shooting at you and stay there for about twenty minutes 
while firing some guns. Then I want you to bring it back out without hurting 
anyone. I know how to do that. And I want you guys to trust me. to do the things 
I say. when I say. and we’ll all get out of this together."
The reality, potential and training for combat are the shaping events of military 
leadership. This need for faith in the obedience of one’s troops and in their commitment 
to carrying out the mission is at the foundation of military tradition, philosophy, 
structures and practices.
Theme One: Military Leadership Development
As mentioned in the review o f the literature, there are three key strategies used to 
develop officers in the military -  schooling/training, mentoring and experiences. A key 
condition that affects leadership development is the ever-present potential for combat.
The realities of combat mean that the military must prepare its junior officers to take the 
place of a fallen commander quickly and with little notice. The military also establishes 
structures and protocols so relatively inexperienced officers can take command when 
necessary. Each o f its three development strategies plays a role in this preparation. 
Education and Training
Initial military officer education programs, such as the Naval Academy or Officer 
Candidate School, attempt to instill the strong values and beliefs of the military culture
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and the norms of behavior expected of officers (Peck. 1994). The Navy, some feel, 
places less emphasis on formal leadership training because it has traditionally held that 
leadership is learned on the job. For example, its Naval Leadership program at the Naval 
Academy has been led by a Lieutenant Commander with a Bachelor's Degree. In 
contrast, a Colonel with a Doctorate leads the program at West Point. Additionally, 
unlike the Army and Air Force, the Navy has no research center devoted to leadership 
(Lt. Cdr. W. Hall. Annapolis, personal communication March 20. 1998). The primary 
leadership preparation for N a\y and Marine C >rps officers is through their mentors and 
through experience, the so-called "school of the ship."
Military Leadership Mentoring
The Navy and Marine Corps identify mentoring as a key leadership development 
tool. This was confirmed both in the literature (Montor. et al. 1987) and by each of the 
participants. They were unanimous in their view o f mentorship as key to their leadership 
development.
One of the standard questions asked during this research was for participants to 
describe one of their role models and. if possible an incident that exemplified their 
leadership. Their stories are described below and summarized in Table 2.
Ralph cited the first chief petty officer he served under as an enlisted man on a 
nuclear submarine. This CPO had considerable technical knowledge, set high standards 
and was well respected by his men. “Mv respect for him was so high the last thing I 
would want to do would be to disappoint him." Ralph explained that this CPO expected 
that all members of the team would work avidly to earn their dolphin insignia quickly, 
designating him or her as qualified submariners. He described how the CPO's
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expectations became the submarine team's expectations. "The crew would stop a movie 
if someone was in there who didn't have qualifications, throw him out and tell him to 
study.. . .  You wouldn’t be reading in the library for entertainment either." The CPO 
created an infectious attitude that motivated achievement.
Dan told o f his first assignment in charge of a squad created from men "offered 
up" from different companies. His squad was rife with discipline problems and drug 
use. He turned to his chief petty officer (CPO): "He was a Korean War veteran. He had 
a bulldog face, a pot gut. [He] smoked too much, drank too much and cussed too much." 
During their nine-month deployment. Dan had what he identified as his best lesson in 
leadership:
I had 120 men and the bulk o f them were misfits, cast-offs and rejects from all of 
the other parts of the battalion . . .  the last of the Vietnam draftees . . .  and I was as 
green as grass. I learned more in nine months working with him than in four 
years of ROTC or with any other officer I ever worked with . .  . We started out as 
the dregs. And for a lot of these guys, the reason they were so crappy is [that] no 
one had ever taken the time to look after them, or talk to them, or take care of 
them. . . .  We gave these guys intensive TLC and at the end of the deployment 
they were the best. . . .  It was nothing short of phenomenal.
Dan stated that the lessons he learned from his CPO were: to communicate expectations 
and standards, to reward performance, but not mediocrity: to take care o f your people and 
to demonstrate that care by learning about them as individuals and to be innovative and 
individual in how you reward them. Frank also cited his first CPO as his leadership 
model: "If you listen to these 25 and 30-year veterans, you’ll get things done.”
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Both ship commanders identified senior officers who kept their composure under 
pressure as their models. Les told o f a commanding officer who handled danger while 
remaining calm. He described two incidents: one in which a ship was in great danger of 
running aground and another while under fire off Vietnam. "There was almost panic in 
the voice of everybody on that bridge except for the commanding officer . . .  the man 
never lost control. . .  He had the [total responsibility] if something went wrong, and yet 
he was the calmest person in the operation. That left an impression."
Ted cited a captain who could "maintain his patience and his cool" in high- 
tension. rapidly-changing situations. His captain not only had self confidence, but 
maintained trust in his junior officers: "He wasn't jumping in and grabbing control when 
I made an order that might not have been the optimum one. He was coaching rather than 
taking charge and I learned a lot through him.” His second example was a captain who 
had an alcohol problem, but had a tremendous rapport with his crew. He was a former 
enlisted Marine "who was able to go down and mingle with them, talk with them, make 
them feel [that], even though he was . .  . [senior to them] in terms o f rank he was not 
superior as a human being. He was just another man." Ted said that not all senior and 
flag officers could establish such rapport with staff.
Many of the civil engineers cited supervising officers as their models. Sam cited 
an admiral he worked for who would constantly test his junior officers and push them to 
think critically. He would ask their opinions and test them with questions, thus 
encouraging their analytical skills. The admiral gave him challenging assignments and 
allowed him to observe high-level meetings and at times asked him to speak. It appeared 
to Sam that the admiral felt "I could contribute and add some value." which bolstered his
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self-confidence. He also discussed a captain who "exuded personal confidence" and paid 
attention to the small details, such as burned out light bulbs. Sam observed that when the 
base executive officer (XO) paid attention to details, so did his staff.
Paul explained that his first commanding officer provided "a vision for the 
command.” He stayed involved in the work but "did not micromanage or ask those kinds 
of detailed questions that were my responsibility.” In one particular instance he put the 
success of a mission before his career and lobbied up the chain o f command against a 
policy that was damaging to operations. Because of his commitment and ethics. Paul 
stated. "I'd absolutely have followed him anywhere.”
Steve cited two models. One was a captain who stayed involved with his staff.
He counseled all levels of staff, created a recognition program and required his officers to 
promote training and maintain individual development plans for each staff member. He 
also took his officers off site for one day a month to build teamwork: "I didn't believe in 
it. to be honest with you ,. . .  but the team functioned together, worked together, got to 
know one another in a very informal forum .. .  . They became much more ready to work 
with each other." Steve has since replicated the individual development plan strategy in 
his own organization and is working on organizing team-building sessions. His second 
example was a female captain who was perceived as "grinding everyone into hamburger 
because of her work ethic.” She urged her senior officers to take on more that they 
thought they could. She pushed them toward improving their personal organization and 
productivity. The lesson she left with Steve is "don’t be afraid to take on a lot.”
Some had difficulty in naming a specific role model. Bob could not recall a 
particular mentor, but stated he was drawn to two types of models — aviators who
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demonstrated superior technical ability and officers who “looked sharp handling people." 
Will could also offer no specific examples, but admired leaders who could speak well in 
public. The stories about leadership mentors are summarized in Table 2.
Table 2: Personal Leadership Mentor Stories: Leadership Mentor(s) and Command
Context, Example of Leadership. Lesson in Leadership Identified
Name Mentors Leadership Example Lesson in Leadership




Different leadership needed 
for different tasks.
Dan 1st CPO* 
(CB* unit in 
Vietnam)
Took unit o f 120 
"misfits” and turned 
them into the best unit 
in 9 months.
How to work with people. 








How to handle people.




Care about people. 
Lead by values.
Les 2 Captains 
(shipboard)
Handling ship in danger 
and in combat.
Command presence. 
Staying calm, in control.
Paul Captain
(Civil Engineer)
Lobbying for program 




Ralph l sl CPO 
(submarine)
Set high expectations 
for staff to pass 
qualifying test.
Technical knowledge. 




Would point out burned 
out light bulbs.
Notice the large and small 
things and so will your staff.
Admiral Tested verbally; gave 
responsibility.
Develop self-confidence.
Steve Female Captain 
(Civil Engineer)






Held teambuilding days. 
Required training plans.
Build camaraderie. 
Take care of staff.
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Ted Captain Tense situations. Command presence.
(shipboard) Let junior officers learn. Don't micro-manage.
Captain, (USMC Built rapport, mingled Don't act superior,
enlisted) crew. Manage by walking around.
For many of those interviewed, their first chief petty officer or supervising officer was a 
key mentor. The first CPO can help the new junior officer stay afloat in his or her first 
command. Some of the warmest leadership mentor stories related were about the veteran 
CPO taking the young junior officer under his wing, while allowing the new officer to 
still look good in front of the enlisted staff. As officers gain more experience, they are 
better able to coach petty officers, creating the potential for two-way mentorship 
development.
Senior officers had the most influence in the areas of command presence and 
decision-making. These senior officers provided both examples of leadership and 
developmental experiences for their subordinate officers.
Assignment rotation in the Navy is generally every two to three years. This 
provides officers with the opportunity to serve under a number of senior officers and 
observe a variety o f leadership practices. Steve mentioned that he had worked many 
assignments with two captains overseeing the project. As a result, he had worked with 32 
different captains, giving him a wide exposure to leadership practices. Most stated, like 
Ted. that they had worked under some "truly great men" and valued the tremendous 
models of leadership they were exposed to. About a quarter of the participants 
mentioned that they had also witnessed some negative models. Ralph offered that poor
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leadership also provides teachable moments: “You learn [not only] what works [but] 
what doesn't."
Developmental Experiences
As Paul discussed, development of junior officers is a responsibility o f both the 
chief petty officer and the senior officer. One of the key leadership development 
strategies for young officers consists of providing a structure for increasing levels of 
responsibility. The initial assignment, however, is often a huge responsibility. For 
example, right out of college, with no prior supervisory experience. Frank and Dan each 
were in command of construction battalions of over 220 men in forward areas. Ted was 
overseeing treacherous mine sweeping operations in the Mekong River with no CPO or 
other officer to assist him. As Frank saw it. these experiences discouraged those who 
were not comfortable taking on the level of responsibility required by a military 
organization:
The experience of coming right out of college, being thrown right into that 
leadership role and having to develop that trust and confidence o f the subordinates 
probably [had] the biggest impact on me. Most o f us [held jobs] going through 
high school and college but never with that amount of responsibility . . . but the 
military throws you in. A lot of people end up getting out after four years because 
they don't like it. or they want to try something else. But I kind o f survived and 
was really excited about my responsibility.
The military experience may select those who crave and value responsibility. Almost 
every participant described a similar process in which senior officers provided more 
structured decision-making experiences, but quickly began to provide increasingly more
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general direction, leaving more decision-making responsibilities with the junior officer. 
Steve found that the more tasks he took on. the more responsibility and independence 
senior officers gave him. He credited this with developing his work ethic and his 
leadership style. Sam and Paul felt such experiences developed self-confidence. 
Conversely, every participant mentioned his dislike o f micro-management, and how 
particularly painful it was to go from a captain who recognized and rewarded one's 
capabilities with increasing authority and responsibility to one who micro-managed.
A  second development tactic that senior officers use is bringing their staff into 
higher level decision-making processes, even if only at the observer level. Many 
participants related stories of commanding officers who brought issues to meetings for 
the junior officers to discuss. Often the CO already had a decision in mind, but wanted to 
provide junior officers with a forum for developing critical thinking. Participants 
described superiors who would question them about the rationale for their decisions, to 
further hone their analytical skills and ability to command.
Military leadership development focuses on preparing officers to take command 
quickly and with little notice in a combat situation. These officers may be young and 
inexperienced. The participant data revealed three structural conditions designed to 
foster military leadership development: education and training, mentoring and 
developmental experiences. Coupled with these conditions are the actions and strategies 
summarized in Table 3. The intended result o f  military leadership development process 
is to instill the cultural values, beliefs and norms, develop the skills needed to lead staff 
and develop decision-making capabilities. The possibility of combat necessitates a quick 
initiation to leadership responsibilities. While some principles are taught in military
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education settings, the main portion o f leadership development takes place through 
mentoring by senior officers and petty officers and by the accelerated developmental 
experiences provided by senior officers. A summary of military leadership development 
is in Table 3.
Table 3: Description o f Subtheme of Military Leadership Development
Context Conditions Strategies Consequences
Must prepare to Education and Common initiation. Instill values, beliefs.
take over Training ongoing career behavior norms.
command without development. leadership principles.
notice
Mentoring CPO's and sr. officers Guide, role models.
Youthfulness of expected to develop how to lead crew.
many junior junior officers. decision-making.
officers (as young
as 22) Developmental Immediate Develop critical
Experiences responsibility. 




thinking, confidence & 
decision-making.
The leadership development approach perhaps most unique to the military' is the practice 
of assigning immediate responsibility to very'junior officers. The participants were 
unanimous in attesting to the significance of this experience in their development, and 
several noted that early leadership responsibilities tended to "'weed out" those officer 
candidates who were not comfortable with authority. Also noteworthy is that each 
participant discussed his dislike of micro-management. It appears that the military 
leadership development experience culls individuals who seek and thrive on 
responsibility
Reproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
118
Theme Two: Leading People
The possibility of and preparation for combat has shaped the structures, practices 
and principles of leading people in the military. Despite their varied experiences, the 
participants interviewed exhibited a strong, shared outlook on leading individuals, 
suggesting there is a dominant approach within the military. The subthemes identified in 
the interviews include: the contingency style of leadership, the nature of staff, the 
perception of the leader, motivating staff and building teamwork and camaraderie.
The Strategy of Military Contingency Leadership Stvles
The participants identified two objective circumstances that determine what type 
of leadership style is appropriate. They defined these circumstances as 1) an operational 
environment, e.g.. combat, a training exercise, a submarine patrol, a construction project 
in a forward area, shipboard operations, foreign deployment; or 2) an administrative 
environment, e.g.. a shore-based assignment, a civilian-military construction project, a 
research and development program, a ship repair and refitting assignment. Operational 
and administrative environments place different demands on the crew. As Ralph viewed 
it. an operational assignment requires "a lot of physical and mental performance [and] a 
lot of dedication to some immediate stressful challenges/' An administrative situation, 
however, more closely mirrors a civilian setting.
Most of the interviewees described a contingency view of leadership in the 
military, where the circumstances determined what style was appropriate. Paul, who had 
no direct combat experience, saw just a small distinction between combat and managerial 
environments: that combat simply requires an officer to make quick judgments with ease 
and to keep "focused on the big mission.” Frank, on the other hand, drew the most
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distinct lines between the two ty pes of leadership. He also had the most colorful 
description of the operational leadership style, what he termed the "kick ass. take names" 
style (hereafter called KATNleadership). This involved giving orders and using threats if 
necessary to gain total compliance. The KATN leader was "the guy everyone hated.” yet 
in combat or field situations, his men would have '‘the deep [fox] holes and the proper 
camouflage . . .  no questions asked."
Frank described a dualistic view of leadership — a leader could threaten or coach 
staff. Those officers who could change styles were successful in any environment.
Those who were limited in their leadership tactics were not effective in all settings. In 
his view, the KATN leaders were a disaster in construction settings. Their men had low 
morale, worked poorly and "did nothing but grumble and get into trouble." Conversely, 
those officers using solely a coaching style had high-performing teams in construction 
settings but in an operational environment, according to Frank, their staff "would have 
shallow' fox holes and skimpy camouflage and they'd be asleep on watch because the 
coach wasn't threatening." The ideal officer could adapt styles to fit the setting. Frank 
had spent a substantial amount of his career commanding blue-collar CB units, often 
overseas. He mentioned experiences in Vietnam. Central America and Africa where his 
units had to post guards around the clock while completing strategically important 
projects. These experiences may have contributed to his sharp delineation between the 
leadership needed in the two settings.
Ralph, perhaps due to his submarine and helicopter experience, emphasized 
technical expertise and team coordination:
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At sea. high technical operations often in the middle o f the night require a 
dedicated, concerted commitment to get the job done and to deal with people very 
directly. You expect a lot of independence from them and coordination and you 
expect it immediately. There are times when there's trouble on the ship. rain, low' 
fuel . . . .  Guys have to know what to do immediately and do it. That's w hat all 
the training is about.
His view' of the role o f leadership was to have and be able to inspire the kind of technical 
expertise and coordinated performance that preserves lives. He described submarine 
drills called "scrams” where the crew would handle screaming sirens and alarming 
readings, not knowing if they were involved in a drill or a real equipment failure that 
could result in an irreversible flooding of the ship. Later, as an aviator, he led helicopter 
squadrons in night anti-submarine maneuvers in the middle of the ocean. Such 
experiences led him to view operational leadership as producing high technical 
performance, sharp physical and mental dedication and a "dedicated, concerted 
commitment.” Will, in contrast relied primarily on administrative skills in the Civilian 
Engineer Corps.
Les stated that in a shipboard environment, a leader expected orders to be obeyed 
without hesitation. Shore command provided the experience o f working "more like a 
business type environment.” He saw ship command as leadership and shore command as 
management. The ability to command staff and get results was different on shore as well: 
When I was at sea. and I would say "Right full rudder." I could watch the bow of 
that ship turn to the right and know where I was going. When I [was] ashore and 
ordering “Right full rudder" and I’d wait and wait for something to happen with
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this organization. [I] reach a point where . . .  I don't care which direction it goes, 
just turn somewhere! Show me the bow is moving!
Nearly every participant confirmed that the style o f leadership they used in the military' 
was determined by the circumstances. This view is echoed in military literature: "The 
leadership style required in combat or the field is different because there is an overriding 
need to both protect the troops and to accomplish the mission" (Henderson. 1985. p.
164).
Interestingly, both Marines mentioned the stereotype of the authoritarian military 
leaders -  whom George referred to as “the screamers." They both agreed that officers 
solely using that style were ineffective. Bob described several assignments where he had 
been brought into a unit to do “damage control" in the wake o f an authoritarian CO. As 
Les described, being flexible and in control o f one's leadership style was a command 
asset, especially if the troops knew one was capable of using a tough, authoritarian style: 
f m a  sarcastic son-of-a-bitch sometimes. I can be intimidating when I want to be. 
but I can control that and. quite frankly, sometimes it comes in handy and I use it 
that way. But my personal style of leadership is walking around and asking 
questions . . . [and using] some common sense.
George referred to this tactic as consciously “yelling for impact, but never out of anger."
Ralph was the only participant to describe an incident involving a physical 
confrontation. He had "chewed [an enlisted man] up one side and down the other" in his 
quarters for making derogatory comments about other sailors' wives. The man had 
reacted by refusing to guard him during a social basketball game. Ralph responded by 
physically hitting the man open handed in the chest and swearing at him in front o f the
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whole crew. He felt that only “a very direct response [would] get him back on track 
again." He felt that such a strong impact was required to get the sailor out o f the rut he 
had fallen into.
Those who felt a KATN style was necessary agreed: 1) it can be used in the 
military in a way it could not be used in the public or private sector and 2) the knowledge 
that it can be used helps ensure orders are obeyed. It provides a balance to more common 
coaching styles. (See Table 4.)
Table 4: Description of Subtheme of Leading Staff, Contingency Leadership
Context Conditions Strategies Consequences
Operational
environment
KATN style Demanding, possible 




High mental & physical 
performance, handle 



















The nature of leading staff in the military is not a strict choice between styles. 
Operational and administrative environments place different demands on the staff in 
terms o f performance expectations.
It is tempting to draw a parallel between the operational and administrative 
environments and the leadership and management distinction outlined by many 
leadership scholars (Rost, 1993; Bennis & Nanus, 1985; Zaleznik, 1977). This is not
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valid, as it is certainly possible to practice and observe leadership in administrative 
settings involving significant change and collaborative efforts.
Nature o f Their Military Staff
Frank. Paul, Dan and Ted all commented on how their military careers gave them 
the experience of managing widely diverse groups from every walk o f life. All of the 
participants described the youth and inexperience of many o f those under their command 
as a condition that they had to address. Steve remarked that most of the enlisted he 
commanded were under 25. had little life experience away home, often had high school 
educations and "needed to be watched 24 hours a day." George described his experience 
as the commanding officer of a remote desert base as a time he "lived cringing over the 
young Marine, 18 years old. who wanted to go out and do something stupid . . .  I felt 
totally responsible for these individuals." The age. naivete and immaturity o f many 
subordinates places an "awesome responsibility" on military' officers who control aspects 
o f both the personal and professional lives of their crews
Complicating the situation is frequent personnel rotation. In general, military 
members change assignments every two to three years. Many of the military leadership 
strategies and structures address the challenge of creating cohesive, technically-capable 
units out of many youthful, inexperienced, diverse and continually rotating personnel. 
Some of these strategies are: selecting out. controlled environment, straightforward 
communications, training and development, values and standard operating procedures.
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Selecting Out.
The military does some initial "weeding out" of staff in boot camp. Bob. a retired 
Marine, cited the importance o f the initiating rituals of boot camp in identifying those 
suited to military life:
That's the reason they start skimming your hair off and requiring you to have 
shined boots, for requiring you to be able to bounce a quarter off the covers on 
your rack [bunk]. It’s kind of a rude awakening to a lot of people, and a lot of 
people rebel and never adjust to it. But that’s what they [the military] want to do. 
They want to identify that person who’s not going to be adaptable so they can get 
them out and focus on the people who can adapt and be effective.
Frank agreed that "those who don’t fit the system get sent home" during boot camp. A 
second way people are selected out is through the re-enlistment process. Officers, 
according to George, must “get tough, make the calls early and preclude re-enlistment" 
by writing honest performance appraisals and administering discipline. He described the 
leadership role in such circumstances as “balancing the real strong guy with the 
compassionate side. The true leaders can do both." The goal, in Dan’s words, is to retain 
those people with "the right stuff.”
Controlled Environment.
There are certain structures and practices that assist in building a cohesive unit. 
Among those cited by the participants are combat, foreign deployment, the shipboard 
experience and training/field maneuvers. Such assignments give those in command 
control over the essential elements o f an individual’s life. As Dan stated, “you eat. sleep, 
do everything with this same group.” In such circumstances, the troops are separated
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from their families, giving the leader a more powerful role. This is especially true on 
ship. Les described the interdependency of the shipboard relationship:
I would be a lot more involved with my subordinates on a shipboard environment 
where [we're] going to spend six to eight months at a time away from families 
and where it's going to be just us. They're going to rely on me. I'm going to rely 
on them.
On deployment, the leader has much more control over staff -  what movies they watch, 
when they work, when they sleep, when they cut their hair. Ralph described a submarine 
crew as the ultimate "captive audience."
This controlled environment gives the officer a unique opportunity to build 
camaraderie, unit pride and a common bond. Dan attributed the control of the operational 
environment as critical to success in his first command. He and his CPO dramatically 
reversed the poor performance and personal behavior of a unit in nine months in a 
situation where he and his CB unit were together 24 hours a day. Thus, the control 
military officers have over their units allows them to better build teamwork and to have 
more effect in managing the work performance and personal behavior in their crews.
Straightforward Communication.
The youth and inexperience of many of the enlisted staff may be a contributing 
factor to the use of straightforward, direct communication in the military. Orders are 
followed — literally. Paul summarized the importance of clear, direct communication:
You have to make sure people hear what you're saying and you have to be careful 
in your communication . . .  you make a comment about how you would like to see 
things done and that's exactly how they're going to do it.
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Vague or misleading directions can bring the wrong results. Dan related an episode that 
shaped his communication style. He had taken over a command as a new junior officer 
and had 90 performance evaluations to do. He asked the CPO to write up one evaluation 
for him to review. He was pleased with the format and type o f information the CPO 
included in the evaluation. He complimented the Chief and told him ”make them all like 
this." For three weeks the CPO typed the evaluations on a manual typewriter with carbon 
paper. The CPO then turned in 90 evaluations with exactly the same wording. The 
military environment forced Dan to adapt his communication style to what was expected 
within the organizational culture.
Another reason for straightforward communication is the importance of being 
honest with staff in order to develop the trust needed. There is a stereotype o f command 
and control communications in the military, but Les distinguished between 
communications in an operational setting versus everyday communications. As a 
commander, he wanted to communicate decisions and his rationale to staff whenever 
possible, so they were better informed, and would also develop trust in his decision­
making. Finally, it is also an expectation that officers be careful and judicious in their 
comments -  often communicating on a "need-to-know" basis. As Paul stated: "In the 
military you have to be careful, because a side comm ent. . .  could easily kill someone."
Training and Development.
Every participant mentioned their personal belief and commitment to the 
importance of training and staff development. As Paul stated, training is the military's 
"number one budget and operational priority." In the military, the rigorous training 
prepares the younger members of the force to quickly take on specific technical
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responsibilities and allows for some members with mediocre educational backgrounds to 
improve and take on responsible roles. The consistency o f the training also allows for 
staff to be rotated frequently while retaining quality and consistent performance. Each 
position has a required set of coursewcrk. Some have specific qualifications and 
credentials that must be earned. Steve worked in commands where each individual had a 
development plan in addition to the training requirements of their current position.
The military training program appears to have shaped the leadership views o f the 
officers interviewed. Notably, nearly half o f the participants mentioned their own 
experience with continuous professional development as a key reason they remained in 
the military.
Leading bv Values.
Participants were asked what caused individuals to go against human nature and 
place themselves in harm’s way to make what Paul termed "the ultimate sacrifice."
There were two principle areas o f response. The first had to do with the core values of 
the military — duty, honor, self-sacrifice and country which are instilled during the 
initiation process and reinforced throughout one's career (Janowitz. 1960; Nye. 1986; 
Dunivan, 1994). Sam believed that an understanding and commitment to these values 
comes from the military experience:
It’s the development of an understanding o f history, making people feel patriotism 
and to have a love for what the country stands for. . . .  I don’t think that most 
people join the military because [these values] naturally exist within them already.
Reproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1 2 8
While these values are introduced during basic training, it is the military officer who 
models and reinforces them during throughout one's career. The leader himself is the 
second factor cited as contributing to developing a willingness to risk one's life.
Perception of the Leader
Crucial to the notion of military leadership is the confidence and trust that the unit 
must have in its leader. Obedience comes with rank. As Will described it. military rank 
"carries the weight ... the respect.'' Officers "have got it to start with. It's sort of theirs 
to lose." The potential for combat requires that the individual members must be willing 
to put their lives in the hands of the person in command. Military officers can readily 
rely on the compliance of their subordinates. They have the opportunity to build upon the 
respect and develop deeper loyalties through their actions. The participants described 
command presence, trust in decision-making ability and loyalty as the factors critical to 
the unit's perception of the leader.
Command Presence and Ability.
Les defined command presence as knowing "the person is a leader just by the way 
the person carries himself, [by] the way they act." Ted saw it as "an aura . .  . where 
others feel comfortable you're in charge, wherever you are." An aspect o f command 
presence is the physical bearing of the officer — the uniform, personal neatness and 
grooming, etc. But command presence is more often found in the individual's actual 
manner. The phrases repeatedly used by participants were "in control" and "calm under 
pressure." Ted told a story of how his mentor could handle any situation — and remain in 
his captain's chair on the bridge:
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It amazes me the self-control he had and the confidence in his own abilities to be 
able to do [anything while] just sitting there and I can't think of when he ever 
allowed the ship to be unduly risked. He was just able to do it in a manner that 
[showed he] was very much in control and very calm, very capable.
Ted described another captain he met during a ship inspection: “When he got on die 
ship's intercom to talk, the sailors stopped; they listened . . . .  When he spoke. God 
spoke.” Les and Paul also cited examples o f command presence when describing their 
personal mentors.
The technical knowledge and physical ability o f the leader is one aspect of 
developing confidence in a leader and ties into the notion of leading by example. On a 
nuclear submarine, according to Ralph, the officers needed to display sufficient in-depth 
technical knowledge to assure personnel o f their own safety. This positioned them to 
demand a similar commitment to technical proficiency from their staff. The personal 
flying abilities o f the leader determined the respect given by subordinates in an aviation 
unit, according to Bob. In contrast, Will said that in a CB unit. “I've never though that 
the technical knowledge was the important factor in our business. It was really the 
administration or the management of organizations that was important."
Military leaders need to model that they can and are willing to do what their unit 
does in both technical and physical tasks. When taking on a new ship command, Ted 
would make it a point to go into the engine room and turn wrenches with the crew. Ralph 
described the extremely competitive and physical athletic games he organized with his 
units. George mentioned that Marine officers were expected to go on ten-mile runs with 
their troops carrying fully-loaded packs -  and to finish at the front:
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Participation from me was a big thing that increased their loyalty.. . .  We would 
run once a week as a unit and it was important that not only myself as the CO. but 
every other Department Head was out there.. . .  If you're making the run and 
leading the run . . .  it builds the esprit de corps . . . .  They enjoy seeing you out 
there. It just builds the excitement and everyone appreciates it.
He would also join his crew in the menial tasks involved in preparing for inspection. In 
all, an "in control'' deportment, technical ability, physical ability and personal 
involvement o f the officer all contributed to the officer's "public" image with the crew.
These lessons appear to have remained with nearly all the participants 
interviewed. All but one participant had an extremely neat office. Ten of the eleven 
participants appeared to remain in very fit condition.
An officer joining a unit is granted inherent respect, based on rank. As Will put it 
"it's yours to lose." The officer can also lose the respect of the crew by such actions as 
fraternization, allowing the crew to be disrespectful and excessive drinking. Officers can 
and should socialize with subordinates as long as they maintained the decorum o f their 
rank and position.
Trust in the Leader's Decision-Making.
The officer in command has the ultimate responsibility for decisions. The 
military unit must believe that the leader has the capability to make quality decisions and 
to provide for their well-being and safety. Sam. among others, used the process of 
briefing and educating his staff in non-critical times to build their confidence in his 
decision-making abilities:
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I felt that I had this responsibility to share with them the "why" [of what] we were 
doing, not just the "what." . . .  My thought process was. if we ever do get attacked 
or we get in a situation where [I] have to give orders. I believe that these people 
will follow me a lot better if they have developed a confidence in my judgm ent..
. When the bullets start flying, if I say “Do this or that." I don't have time for 
them to question me. I don’t have time for them to disobey me.
Demonstrating decision-making ability builds loyalty and confidence in the leader and 
consequently improved combat readiness.
Lovaltv.
A military maxim repeated by each interviewee was “take care of your troops."
The military leader needs to demonstrate a commitment to both looking out for the 
interests and protecting the safety o f staff to earn their loyalty in return. Paul described 
the symbiotic relationship o f loyalty between the officer and enlisted:
I mentioned that you had to get the confidence of the people you led. That 
confidence came from them knowing that my biggest asset wasn't the machinery, 
it wasn't the equipment, it was the people who run that ship. And you treat the 
people accordingly [as] a much higher priority.
Frank found this relationship to be one of the most dynamic aspects o f his military 
experience: “One of the biggest thrills o f being in charge is that they rely on you for that 
[protection].” Taking care o f  your crew can involve personal counseling, family support, 
providing rewards and recognition, looking after their comfort, encouraging their 
development, granting them additional authority and responsibility, getting resources and 
support for the mission, and much more. Many of the participants cited examples o f this
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described the personal satisfaction they had gotten from guiding a crew member through 
a troubling moment in his or her life.
Coupled with the notion of ensuring the safety of the unit is maintaining 
discipline. An officer who ignores discipline problems puts everyone else in jeopardy.
As Frank stated: “There’s no room for those who don’t obey orders." The theme 
repeated by all who discussed discipline was that it needed to be fair and consistently- 
applied to all. Each participant had been involved in serious discipline hearings in the 
military. One had dismissed over 50 sailors and another had presided over more than 200 
sessions of Commanding Officer’s Non-Judicial Punishment (NJP), known in the 
military' as the Captain’s Mast. All agreed that an officer's willingness to take action 
against those who violated rules was important to building loyalty' and unit cohesion. 
Motivating Staff
Recognizing and motivating staff is regarded as a core responsibility of military 
officers. A repeated theme raised by participants was that recognition was tied to the role 
o f the leader in setting high expectations, communicating them and promptly and 
consistently rewarding top performance. Participants cited a host of recognition tools 
available to officers: letters of commendation, parties, time off, awards, pay. medals and 
others. Dan felt that recognition strategies were one of the most important things he 
learned in his thirty years as a military' officer:
People always want recognition. They want to feel that they're important.. . .
One thing I learned was that you’ve got to be innovative. You just always have to
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look at the buttons to push on people. You just can't use the same code [with 
everyone].
The military also offers training and promotional opportunities as incentives. Paul 
viewed it as "in the military, you're only limited by your own capacity to do good work." 
Enlisted staff can rise to senior officer ranks, as in Ralph's case.
There were different views of the self-motivation o f enlisted staff. Paul discussed 
the high self-motivation o f staff. Whereas Steve. Ralph. Dan and Sam felt officers had an 
ongoing need and duty to ’'push" people to be their best. Ralph cited a case where a 
sailor who was a poor test taker refused to take a promotional test that he had failed 
several times before. Ralph ordered him to take the test and personally worked with him 
on test preparation. The experience o f watching that sailor pass the test and go on to a 
fine career with future promotions remains one the proudest accomplishments o f Ralph's 
career.
Building Teams: Camaraderie and Unit Cohesion
In a close operational environment, individual and team motivation are 
intertwined. The leader's standards and expectations can become transferred to the entire 
team, and an impetus to please the leader can become peer pressure. Ralph described 
how this happened on a submarine when some crewmembers pressured others to study 
for their qualifying tests. In Ralph's experience, when the leader sets high expectations 
and rewards achievement, "that kind of attitude is infectious and improves the whole 
organization overall."
Critical to managing military staff is building camaraderie among the troops. 
Colonel William Darryl Henderson, a combat commander and instructor at the National
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Defense University, defined camaraderie as what exists “when the small group, the 
organization and the leader come together" ensuring the group functions cohesively 
(1985. p. 9). According to Henderson, the military builds camaraderie through its 
informal culture (mission and values) and through structures that support the unit. The 
goal is to have individuals identify with their unit, de-emphasize their individuality and 
be willing to make the ultimate sacrifice for their crew . Experiences in boot camp and in 
operational environments, e.g.. shipboard, field exercises and foreign deployment, are 
structures previously discussed that help build unit cohesion.
Ted described building unit cohesion as “the challenge that I took on everyday of 
my military career/' In a shipboard environment, he would, like Bob. make certain he 
spent time working alongside his men. “I always wanted to portray that I was not better 
than them. I just had a different position. I was not afraid to get my hands dirty.” He 
would also meet with new members of the crew and promote to them that. “This is vour 
hom e.. . .  I want you to feel like this is yours."
It is more difficult to maintain that type of unit cohesion in an administrative 
setting such as in a shore facility. There were several strategies offered by the 
participants to maintaining cohesion in such an environment. Ralph and Frank discussed 
using competitive events to generate ongoing unit pride and identity -  Ralph employed 
athletics and Frank used inter-unit competitions. Others structured social events and 
gatherings. Les's strategy was to be as visible on shore as one would be on board ship:
Be visible, get around. Let people know you're still out there, you're still in 
charge and you're still concerned -  and what your concerns are. Often people 
would be more than happy to do what you want, [but] they don't know what it is
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you want, because it's getting filtered. . . .  People are more than willing to charge 
down that line you want them to go as long as they know what it is you want, and 
that you're not changing day to day.
This relates to the practice of direct, straightforward communication valued within the 
military. Clarity of mission ensures that direction is clear within so large an organization. 
The officer needs to communicate each individual’s role within that mission. Without a 
clear understanding of the mission and priorities the staff go in a host of directions and 
there can be no unit cohesion.
An additional aspect of building camaraderie is for the unit to know they have the 
support of their officers. For example, when bureaucratic mandates and directives 
coming from down the chain of command have a potentially negative impact, the leader 
may have the opportunity to demonstrate a commitment to “take care of the crew." Les 
described some occasions in administrative settings when had argued against 
implementing a bureaucratic procedure that was detrimental: “Sometimes the role of a 
good leader is to . . .  say, ‘Look, this is stupid. . . .  You’re tearing my people up. I can't 
keep doing it this way.’ and stand up and say ‘No.’" He added that one did not advertise 
“taking on’* the chain of command but that the unit "senses" when it has happened and 
that enhances loyalty.
Despite differences in their service areas, there was remarkable consistency in the 
strategies and practices described concerning leading people in the military. The main 
themes identified centered on the operational/administrative environments, the nature of 
staff, the perception of the leader, motivation, and building teamwork and camaraderie.
R eproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1 3 6
The key conditions that affect these conditions, the strategies used to address them and 
the leadership lessons learned are listed in Table 5.
Table 5: Description of Subtheme of Leading Staff
Context Conditions Strategies Consequences:
____________________________________________________ Leadership Lessons
Operational KATN style Demanding, possible High mental & physical
environment threats. performance, handle
Set & expect high stress. Obey orders
standards. without questions-.
Demand orders are Accomplish strategic
followed. mission.
Technical Set and demand high Increase technical
expertise standards. expertise. Accomplish
Model technical mission.
proficiency.
Administrative Coaching style Plan, coordinate. Accomplish
environment involve, and inform. programmatic mission.
Staff: some Select out those Boot camp. Be honest in appraisals.
young, lack who can't Honest performance "Make the tough calls" -
experience, adapt. appraisals. deal with discipline
poor education. May not let re-enlist. problems.
Continual staff Discipline.
changes.
Controlled Paternalistic system. Build camaraderie.
environment Do everything together. Turn around behavior.
Communication Orders followed Communicate clearly;
straightforward literally. speak directly.
state reason. Trust leader. Demonstrate your





Make up for poor 
education. Consistency 
despite rotation.
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Table 5. Leading Staff, continued
Context Conditions Strategies Consequences: 
Leadership Lessons
Willingness to 
go into harm's 
wav.
Shared values. Instill at orientation. 
Leader models & 
reinforces.
Lead bv values.
Willingness to Command Perception: leader is in Appear calm.
go into harm’s presence, calm, control, knows job and Maintain demeanor.
way: to follow 
leader.








place self in 

















will keep staff safe.
Build crew’s 
confidence in leader. 
Perception: we are in 
good hands.
Counsel all; be 




Be fair & apply to all. 
Take action to protect 
crew.
Set high expectations: 
communicate & 
reward; Promote for 
merit;
Values of unit identity. 
Structures: deployment, 
social events, sports, 
and competition.
Be visible: demonstrate 
support for staff.
Display abilities: work 
along side staff; stay fit. 
Respect is yours to lose.
If people trust your 
judgment they will obey
Take care o f your people.
Discipline builds loyalty 
and obedience.
People need to be pushed. 
Recognize individually. 
Reward & promote on 
merit.
Use events and structures. 
Demonstrate support. 
Work along side staff.
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The participants identified common core lessons in leadership, which they gained from 
their military experience. These lessons were shaped by the existing conditions facing 
the military and by the structures and strategies developed within the organization.
Theme Three: Leading Processes
Standard operating procedures (SOP's) are one o f the strategies that facilitate 
organizational consistency within a context of regular change in positional leaders and 
personnel. Paul summarized the philosophy of standard procedures as: “The guy who is 
implementing that procedure today could be dead tomorrow. Somebody has to take it up 
from where they did.*’
SOP’s are written procedures that exist for every common process from 
maintaining a boiler to ordering supplies. One participant related how he had taken over 
an assignment the day his new ship got underway -  a very complicated process. He 
“went by the manual" and left port with no complications. Military SOP’s are an aspect 
of the military bureaucracy that one had to learn to adjust to according to Frank:
Every piece o f paper had to be blessed all the way up so that there are forms for 
everything and everything had a form . . . .  We were given a certain amount of 
authority and you learned to live with it. . .  . It's those people who really got 
frustrated with that who got o u t.. . .  1 found I could adapt.
While all participants agreed that SOP's were absolutely essential in a combat situation, 
there were differing perspectives on their role in daily administrative functions. The civil 
engineers interv iewed displayed a “softer" commitment to sticking to SOP’s than did the 
ship commanders, the submariner and the aviators. Paul and Steve -  neither of whom
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have combat experience -  both talked at length about how success in the Civil 
Engineering Corps relied on going around the procedures. Steve described how he had at 
times circumvented procedures, yet still worked within the system:
I was constantly having to go around processes . . .  [that] didn't provide speedy- 
enough. quality enough or cheap enough results. I learned early on [about] the 
big difference between law and rules — arbitrary procedural rules, you know. 
Stepping over the line of the laws or statutes was one thing — you couldn't break 
those . . . but if [a procedure] was in the way. find a way around it.
Paul also discussed the distinction between procedures and law. He saw SOP?s as largely 
assisting enlisted staff by clearly laying out what needed to be done and helping them 
perform the tasks necessary to contribute to the mission regardless of whether they 
understand the "big picture."
A Leadership Decision: When to Break the Rules.
Each participant was asked to remember a time that he had made a decision to go 
against the rules or procedures, to describe the incident and explain his rationale. Not 
every' participant could recollect or was willing to discuss such an occasion. Below is a 
summary of the incidents related.
Bob discussed a low' point in his career when there had been major cuts in the 
aircraft maintenance budget. He w'as overseeing a program where his crew was stripping 
down planes for spare parts, working seven days a week and was still behind in repairs.
He became so frustrated that he turned in his resignation. A general met with him to 
negotiate what it would take for him to stay. Bob w'as concerned that the record of his 
attempted resignation "would be like having VD in your file." The general assured him
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that any such information would disappear. Bob did not make the decision to remove the 
information but supported it.
Dan brought up a case where one of his petty officers, an E-7. was convicted o f 
Driving Under the Influence (a DUI). The standard procedure was to put the conviction 
in the person's evaluation. Dan decided not to because the individual was a 
“tremendous" petty officer, had (in Dan's view) learned his lesson and would never again 
be promoted with a DUI in his record. As a result he eventually became a senior chief 
petty officer and “was considered one of the best senior enlisted in the Navv.”
Frank related how he was ordered to take 250 men to Somalia for a construction 
project -  prior to the outbreak of the recent civil war. The ambassador had told the State 
Department that the men could not carry weapons. Frank sent three men to do some 
assessment prior to the mission. His men were ambushed several times and had to bribe 
their way out of the situations. He re-contacted the State Department and told them his 
unit would need to be armed. The ambassador replied that this would be “too 
confrontational.'' Frank stood up to the State Department and the ambassador and 
refused to send his unit under those conditions. He was willing to end his career over the 
issue. He ultimately won the support of his superior officer and his unit did not go.
George provided an example o f  when he was involved in a joint Navy and Marine 
Corps exercise. Each had given him conflicting directives on the number and type of 
aircraft to include. He concurred with the Navy because the decision involved a safety 
issue concerning the amount o f space available on deck. As a result. “I was chewed 
probably the worst I’ve ever been . . .  [I made] the right decision, but it still didn’t help."
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In this case. George was willing to face the wTath o f his Marine commanding officer to 
protect his flight crew.
Les gave examples of being in a field command and receiving mandates to begin 
new administrative programs after talcing a cut in staff. To focus his limited crew on the 
critical tasks, he began to challenge some of the blanket administrative policy 
requirements such as launching a smoking cessation program:
You would either pick up the phone or write a letter. . .  and say “NO!” I used to 
love to do that, because I found after awhile that nobody wants to take on the guy. 
the leader in the field. Because no matter how big the bureaucracy is. when you 
get right down to it. they really do think in the Navy that the guy who is the 
commander on the ground somewhere is the first line, is the guy who knows 
what's going on. . . .  I found th a t. . .  when you say “no” often times nobody 
realizes there's nobody in a position to say “Wait a minute, you can't say 'no*'* 
because nobody back there knows who's in charge.
Les found it necessary to focus on the mission, and not to dilute and exhaust his resources 
on non-essential programs. Ted. also a ship captain, made comments very similar to 
Les's: “There just weren't enough man-hours in a day. wasn't the level of skill available 
to meet them all. . . . You're left doing selective compliance."
Paul described a case where higher command had told his unit to construct some 
paint floats with weathered, inferior materials. They completed the project and the 
customer rejected it. High command told them to require the customer to use it. Paul, as 
a junior officer with message release authority, sent a message directly to the admiral's 
office without first informing his commanding officer who was “more concerned with his
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ability to make captain than with his battalion." When word of his action had gotten out. 
the CPO told him that ‘’right now you have 400 people out here who. if you left the Navy 
right now to start your own construction company, would line up and sign up right now." 
The admiral intervened and made the needed changes as a result of Paul’s message
Steve mentioned two incidents. One was when he spent money improving some 
1000 housing Navy units even though the base was scheduled to close in three years and 
the directive from Washington was to not spend money on such bases. He and his 
captain agreed that the state of the housing was deplorable and was affecting the home 
life and personal security of the families. They improved the housing because "you’ve 
got to take care o f your people." In the second incident, he needed to complete a 
strategic construction project in 18 months at a cost o f $1 million. The standard 
procedure was to create a request for a military construction project that would take about 
five years. Instead, Steve divided the project into segments under $200,000 -  which 
could be authorized locally. He received approval for his small projects from local 
controllers and field level officers. Three months later the contracting office in 
Washington contacted him. He was told that he had broken contracting law and that 
"people have been thrown out of the Navy for doing this.” Steve explained the 
endorsements he'd gotten for these projects and left the contract officer with the 
impression that "he was going to have a lot o f people to deal with" if he interfered with 
its completion. Steve often had to be creative with project funding, but stated that, in this 
case, it could have ended his career, *T came close, I came real close on that one.”
Ralph, Will and Sam did not recall specific incidents. Will stated that, in general, 
he followed procedures, *Tm a pretty conservative person.”
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Table 6 summarizes the personal stories of the participants related to going 
around standard procedures and their rationale for taking such action.




Description o f  Incident Rationale
Bob Put in resignation over stripping 
planes for parts and working staff 
seven days a week.
Maintenance aualitv and safetv 
beine compromised. Take care of 
vour people.
Dan Did not record DUI conviction on 
officer’s performance evaluation.
Individual had learned his lesson 
faced end of career. Take care of 
vour people.
Frank Refused to send unit unarmed to 
Somalia despite directive from 
ambassador and State Department.
Safetv of his unit. Take care of 
vour people.
George Conflicting service directives. 
Followed Navy orders & scaled down 
the aircraft involved in an exercise.
Safetv issue -  not place too manv 
aircraft on the ship.
Les
Ted
Refused to implement some 
administrative directives.
When low on staff resources do 
the requests critical to the 
mission. Do not overtax staff on 
non-essential tasks.
Paul Sent letter to admiral over his 
commanding officer informing him 
of likely project failure.
High command staff making poor 
decisions and his commander was 
not looking out for the project.
Steve Upgraded military' housing though 
base was to be closed.
Violated contracting law by dividing 
$1 million project into smaller ones.
Poor housing -  affecting families. 
Take care of vour people.
Project was time sensitive and 




Did not cite an instance.
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The three reasons repeatedly cited for circumventing SOP's were: taking care of your 
people, safety and supporting the mission. Paul's story was the only one that appears to 
fall outside of these reasons. The paint floats under construction were not strategic. His 
story did not adequately portray his rationale for violating chain of command, and his 
report of the reactions o f the enlisted staff suggest his actions had a negative impact on 
organizational loyalty.
Interestingly, those responding to this question from the Civil Engineer Corps 
were more cavalier about procedures than the other participants. This could be because 
their work is most commonly managing projects and contracts. Those who had been in 
combat expressed a stronger commitment to the role of SOP’s. Dan emphasized that 
ignoring or going around the rules was dangerous:
You know, it’s not like M*A*S*H and McHale's Navy . . . because the rules are 
there for a reason and when you start bucking the system . . .  someone will get 
hurt, something will happen. Normally when there are disasters they can be traced 
back to people who didn't follow the established procedures and rules, and in the 
end someone gets hurt or killed and it's not a pretty sight. So you have to ask 
yourself what's the risk for.
A military leader works in an organization steeped in tradition and structured by standard 
operating procedures. Yet. the leader must be prepared and ensure the staff is prepared 
for immediate deployment. As such, the military could be looked at as operating as an 
organization of stability working within a context of uncertainty. Standard operating 
procedures contribute to both providing stability and enabling operations to continue
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under the most unpredictable and stressful circumstances. A good military leader adheres 
to SOP's. but also makes judgment calls about when to go around them.
Theme Four: Decision-making
One of the stereotypes of the military leader is that of an autocratic individual 
directing all aspects of the operation. To the contrary, the military is committed to 
developing leadership capabilities vertically within the organization to create a system 
where leaders are interchangeable and replaceable. This is critical to prepare for combat 
situations where an officer may suddenly need to assume a command. As such, it seeks 
to quickly build the decision-making capacity in its officers.
One of the features of military leadership development stated previously is 
granting officers responsibility early in their career. Frank reflected on his early 
experience: “Most college graduates. I think, start out slowly and work their way up.
But the military throws you in . . .  I kind of survived and was really excited about my 
responsibility.” A good senior officer teaches decision-making to junior officers by 
granting increasingly more decision authority, giving feedback on those decisions and by 
sharing the rationale for command decisions.
Those officers who remain in the military for a career have had the opportunity 
for broad decision-making experience and to be a part of command decisions. Each 
participant described instances where he relished the opportunity for challenging 
command assignments and. conversely, also described chaffing under a senior officer 
with a propensity to micro-manage. When Steve, for example, reflected on his most 
challenging assignment in the military, he was especially pleased that his team
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accomplished its mission with virtually no direction from up the chain of command. The 
military system of increasing responsibility and feedback is designed to build the self- 
confidence of officers, the quality o f their critical thinking and the speed of their 
decision-making. All three of these are required in a combat setting.
The style o f decision-making is not autocratic, nor is it consensus. The 
participants described experiences where, as junior and senior officers, they were 
exposed to the critical thinking process, they were given broad authority over their work 
and they were often brought in and consulted on true command decisions. But. the 
individual in command, as Sam described it. controlled the final decision:
Everybody knows in the military organization that the buck stops with the 
commanding officer -  he is to set the tone and direction for the whole command. 
Now’ he does that with . . .  other senior officers, discussing and most o f the time 
mutually deciding what this direction is going to be. And he relies upon his 
individual experts like his civil engineer or his doctor and chaplain or whatever, to 
provide him with advice and guidance in the particular field. But overall, if 
something goes wrong, it’s the CO's fault. And he knows that and so does 
everybody else. So they know -  and this is where power comes from — that 
power is distributed to all of the rest of us so long as we use it to follow the same 
direction, but we have some influence in setting that direction.
Authority and discretion are granted to those who demonstrate their abilities through their 
accomplishments and who follow the direction set by the commanding officer. Relying 
on the obedience of subordinates is just as critical in the officer ranks as it is with the
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enlisted. The officer in charge must know that when a critical situation arises, 
subordinate officers will obey orders without question.
As previously discussed, it is also essential that crew have the confidence in the 
officer's judgment and decision-making ability to follow orders unquestioningly. This 
involves several factors related to the perception o f a leader: command presence, quick 
decision-making and quality decision-making. In administrative settings, an officer can 
structure situations so that the crew can witness the decision-making process and thus 
gain confidence in the officer’s leadership abilities. A summary of the data on 
developing decision-making within military officers is contained in Table 7.
Table 7: Description of Subtheme of Decision-making. Condition: The Possibility
of War
Context Conditions Strategies Consequences: 
Leadership Lessons
Leader may Develop Early responsibility. Final decision is CO's. Input.
need to be decision­ gradually increasing. not consensus.
replaced making. Responsibility is a Relish independence.
quickly. reward Dislike micro-management.
The goal is to build the confidence and loyalty required ensuring that orders will be 
followed. Paul used a bit of humor to characterize military authority: “There's really no 
room for consensus. There are in a military system really only about five answers to any 
question. And that's ‘Yes sir; No sir; No excuse sir; I’ll find out sir; Aye, aye sir.' 
Nothing in there said ‘Why?’”
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Theme Five: Managing Change
All of the participants were in the service during periods of great organizational 
change. The post-Vietnam War era has been a period o f  reviewing, reflecting and re­
examining the mission and direction o f the military. Some o f the major changes taking 
place during this time include: focusing more on humanitarian and peace-keeping 
missions, transitioning to an all-volunteer force, becoming a more multi-cultural force, 
broadening the role of women, struggling with the issue of gays and lesbians in the 
military, changing the makeup of the fleet and introducing increasingly sophisticated 
weaponry. Being a part of facilitating that change was a shaping experience for the 
participants.
One of the unique aspects of change efforts in the military is that they often come 
as top-down directives or from outside the organization. The Navy's response to the 
ensuing scandal after women were assaulted by male officers during the 1991 Tailhook 
convention is an example o f how the military often implements change. In this case, the 
Navy declared a "zero tolerance" policy against sexual harassment, had the public affairs 
office of an admiral's staff develop training and mandated that training for all staff 
(Mason. 1995).
Ted gave another example of an organizational change he was a part of -  
changing the attitude and practices regarding alcohol use. As a ship captain, he did not 
have a role in setting the policies. He implemented directives that, for example, required 
that half of the beverages at social functions be sodas. He also enforced discipline 
policies regarding drinking and modeled moderation to his crew. The military had the 
control mechanism and practice of complying with orders to assist in driving the policy
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directives. As with any organizational change, he stated, it took years to change the 
actual attitudes. In both these cases, the role of the commanding or executive officer is in 
monitoring compliance rather than as a participant in developing the approach to change.
The military instituted a number of process improvement initiatives in the last two 
decades, many related to total quality management (TQM). This effort assisted in 
improving processes, broadening participation in decision-making and seeking 
consensus. There were many improvement programs introduced within the military 
within the last decade. Three o f the participants reflected a cynicism toward these change 
efforts, referring to them as "the flavor of the month.” The military’s approach to change 
is summarized below' in Table 8.
Table 8: Description of Subtheme of Leading Change.
Context Conditions Strategies Consequences: 
Leadership Lessons
Managing Change Top-down directives: Follow & implement
change. strategies officer does organizational change.
motivated bv implementation. Variety of programs can be
events. Utilize controlled seen as "flavor of the
environment. month.
What is significant about the nature of organizational change in the military is that it is 
generally directed from Washington, with local commanding officers largely tasked with 
carrying out the implementation. Some officers participated in process improvement 
efforts modeled after such programs as TQM. Responses from participants indicated that 
there was some degree of cynicism toward the variety of improvement programs 
instituted in recent years.
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This chapter first described the actual research and data analysis processes. It also 
contained the key themes identified in the participant data, the relationship of the data 
categories and a description o f an emergent theory on the nature o f military leadership.
The nature of military leadership is driven by the necessity of preparing for potential 
combat. The participant data revealed five key themes: leadership development, leading 
people, leading processes, decision-making and leading change. Rapid leadership 
development is a priority in the military where an officer may, on little notice, have to 
take command. As such, responsibility is given early and skills in leading staff and 
making decisions are developed through education, mentoring and command 
experiences. Shared concepts on leading people include using a contingency leadership 
style, firm but fair discipline, controlling the environment, straightforward 
communications, focusing on training and development, leading by values building 
camaraderie and developing command presence. SOP’s are valued as providing 
consistency across the organization and in the face of ongoing staff changes. Finally, 
much of the organizational change is centrally mandated.
In the next chapter, the data will be examined to reveal the applicability of 
military leadership strategies and practices to the public sector organizations. In addition, 
this theory will be triangulated with existing literature and research on the military and 
public sector in the final chapter.
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CHAPTER FIVE
DESCRIPTION OF THE KEY THEMES OF THE APPLICABILITY OF 
MILITARY LEADERSHIP TO THE PUBLIC SECTOR
Overview
The first chapter established that the purpose o f this research is to examine the 
leadership beliefs and practices learned by career military officers and their applicability 
to the public sector. The second chapter reviewed relevant literature on the 
organizational cultures o f the military and public sector, career transitions, the nature of 
organizational change, and current change trends in public sector organizations. The 
third chapter discussed qualitative research, grounded theory methodology and the 
specific research steps and protocol used in this study. The fourth chapter examined the 
data gathered concerning the leadership perspectives and practices learned in the military 
and proposed a construct of military leadership based on grounded theory methodology.
The goal of this chapter is to identify the similarities and differences in the 
organizational context, conditions and structures between the military and the public 
sector as experienced by this study's participants. Highlighting any differences does not 
suggest that they are challenges that retired officers cannot adjust to. The intent is to 
identify both these challenges and any strategies that retired officers utilized to adapt to 
these differences or utilized to improve the public organizations they joined. The last
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chapter will compared the data to relevant literature and examine the implications o f the 
findings for leadership and for the public sector.
Causal Condition: The Movement o f Military Officers to the Public Sector
The transition of retiring military officers to a civilian career represents a 
significant life event. They leave an organization that has been a central part o f their 
professional and social lives for 20 to 30 years. Transitioning officers enter a new 
organization, perhaps with some similarities, but certainly with many differences from 
the unique culture o f the military. This chapter explores the experiences of the eleven 
participants taking on leadership roles in the public sector. It focuses on the applicability 
of leadership strategies and practices learned during their military careers, and discusses 
which of these strategies and practices assisted them in facing the challenges encountered 
in their new positions as mid-managers and executives in local government.
The interview data revealed four key subthemes -  leading public sector staff, 
organizational relationships, leading public sector processes, and encountering 
stereotypes of retired military officers — which are discussed in the following sections. 
These military leadership strategies and practices will be examined to determine how 
they meet the current challenges of public sector leadership.
Transition to the Public Sector
The participants interviewed had a wide variety of experiences in leaving their 
military' careers and entering public sector employment. There were different reasons 
cited for entering the public sector. Three chose government employment because they 
felt closer to public service values than to the values of the business world. As Dan
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stated: ‘̂ Public service, honesty, integrity are those traits valued here . . .  In the private 
world they always work toward bottom line and profit.” Ted also was drawn to the 
mission of continuing to serve the public. He knew he wanted to work in government 
when he retired, and entered a Master's program in Public Administration to prepare 
himself. Four specifically stated they refused to work for defense contractors, to avoid 
what they saw' as conflicts of interest.
Others, particularly those from the Civil Engineer Corps, found government to be 
a natural transition because the work of managing large scale construction contracts, 
public works or facilities operations was so similar to their work in the military. Finally, 
some entered the public sector because a personal associate in a government agency had 
contacted them about applying for a job opening. Three of the participants were steered 
toward a job by former commanding officers.
Both of the two aviators now' working in airport management -  Bob and Ralph -  
had difficulties in finding employment. At the time of their military retirement, their 
skills were not in demand in the private sector and defense contractors were downsizing. 
Bob found the memory of the job search particularly painful, even five years later: ”So 
here I was 'a  trained killer' and those jobs with military contractors weren't there. It w'as 
a rough transition until the airport opened up." George, a marine aviator, found work 
quickly, but admitted that he devoted a great deal of energy during his last year of 
military service to job hunting and preparation: "I was probably not the best marine that 
year because I just don't think you can do your military job [adequately] and 
[simultaneously do] a job search.” Ted. a retired ship captain, had a difficult job search: 
"I sent out 50, 60 resumes and did not get one bite!” He decided to work as a volunteer
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intern with a local government agency to try to make contacts. At a particularly low 
point in his job search, he was turned down for a volunteer position because he had too 
much experience. George. Paul. Will and Les on the other hand, had jobs before they left 
the service. All but three participants found employment within six months. In general, 
the civil engineers had an easier job search.
There were varied assessments on the ease of the transition. Les had found just 
dressing for work to be stressful: “I’ve got to pick out a shirt and tie that match that 
aren't khaki or blue and white -  and to this day I have trouble with that." He has also had 
to break the code of corporate dress:
I got hired in August. I went out and bought a bunch of clothes. One of the 
things I have always worn is short sleeves. I start to notice in meetings that 
everyone is wearing a long sleeve shirt. I’m thinking to myself. "You know, 
there’s probably something here. There’s a reason for this." So finally I cornered 
a retired admiral who sits on a board with me and he told me. "Short sleeve shirts 
are shop foremen. Long sleeve shirts are CEO’s." Well I never heard that said 
before, so I learn as I go along.
For Les. this was one of the experiences that brought home to him that he was in a new 
culture, and that he had to look for signals and cues on appropriate behavior. Frank had a 
similar revelation when he had to counsel a female secretary about wearing low cut 
blouses to the office. During his over 25 years in the service, he had never had such a 
discussion.
Not every participant could relate such a moment and some denied when asked 
directly that there were significant differences between the public sector and the military.
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Dan. Paul. Sam. Steve and Will all mentioned that they had worked extensively 
managing federal employees which gave them valuable experience in leading civilian 
staff and with a government civil service system. Dan remarked that about half of the 
jobs he oversaw in the military were done by federal employees or by civilian 
contractors, so he '‘didn’t have an identity crisis” when he entered local government. Dan 
began by saying that he’d had "a very easy transition” but reversed himself after some 
reflection and acknowledged that he had faced some adjustments, admitting. “No 
transition is ever easy.” Paul was emphatic that there were no transition issues for him: 
“People can’t believe I came from Annapolis.. . .  I’m a little unique because of my Civil 
Engineer Corps background. I’d say my hardest transition was that I didn’t have my hat 
on my head.” George considered one particular aspect o f his military experience helpful 
in making the transition: “In the military we change jobs every two to three years. The 
mere fact that I left one job and was coming to a new one was not strange." Will 
believed that changing jobs frequently in the military taught him how to enter an 
organization and affect change.
Early in the interviews and during the initial phone contacts, many o f the retired 
officers stated that they had not had transition issues. There appeared to be a certain 
amount of denial at least initially about the difficulties experienced in working in the 
public sector. For example. Sam remarked that he and other Civil Engineer Corps 
officers probably had an easier time entering the public sector and that pilots probably 
had the more difficult transitions. Yet Sam was one of the two participants who left the 
public sector because o f frustration. Paul repeatedly commented during the interview
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that he had experienced no transition issues, and yet he was by far the most critical of 
public sector staff, processes and leadership.
Whether or not they were willing to directly acknowledge it. each participant 
ultimately described differences between the two organizations and some strategies they 
utilized to manage these differences. The interview data identified the key issues of the 
transition to the public sector as leading staff, organizational relationships, leading 
processes and encountering stereotypes. The next sections discuss these themes, the 
organizational context (structures and processes) that affects them and the strategies the 
participants used to manage them.
Theme One: Leading Staff in the Public Sector
Leading staff in a government agency presented some different challenges for the 
participants. They faced rules and structures different from those in the military. There 
are now set working hours, and salaries are a budgeted item. Public sector managers 
must operate within the parameters of the Federal Labor Standards Act and a civil service 
system. All but one of those interviewed now worked in a unionized agency. Re­
enlistment options have been replaced by expectations of "lifetime employment" by 
many public employees. Participants also noted that they had experienced differences in 
the staff, workforce mobility, employee expectations, communication styles, training and 
education levels and teamwork in the public sector.
The rules and the culture o f the public sector exclude some o f the practices used 
in the military. For Frank, entering the public sector meant recognizing “the ‘kick ass, 
take names’ part o f [leadership] can’t work here. So you have to drop it completely.’’ He
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moved to leading full-time with the coaching and teamwork skills he learned in the 
military. Ralph too. discussed abandoning the more intimidating methods he sometimes 
drew upon in the military. He had related a story about pushing and swearing at an 
enlisted man whose behavior was egregious and drew the parallel to the public sector: 
"Can you imagine [if I had done that] in the civilian sector with unions? Fd be fired." 
(However. Ralph's use of physical force would also not be condoned by the sendees.)
Many of the participants made a connection between leading public sector staff 
and leading in a military administrative environment. Among the leadership strengths 
they cited from their military careers were their experiences in leading diverse groups and 
building teamwork. Participants identified some differences in what Strauss and Corbin 
(1990) called the "organizational contexts" o f the military and the public sector that 
affect leading staff. These key differences included: the nature of the staff, the 
classification system, staff retention, commitment to training and development, teamwork 
and camaraderie, managing performance, communication styles, executive leadership and 
values and ethics.
View of Public Sector Employees
None of the participants made any blanket statements about having a preference 
for leading government versus military work units. According to Steve, there are "really 
outstanding performers" and "troubled employees" in both sectors. But there were some 
general differences noted between the two. Both Steve and George commented that the 
government staff members were generally older, more independent from the organization 
and more savvy in workplace issues than was the case in the military. George noted that 
public sector employees want to know how policy changes are going to affect their
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retirement, their taxes and their deferred compensation. He rarely got those kinds of 
questions from his marines:
In the civilian community, I think people are wiser. You take an eighteen-vear- 
old in the military. They're not thinking benefits. The military is taking care of 
that individual. All they have to think about a lot o f times is are they doing their 
job. staying out o f trouble and, hopefully to some degree, being successful.. . .  
Whereas out here people are thinking benefits, thinking their paycheck. We just 
do not have the same control over people out here. One thing I had to learn [was] 
. . .  to treat people differently than I would in the Marine Corps. I think they're 
just a little smarter and sharper out here.
The Corps and the armed services in general have a paternalistic culture where members 
felt more trust that they were being taken care of. George found that his government 
employees wanted changes explained to them, particularly when policy changes affected 
their paychecks and benefits. After a recent contract negotiation, he was deluged with 
questions about its impact on employees' deferred compensation plans and their 401 (k)’s. 
He ultimately scheduled a series of staff meetings where he had to answer some complex 
financial questions. "You had to address them at a different level than you would in the 
military." He initially made the error of just issuing a written notification of changes, but 
had found that memos generated rumors. He now has more meetings to keep people 
informed: "It may not build loyalty, [but] it just keeps them from getting the negative 
attitude." He observed that there was less trust between government managers and line 
staff than between officers and enlisted.
Reproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
As George noted, public sector leaders have significantly less control over their 
staff than do military officers. Frank joked that: “There’s just getting used to the fact 
that everyone has a choice where to eat and where they go home at night/' Some 
participants volunteered that there was a moment that highlighted the difference between 
the two organizations. For George it was as simple as realizing that, to get all the 
employees to turn in a form, he couldn't just order them into a room and issue pencils. 
For Frank, his counseling session with a female secretary about inappropriate office attire 
demonstrated to him the limits of his influence as a public sector manager. He could no 
longer order what people wore and when they got haircuts. The progressive discipline 
system defined the multiple steps he needed to take to initiate formal action against an 
employee. Coaching, counseling and influence skills were now his primary tools for 
shaping the behavior o f staff when, in the case of proper dress, the threat of action is 
remote.
One of the areas that demonstrated this lack o f  control was in gaining compliance 
-  simply getting individuals to do what they were instructed to do. Paul, who leads a 
professional group of engineers, architects and project managers was “shocked" that 
some staff did not follow a directive he gave them three times. He found this a stark 
contrast to the military where: “If I gave [a direct] order, it happened." He has learned to 
follow-up on assignments he gives. This has been a source of frustration for him. as he 
feels “if you direct that something be done, you should have 98% confidence that it's 
going to happen." He added that he has confronted one staff member and suggested he 
leave the organization if he can't follow directives.
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Paul was one of the most critical of civil service employees. He found many 
public employees to be “cynical” and resistant to change. He commented that, rather 
than support change efforts, they seemed to be waiting them out with a “this too shall 
pass’" attitude. He was disturbed by individuals who seemed to lack commitment and to 
be disconnected from the organization’s values. He watched for “the smaller indicators" 
such as whether a person's desk was cleared by 4:01 p.m. each day and whether he or she 
submitted mileage reimbursement requests for as few as three miles:
I try to take a view of loyalty, commitment and public good -  all those things. I 
look at those indicators, and they’re small, but I roll those into some other job 
performance issues, and I tend to doubt whether that person is committed to the 
values 100% . . . .  They’re the person (sic) who’s most likely not promotable. who 
won’t advance very quickly in the organization.
There were different views expressed on the nature of public sector employees, ranging 
from “more sophisticated" to “lacking commitment." While acknowledging the bright 
spots in their organizations, both Paul and Ralph expressed frustration with some of the 
staff they had inherited.
Many of the participants who served in the Civil Engineering Corps, had managed 
large numbers of federal civil service staff, particularly on public works and contract 
management assignments. Steve, for example, remarked that he had spent 18 of his 20 
military years managing federal, blue collar workers. Some participants who had 
experience with the federal system expressed a somewhat cynical attitude toward 
government workers and processes, and fatalism toward what could be accomplished 
within government. Steve remarked that he faced some “low motivation,” stereotypical
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behavior from some of the federal government employees he managed and had 
difficulties in getting results within the civil service system. Dan amusingly- 
characterized the processes within the federal government as following the motto. “We'll 
do no job before its time.” The concern over the effects of these experiences is whether 
they will translate into an acceptance and expectation of mediocrity in the government 
agencies they now lead.
Lack of Flexibility: The Civil Service Classification System
Participants also expressed frustration about the public sector human resources 
systems that limited their ability' to address personnel and staffing issues. Some 
addressed the lack of flexibility' and restrictions within the classification / personnel 
structure of civilian government organizations. As Ralph described it, in the military, 
people did whatever needed to be done to accomplish the mission. As an airport 
manager, he now has restrictions:
There are limitations [here] on your resources.. . .  You don't encounter those 
kinds of things in the military', you know. If you have something that needs to be 
done, if it's heavy, physical work and the guy's an Electronics Technician or an 
Electrician, you can still assign him to do that. We do whatever we have to do to 
support our detachments and our commitments.. . .  Here, people come back and 
say, "That's no t . . .  in my classification. I'm going to call the union."
Ralph has had to handle disagreements with the union over job assignments. He says his 
manager has coached him on reviewing job descriptions with employees “step by step, 
item by item and tell them what the expectations are.” The most important lesson he has 
learned since coming to the public sector is to “document everything.”
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Paul faced a problem where the system had not kept pace with the actual work 
done. He had staff working at jobs that have evolved, while the job description, title, and 
pay have not:
There are some pay issues [in] civil service that the military didn't have to deal 
with. We just took all the responsibility -  as much as they could give to you.
What you got paid didn't matter. Now on the civilian side, that salary is a big 
[issue] for folks. We have some pay discrepancies within the organization now 
with some people having incredible accountability and responsibility and not 
getting paid as much as people who have less. I'm not so sure I can fix that 
myself, but I can be an advocate.
After two years of his lobbying, the centralized human resources system only 
implemented some of the classifications and pay changes Paul saw as necessary. For 
both Ralph and Paul, the inflexibility of the system affected the work product. In Paul's 
case, it also affected his ability to take care of his people. Despite their frustrations, 
neither has attempted to affect change in the HR area. George and Dan have found that 
they have adopted the strategies available within the context o f the public sector and 
worked on reorganizations within their work units. Dan also has focused on selecting 
quality staff, an option he did not have in the Navy where "you have to play the cards 
you're dealt. At least [here] you get to pick your cards.”
Staff Retention: The Culture of Lifetime Employment
An interesting insight of some of the participants is the view that the culture of 
lifetime employment within the context o f a small organization is unhealthy for both the 
organization and the individual. Dan is working to change that in his organization:
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You need to be bringing in good people in at the bottom o f the organization, 
working them up through the ranks, and then shooting them out to the side to go 
either to another department or go out to the private sector. I mean, that is a 
healthy organization. An organization where everyone stays put. and there's no 
change or mobility, that's sick! It's just gonna die. What [I'm] trying to do is 
change the thinking.
Dan wants upward mobility and development to become a value in his organization.
Both Steve, Will and Dan all viewed the military practice of moving staff every two to 
three years as positive because it accustomed people to change.
Dan observed that the continual staffing changes also brought fresh perspective 
into the unit, combating the ‘'we’ve always done it this way" syndrome. He is trying to 
change the stagnation in his current organization by introducing a new paradigm that staff 
turnover is positive. He is training his managers not to hire people who are seeking just 
to "stay here until [they] get a gold watch." During a recent reengineering effort, he 
created a team that designed alternative career paths — a plan he's very proud of because 
he feels it will make a difference for individual staff and for the long-term health of the 
organization.
The high turnover rate of enlisted within the military also prepared officers to 
cope with staffing changes where the loss o f a single employee was regarded as routine. 
Will noticed that in his agency, "when somebody who is doing a good job wants to leave 
here, everybody gets all excited and [feels] the whole world is falling apart and [wonders] 
what can we do to make [them] stay." He took the position that the organization should 
end the practice of trying to keep existing staff by reclassifying positions to raise salaries.
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but rather pay for the proficiency level needed. He regards moving around during a 
career as "part o f how you get ahead in life.”
Some participants saw the government culture of lifetime employment as a 
detriment to both public organizations and their individual staff. A few of the retired 
officers have acted to change some o f the selection and promotion practices as well as the 
pay and career development structures within their organization to infuse new ideas into 
their organizations and enhance employee morale.
Training and Development
Another difference noted between the military and the public sector is the 
commitment to training and development. Frank observed that government employees 
are often better educated tha:; military enlisted personnel, but that the military staff 
receives more ongoing training. The military’s philosophy is to train a talented person 
for a position; government's philosophy is to hire a person who already has the education 
and skills for the job. Frank found it a "different challenge" trying to get an older, more 
experienced workforce to apply school education received decades ago to a changing 
work setting.
Other participants were more critical of the failure of government organizations to 
adequately train their staff. Paul estimated that comparable military members receive ten 
times the ongoing training of public sector employees. He found many professionals 
"inadequately trained for what they are doing and probably not even understanding the 
job they are supposed to be doing because [it] had changed" since they were hired.
Nearly every participant mentioned skill and training deficiencies in their workforce, with 
few budget resources allocated to keep staff up-to-date in their fields.
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Will was the exception: he found a good level o f technical proficiency in his 
organization. He focused on expanding computer training, introducing customer service 
training and creating a leadership academy within his organization. Now all individuals 
receive training annually. In contrast. Dan and Ted work in organizations with no 
significant funds for training. Both are trying to establish small-scale, in-house offerings.
Paul. Dan and Sam expressed disappointed over the absence o f a leadership 
development strategy in their organizations. Sam pointedly stated that. "Somewhere 
along the line, upper management and leadership lost the focus that it wras their 
responsibility to develop the managers and leaders beneath them to someday take their 
jobs.’" Paul related that he currently has no internal candidates to fill a high-level position 
in his organization managing about 30 professional technical staff:
There's absolutely nobody qualified within the organization right now to fill the 
position . . . .  [It's] shocking actually.. . .  That tells you that you have an awful 
lot o f followers and nobody trained or equipped to be a leader. That's not good 
for an organization.
The lack of an upward mobility program for members can lead to organizational 
stagnation as people remain in the same position for years, which can also affect morale. 
Dan and Will initiated leadership development programs to begin to address this.
This also means that military officers transitioning to the public sector may 
encounter a "shallow bench." The CO's team is simply not there for them to use as a 
sounding board for ideas and decisions. Paul was attempting to create what he calls his 
"inner circle" -  a group composed of staff who display a good work ethic and "have the 
goals and the objectives" of the organization at heart:
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I tend to pull them in probably closer than other folks. I would probably talk to 
them about issues where a lot of managers would not. I use them as sounding 
boards and reality checks. I may be describing things to this person that I 
probably shouldn't. It may involve other people. It may involve opinions, 
personal opinions . . .  [to] have that level of [candor] that you sometimes miss as 
an executive working within a department.
Paul noted that the government did not have restrictions on fraternization. This left him 
freer to expand his circle wider than he could in the military. His description o f his 
"inner circle" suggests that he may face future issues concerning breaches of 
confidentiality and disparate treatment — two serious issues in public sector personnel 
practice.
Several senior participants who retired at the rank o f captain, left a command with 
a team of commanders, lieutenant commanders and lieutenants, many with Master's 
degrees, eager for decision-making authority and supported by veteran chief petty 
officers seasoned in managing people. They entered organizations with a very slim 
management or supervisory staff. Some retired officers, who entered small agencies or 
small city governments, transitioned into organizations where the entire support staff was 
a clerk and a few supervisors. They left a team of executives; now they have to do it all. 
Building Teamwork in the Public Sector
The military has institutions and practices that build teamwork, e.g.. boot camp, 
overseas deployment, operational assignments and competitions, that are not available 
within the public sector. Each participant was asked how one could build teamwork in a 
public sector setting. Some common themes emerged from their responses. Primary
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among them was identifying goals, communicating them and creating systems that 
rewarded and valued the goals. Frank acknowledged that it is difficult to build teamwork 
in the current downsizing environment within his agency:
You have to be loyal to your people, or they won't be loyal to you. Obviously, if 
you want their trust and their confidence, want them to be a decent team, you 
want them to be loyal. If they know you want to get rid o f their jobs, or you 
won't protect them . . .  If they know that, you’ll never get anything done.
Frank and Dan both voiced that the “bottom-line” business rhetoric currently popular 
with some elected officials and public sector executives is counter to building teamwork.
Both Frank and Steve advocated a leader-centered view o f teamwork based on 
strong communication. Frank believed the leader’s willingness to share information was 
important to building a team in the public sector. For Steve, the role o f a leader is “to be 
honest with your people at all times” and “share the reason for decisions.” This will 
build trust and loyalty in the leader and. in turn, develop trust in the organization.
Ted strove to create a climate in his public works organization where individuals 
see the organization as theirs -  similar to the climate he created on his ships. He 
delegated authority to his supervisors over their divisions and made it clear that his role 
was to support them:
I emphasized this from day one when I became the director. “That's your 
division. Whatever happens in it is yours. I want to be informed. If you need 
decisions. I expect you to make them. Give me the right information and I will 
[support you].”
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He was “blessed" with good supervisors who welcomed their added responsibility and 
authority. He saw the supervisors in turn, take the same approach with line staff. 
Consequently, he witnessed a change in the motivation and the performance within his 
organization: “The level of maintenance of public properties and of public goods has 
improved substantially. I’m routinely astounded at how many o f these guys, even at the
entry level------have taken their jobs with such pride." He firmly believed that “building
a sense of ownership" is key to building teamwork in the public sector as it was aboard 
ship. In addition, he introduced lunchtime quarterly social events for the entire 
department to build more camaraderie.
Recognition of top team performance was also a key strategy discussed. Will, for 
example, included teamwork on performance appraisals and created a quarterly team 
recognition award to supplant the individual awards the organization traditionally gave. 
While not having the same structures that the military provided to enhance teamwork, 
many o f the same practices participants learned in the military -  such as communicating 
goals, sharing information and creating a sense of ownership -  are also effective in the 
public sector.
Communication
A direct communication style is often used in the military because 1) it is critical 
in combat that orders are clear: 2) directives tend to be followed literally so it is important 
to eliminate ambiguity in instructions; and 3) specific directions require less judgment 
from young and inexperienced enlisted members. This very direct style of 
communication can distance a retired officer from others and can cause conflicts. Bob 
observed that “people in the civilian atmosphere . . .  aren’t used to dealing with people as
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straightforwardly as we're used to dealing with people." He admitted that his blunt 
communication style, especially in his initial days, caused problems with staff and 
customers.
Several o f the retired officers have run into difficulty because o f their direct 
communication style. One participant related a story about a staff meeting where he had 
discussed the substandard performance of an individual, without naming his name, but 
gave enough detail so people knew who the individual was. He defended this approach 
as an effective way of sending a message to the employee, however, he was subsequently 
contacted by the employee’s attorney. Some of the participants related incidents that 
indicated the direct and blunt communication style learned in the military brought 
complications with customers, the union and in one case, an employee’s attorney. Bob 
acknowledged that he has adjusted his style. Dan also mentioned that he has received 
some criticism about his pointed sense of humor and remarked that some staff search for 
issues to criticize management. He now "thinks twice" before speaking. He also found it 
frustrating that he had to speak carefully around discipline and counseling matters. 
Sometimes, he said, he just wanted to say: '"Get a life. Get a grip on yourself. If you 
don’t like it, get another employer.’ But instead, we have to pussyfoot around."
A second communication issue cited by participants was the need to "lose” their 
military jargon. Almost half the participants commented on how they needed to 
consciously guard against reverting back to military phrases and acronyms. Steve joked 
about an incident when he was trying to lead a discussion with his some o f his executive 
team: "I used the expression. ‘Can you get a strawman put together on this issue?’ Then 
I came to realize that no one at the table knew what the hell what I was talking about.
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They all had a totally different guess o f what a “strawman" was." When Steve first joined 
the organization as a deputy director, one of his peers used to challenge him publicly 
when he used military jargon by asking him. "What do you mean by that." It made Steve 
sensitive to how jargon could confuse his staff, set him apart from others and give him 
what he termed "the ex-Navy rap."
George acknowledged that he struggled to stop saying "yes sir" and "no sir." 
George's manager, who is younger than he. reacted uncomfortably to such Marine Corps 
formalities. The retired officer has consciously worked to become more informal so that 
he would be more easily seen as part o f the team rather than as the only retired Marine on 
staff. Sam found he had to get used to the informality o f co-workers and subordinates 
who called him by his first name.
A majority o f the participants found that they had to change to a more "civilian" 
communication style. This encompassed adopting a less direct and blunt style, avoiding 
military jargon and speaking less formally to their superiors.
Managing Performance: Discipline and Recognition
A standard feature of the military discipline system is ensuring that the crew 
knows the rules and that leaders apply them consistently and fairly. NJP rests a great 
deal of authority on senior officers. This is in sharp contrast to the typical public sector 
organization that operates within a civil service system.
Paul felt that, as a military officer he could work with "the whole person" when 
there was a performance or discipline problem. Officers counseled staff on personal 
issues, worked on family problems and really got involved to "put this person back on 
course." Whenever a matter had to be elevated to Captain's Mast. Paul felt he had "failed
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in some wav." In his experience, individuals with problems sent "early signals." The 
leader's job was to watch for and intervene early: "You want to inject yourself [right 
away] to get this person back on course. And so you put effort into this person, as much 
as you possibly can.” In the public sector by contrast, he can focus solely on work 
performance. He saw few avenues for affecting some of the personal issues that might be 
at the core of an employee's problem.
It is worth noting that many of the participants shared stories about working 
intimately with troubled staff and their families in the military. Making a difference in 
the lives of individuals was repeatedly cited as one of the most rewarding aspects of a 
military career. Within the public sector, managers cannot order members to utilize an 
employee assistance program [EAP] and a manager will not be given any information 
about the nature of EAP-related issues without a signed legal waiver from the employee. 
Thus, the manager is hampered from addressing the real issues and is left to operate 
within the lengthy, cumbersome civil sendee process.
Dan bluntly stated that the civil service discipline system is an impediment to 
building teamwork and loyalty in public sector organizations. He cited two extreme 
examples in his organization. He raised questions about an employee who had 
demonstrated bizarre behavior. The Personnel Officer informed him that he could not 
take action because the person was not "technically mentally ill." He also objected to an 
employee who made negative statements against the agency head at a televised public 
hearing. Dan was shocked that the employee was allowed to testily against his superior 
and then return to his desk the same day: "To me the disciplinary system and civil 
service need to be totally reorganized. You're never going to get [cohesion and loyalty]
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unless you start dealing with these people who have legitimate problems." Both George 
and Ralph felt that some employees used "open door" policies to go around the authority 
of their supervisors. They felt this undermined discipline and authority.
Participants agreed that the civil service system was an ineffective tool for 
monitoring staff behavior. Dan expressed that civil service hearings were, "frankly, 
unpredictable." Often, he observed, “it's a roll o f the dice." Paul criticized the discipline 
process for simply taking so long and requiring so much effort by supervisors. He added 
that it was easier to discharge an offender in the military than to terminate an employee in 
his organization. As a result, he observed, many public sector managers take no action 
with problem employees: “People find it easier to pass that problem off on somebody 
else . . .  promoting him up or reassigning him out o f the division." Sam witnessed public 
sector managers who w'ere unwilling to take action and who made excuses and 
exceptions for their employees: “I had been spending time with the people in my 
department in individual discussions and counseling . . .  but none of the other 
departments did. Instead, they were always finding reasons to justify why [each] was a 
special case." In all. those retired officers having experience w'ith the public sector 
discipline system found it frustrating and ineffective.
George, the only participant who works in a non-union agency, discussed how he 
and the agency director used the reorganization process to "get rid of people who were 
not working as a team." He said that his military experience made it easier for him to do 
the reorganization: "I have a little bit easier time calling a spade a spade if someone 
[isn't] producing or we don't need the position." George's situation is unique, however.
In a unionized environment, seniority drives the layoff procedure.
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The second part of managing performance is recognition. The principles of 
recognition -  giving prompt feedback that is meaningful to the individual, rewarding 
behaviors significant to the organization and rewarding based on merit -  are universal, 
regardless of the organization. What is different between the pubic and military sectors 
are the recognition tools available. The military has a variety o f recognition options 
including commendation letters, time off. awards, pay and medals. In the public sector, 
intrinsic awards are available but pay increases are generally automatic based on time in a 
classification. Some agencies are considering going to a "pay for performance" model, 
but many of those now in existence are blanket programs where all employees share 
equally in any payouts regardless o f individual performance. None of the participants 
worked in an agency with a merit pay system.
Dan questioned some of the blanket recognition programs that give cash awards 
to an entire department regardless of individual effort. He viewed them as "encouraging 
mediocrity instead o f rewarding those who bust their rear ends." Several stated that they 
would like to have the authority to grant pay differentials to top performers instead of 
relying on the "step increase" system that rewards time in a position.
Both Ralph and Paul commented that their organizations relied too much on 
formal quarterly recognition events that they felt were too general and too distant from 
the actual performance to be effective rewards. Ralph was more openly critical of the 
recognition practices in his organization. He witnessed recognition given to employees 
who were known to be mediocre performers because, it appeared to him. that everyone 
gets some recognition within the group regardless o f their actual accomplishments. "The 
whole charade makes me uncomfortable." he observed.
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Participants generally found the existing systems within the public sector to be 
ineffective for managing performance. Some stated that they were more willing to work 
with problem staff than were their counterparts.
Summary: Differences in Leading Staff Between the Military and the Public Sectors
Retired officers entering the public sector bring with them a depth of experience 
in leading staff. They have often managed work units of over 1000 people and at times 
have been responsible for the very lives of their crew. It is necessary for them, however, 
to make adjustments when assuming leadership positions in the public sector. Some of 
these adjustments are driven by the differences between the members, the expectations 
and the organizational systems of the military and the public sector, outlined in Table 9. 
The primary categories of difference include the members of the organization, the style of 
communication expected, the classification system (particularly the role of job 
descriptions), approach to staff retention, level of training and development, methods for 
teambuilding and systems for managing performance.
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Table 9: Differences Between the Military and Public Sectors in Leading Staff











Diverse, many young, 
inexperienced.
Trust between officers & 
enlisted.
Control over staff; follow 
orders.
Direct, specific.
"Need to know" principle.
Staff will “Do what needs to be 
done."
Flexible job duties.
Use induction, performance 
reports and re-enlistment 
system to "weed out." Move 
staff every 2-3 years;
Training a top priority; 
continuous development; stay 
current in field.
Many older, more experienced, 
concerned with pay. benefits & 
retirement.
Labor/management relations.
Independent; do not always comply 
with directives.
Negative reactions to straightforward 
communication; jargon; formal style.
Established (sometimes out of date) 
job titles, job descriptions, pay rates. 
"Not my job" syndrome. 
Unresponsive HR system.
No managerial latitude.
Organizational stagnation; lack of 
mobility.
Pay to keep individuals regardless of 
job duties.
Mixed levels of training -  some very 










Work with whole individual; 
NJP; making the tough calls; 
fair & consistent discipline 
creates loyalty.
Wide variety o f recognition 
options. Merit-based rewards.
Lack of established structures that 
promote teamwork.
Limited focus and effectiveness; 
cumbersome civil service system; 
inconsistent enforcement.
Some delayed, undeserving, and 
blanket awards.
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These differences often require some adjustment or adaptation on the part of retired 
officers. As discussed, some of the strategies and practices adopted are successful and 
others are less effective. These are outlined in Table 10.
Table 10: Leading Staff in the Public Sector: Effective and Less Effective Strategies
and Practices Employed by Retired Officers






Nature of Many older. Choices. Meetings; open Information
Staff more experience. and frequent bulletins:







Independent: do Limits of directives will
not always discipline be followed.
comply with system.
directives.
Communica­ Negative Staff Communication Direct style
tion Norms reactions to unaccustomed style adjusted. affects customer
straightforward to direct style. Eliminate jargon & staff




Classification Established Civil sendee Lobby & work Accepting &
System (sometimes out system: some within HR criticizing status
of date) job unresponsive system; improve quo.
titles, job HR systems; selection;
descriptions, pay no latitude for re-organization.
rates: “Not my manager.
job” syndrome.
























































turnover is good: 
promote mobility: 













Work with own 















The broad experience retired officers gained in the military assisted them in leading 
public sector employees. Officers seasoned by command positions are experienced in 
building camaraderie and in employee motivation. They are also practiced in utilizing 
discipline to shape performance. In particular, they bring a strong commitment to staff 
development and an understanding o f the assets new members introduced into an 
organization. Participant data revealed that retired officers needed to adjustment some
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military practices to effectively manage civilian staff. These adjustments were driven by 
differences in the organizational cultures of the two sectors such as the makeup of the 
workforce, the limitations of the civil service system and the constraints of the pay and 
classification system. Participants did not handle the challenge in the same way. They 
identified some personnel management practices that were more successful than others. 
Finally, some of the retired officers had to abandon some practices such as reliance on 
KATN leadership, jargon and military formality in order to be more effective in the 
public setting.
Theme Two: Organizational Relationships
The second subtheme identified from the data addresses relations with other 
departments, agencies, the chief executive and the elected officials. Many participants 
cited some of these areas as the most challenging faced in their civilian career. The 
public sector environment is significantly different than the military chain of command 
where roles and behavioral norms are defined. Government also must provide its 
services in an arena o f politics, citizen input, interdependent agencies, and multiple 
stakeholders. The participants identified differences between the two sectors, primarily 
in the following areas: relations with staff members, peers, one's immediate manager, 
and the executive leadership: the political process: amount of discretion: decision­
making: and values and ethics.
Relations with Staff Members
In the military, status and respect tend to come with position. For example, 
members of the service could reasonably make assumptions about the background.
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experience and competency of a commanding officer. As Will related:
The position is what carries the weight if you will, more so than the individual. If 
the person is a commanding officer, from day one they get all the respect, all the 
loyalty, and the allegiance . . .  to start with. It's sort of theirs to lose.. . .  Whereas 
in other organizations. I think you probably have to earn it first.
In the military, officers can reasonably expect to inherit the cooperation and respect of 
their subordinates at the onset of a new command. New leaders in the public sector 
probably enter the organization with no reputation to assist them in taking charge and. in 
the case of organizations in turmoil, may confront cynical or jaded members who expect 
them to fail. Dan entered a public organization as the new deputy director. The director 
had just been replaced and the agency was being downsized and reorganized. He found 
some individuals that were skeptical and others that were openly confrontational:
"[These] other people just constantly look[ed] for chinks in the armor . . .  for reasons to 
find fault. . . .  I am not used to having everything challenged."
Dan said that the verbal challenges to his authority were important moments in his 
transition to government. These moments helped him realize that he would need to 
adjust his behavior. He said he now picks his words more carefully around some staff 
members. He cited an instance where he was joking with one of his support staff and 
said that if he didn’t get an assignment done he would have to "clobber" him. Another 
individual then accused him of workplace violence: "So I learned from that point on. I 
had to just watch what I say." Public sector leaders work under the scrutiny o f staff 
members and have to carefully earn their respect and loyalty.
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Several participants also mentioned that they had difficulty with their 
organization's "open door policy" which they felt allowed staff to. in Ralph's words, 
"circumvent the chain of command." Ralph felt that allowing line staff to go directly to 
high levels of management was intimidating to managers who had to make unpopular but 
necessary decisions. He proposed that open door should be limited: "Managers should 
be reasonably available through proper channels to talk about a concern. You can't 
afford to have someone just walk in. knock on the door and circumvent lower 
management."
Participants observed that managers and executives in the public sector are not 
automatically accorded the same respect they are given in the military. Staff can also use 
existing open door policies to circumvent the authority of their superiors. These both are 
indicators of a larger issue addressed in the previous section -  public sector leaders do 
not have the same control over subordinates as do leaders in the military. Many of the 
supportive relationships and structures retired officers worked under in the military do 
not exist within local government or in the commercial sector.
Relations with Peers
The military tries to build executive teams focused on fulfilling their mission. 
Individuals are trained from the onset of military experience that the unit takes priority 
over individual concerns. Sam sought camaraderie with his peers — the executives from 
other departments — expecting "them to be sincere about what was going on within their 
respective departments and generally interested in providing mutual support.” He found 
little genuine discussion of shared issues, a lack of support with internal services such as 
filling positions and ordering computers and a lack of trust among department heads.
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I spent a lot of effort in trying to develop within my department a sense of 
direction and purpose and a sense of commitment. . .  but 1 felt we didn't get the 
same thing back [from other departments.] . . .  I would have vacancies and it 
would take six to nine months before we could get a recruitment on the streets.
He found the executive teambuilding sessions "hollow*' because afterward participants 
returned to passing the buck and finger pointing at each other: "After it was over, people 
went back to exactly what they were doing before. No one ever learned anything." The 
lack of teamwork and collegiality is one of the reasons Sam left the public sector.
While Sam's experience was not fully shared by all. most participants felt that 
their public sector agencies did not have close camaraderie. Will identified the lack of 
camaraderie as the most difficult aspect o f his transition to the public sector:
[I miss] the camaraderie of what we call the wardroom . . .  I miss that, because in 
civilian organizations it's almost as if it's not even desired. People, when they 
leave work, want to get the hell away from it and get away from the people they 
work with. Whereas in the military we were used to — especially when overseas — 
[our] own little community.
Despite multiple attempts. Will was able to organize only one social gathering in nearly 
four years. Ted has successfully created some camaraderie through leading by example.
He began sponsoring quarterly staff lunches, often a cookout. within his own 
organization. Other departments have joined in organizing the cookouts. improving 
interdepartmental relations and broadening teamwork across departments.
Sam found that there was a lack o f interdepartmental support from his colleagues, 
other department heads. He found that functions he relied on like human resources and
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planning had a ”vour priority is not mv priority" approach. Each department head went 
in separate directions, sometimes ignoring the direction of the chief executive. At times, 
according to Sam. “it seemed like you had six cities in one."
Although Ted met with some success in building teamwork by holding social 
events with his own work unit and eventually other departments, other retired officers 
noted the lack of camaraderie and collaboration among peers as another difference 
between the military and public sectors.
Relations with Immediate Manager
In the military, the commanding officer is responsible for the development of 
subordinate junior and senior officers and is expected to be a mentor. The CO holds 
ultimate responsibility for the safety of the crew and for accomplishing the mission. The 
role of a subordinate officer is to support his or her commander in that mission. Sam 
expressed that this was still his job. whether in the public, private or military sector.
George spoke more extensively about what he termed the “senior-subordinate" nature of 
his relationship with his boss, articulating views that were clearly shaped by his 
experience as a Marine:
My military' background does not allow me to question too much. ..  . [My 
manager] is in the authority position. You don't really question that. You hope 
he knows what he is doing. If he doesn't, you're eventually going to question it 
or you're going to leave.
George's attitude that "the boss is the boss" originates in the concept of chain of 
command, and the core value of obedience. He saw his approach as more productive 
than the reaction of many other managers who “don't understand and get upset if their
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recommendation isn't followed.. . .  Because of the military I don't [get upset]. He's the 
boss. He makes the decision. I accept that. Now let's go do it." What is interesting 
about George's relationship with his manager, is that it is a complete contrast with the 
actions Dan and Ralph described wherein some line staff members questioned, criticized 
and went around their superiors. It is arguable whether unquestioned acceptance of the 
boss's direction fits with a civilian organizational culture and. more importantly, is the 
best approach for producing quality decisions in a public environment where so many 
stakeholders provide conflicting input.
Ralph felt his manager failed to take an active role in her staff s development: "I 
don't feel like there's an attitude [here] of helping people who are interested and capable 
of moving up." He cited an incident where he repeatedly asked his manager for 
information on the process for getting a certain professional certificate. He finally got the 
information from one of his peers. Almost none of the participants have had any 
significant professional development opportunities since entering the local government, 
in stark contrast to their military experience.
Two of the participants -  Ralph and Will -  specifically expressed their 
dissatisfaction with the assignments given them by their manager. Both felt they were 
required to do too much mundane administrative work and were working below their 
capabilities. Consequently. Will initiated his own special projects such as creating a 
leadership development program and organizing a team to draft organizational values. 
Relations with Executive Leadership
There are two other key components of the chain of command in the public 
sector. The first o f these is the chief executive of the public entity -  the City Manager.
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Port Director. Chief Administrative Officer, etc. -  whose role and authority 
approximately equate to that o f the commanding officer. In the military, the 
commanding officer sets the tone and direction for the organization and delegates the 
authority to direct its implementation to the executive officer and others. Each 
participant discussed some of the “truly great officers" he had worked under. Over half 
expressed disappointment and criticism with the public sector executives and their staffs.
Steve worked under a chief executive who promised sweeping changes. Steve 
anticipated that the executive would bring exciting, inspirational leadership to local 
government. In practice, he abused staff in private and in public meetings. Steve was 
disillusioned to see fear being used as a management technique and contrasted the 
experience to Navy captains who “generally counseled you in private." Paul also 
criticized his chief executive office for not supporting departments in public meetings:
I'm constantly amazed that somebody at [that] level would criticize this 
department in an open arena in front o f other groups. That does absolutely no 
good whatsoever! That comes from people who have no understanding of what 
loyalty and commitment is.
While all the participants recognized that they now operated within a public political 
arena, none o f those who raised the issue of public chastisement appeared to be able to 
condone or forgive it. Some of the harshest criticism of government organizations came 
in this area. Like Paul, none of the officers who witnessed it or experienced it saw any 
benefit in it. As leaders who had for decades practiced summoning staff for a private 
"chewing out." they could not excuse public and sometimes televised scoldings.
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Military commanding officers bear responsibility for the actions of all their 
subordinates. Some participants expressed disappointment that public sector executives 
would assign blame rather than assume responsibility, especially in a public forum.
The Political Process
The second key component of the public sector chain of command is the 
legislative body -  the City Counsel. Board of Supervisors. Water Authority Board, etc. 
There is no direct equivalent in the military. Congress passes the legislation that affects 
the budget and. in a broad sense, the programs within the military. The Department of 
the Navy sets policy and defines the programs and aspects of program implementation.
In the military, however, there is a formidable administrative barrier between the officer 
and members of congress. It is a severe breach of protocol for an officer to have direct 
contact with a member of congress. Few officers have direct contact with the 
Department o f the Nav\' unless on assignment in Washington. There is. more frequently, 
great physical distance between the legislature and the individual officer. By contrast, 
nearly all o f the participants now have at least weekly contact with elected officials.
Many identified this as the greatest change they encountered upon entering the public 
sector.
Will. Steve and Ted found understanding the political process -  placating elected 
officials and their staff, understanding the power structure, writing reports and letters “to 
win the support of five very different people" and managing the public input process -  to 
be their biggest learning challenge. Steve explained that in the military, it was clear who 
had the decision-making authority: “Here, there are a lot of political ramifications [with 
every project]." Dan, in contrast, found it the most exciting aspect in his new career:
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Here, you're closer to the flagpole . . .  We have an opportunity to interact and
respond directly to the [elected officials] who then, in turn, decide to make policy.
Whereas in DC. we were so far insulated from those who make the decisions . . .
[this is] a little more exciting.
George's adjustment involved getting accustomed to the reality that fully half his time 
was now spent in preparation for legislative hearings. His legislative body went beyond 
policymaking and became involved in the day-to-day operations o f his organization.
Steve found the process of writing and docketing legislative proposals to be very 
confusing: “You can adopt the attitude that it stinks and you don't want to deal with it. 
and then you don't get anything done. Or you can try and master it." One of his earliest 
assignments was to write a legislative proposal eliminating staff positions based on a new 
reengineering procedure that required a written finding of “economy and efficiency." He 
sought help, only to find that no other department had done it before. Steve had to write 
and publicly defend the findings and face stiff opposition testimony from employee 
groups. Early in his public career, he was thrown into a high profile political project with 
little support.
Sam observed that politics could have a divisive affect on the teamwork of the 
department heads: "They were all concerned about making sure that they stood in a good 
light with the city council members rather than really doing a good job o f . . . making this 
a great city."
Public managers can actively work within the political structure to build 
relationships and establish trust. Tw o of the participants stated that they had joined 
committees outside their normal job duties to build relations with elected officials who
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influenced their programs. One. for example, served on a city childcare committee 
chaired by an elected official on his board.
Part of the public political process is also dealing with the interplay o f citizens 
and constituents. Ted had been assigned to deal with a problematic citizen who had a 
long history of encroaching on public parkland adjacent to his property. Drawing upon 
the values of citizen involvement. Ted met with the individual repeatedly and ultimately 
they signed an agreement on the appropriate use of the public land. Ted. proud of his 
success in negotiating a reasonable arrangement, was shocked when the legislature threw 
out his agreement:
He'd been a problem enough in the past that they were not willing to be patient 
with him or accept his w ord.. . .  [They] said “We want you to put a fence around 
him so he can't move onto the park." [The citizen] just went white and got angry 
and won't speak to me to this day. You know. I had spent probably two months 
in negotiations and was feeling pretty proud [about the agreement]. . . .  It was a 
learning experience on how [public] decisions get made. You don't have the 
same latitude that you did when you were the commanding officer o f a ship. And 
it takes a whole lot longer.
Ted felt he acted on public sector values, but the legislature acted on their own past 
history with the individual. He received a lesson in politics and in the limitations of his 
own role.
Participants had mixed reactions to working within the political process. Most 
admitted they found it challenging and some enjoyed their expanded influence. It may be 
that those who are more goal and outcome oriented derive less satisfaction from
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operating within the public sector arena. The variety of stakeholders and political 
maneuverings complicates and delays the decision-making process.
Amount of Discretion
Paul recalled that his military commanding officers generally had broad 
experience in his technical field. As junior officers, they had once done his job. so they 
understood the issues. As COs. they would check on the progress and direction of 
projects but. overall, demonstrated faith in the capability of subordinate officers to do 
their job. In the public sector. Paul finds his division being bombarded with requests to 
justify his decisions and directives from administrators who do not understand his work: 
You get hit with an excessive number of questions or direction in many cases that 
is counterproductive. I can't tell you how many hours I spend a week on things ..
. that are o f absolutely no value in accomplishing the mission of our organization .
. . because they don't understand and we're having to explain to them instead of 
them maybe operating on faith. . . .  Let them focus more on keeping us equipped 
-  giving us the budget or the support we need in terms o f personnel.
Elected officials and public sector staff are usually generalists. They do not have subject 
matter experts on their personal staffs in all technical areas. Department heads and 
managers must build a relationship and establish trust to be effective in the policy­
making arena. This is in contrast to the military where expertise and reputation came 
with rank and were ”y°urs to lose." as Will put it. For Paul, who self-described himself 
as "outcome oriented.” it was frustrating to be working under people who questioned his 
judgment and seemed to assume his actions needed justification.
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Decision-making
Decision-making skills are essential in military operational settings. From the 
onset of their careers, officers are given broad authority. The combination o f mentoring 
and experience is designed to develop increasingly higher orders of analytical and 
decision-making capabilities and confidence. As discussed earlier, the delegation of 
expanded authority is a reward for officers. In addition, there is a premium placed on 
quick decision-making under stress. There were two common complaints about decision­
making in the public sector: the slow process and indecisiveness, and the micro­
management by executive and legislative branches.
The public process expands the layers of those involved in decision-making. 
Citizens, lobbyists, public interest groups, unions, the press, other agencies, executives 
and elected officials are all entangled in the public policy process. Les voiced his 
frustration:
[Overcoming the] inertia in a large organization is harder ... for somebody who 
spent a lot of time as a leader, making things happen in a small combat 
organization. That can get frustrating real fast, and you have to kind of transition 
it and start to understand how to make the organization move.
Paul found the layers of involvement led to a "paralysis in the system." The process 
itself delayed decisions to the point, in his observation, that some public sector managers 
had just stopped making critical decisions. He also sensed a hunger among the staff 
members "for someone to make a decision. And it really doesn't matter what the 
decision is. Just make one. Just tell me where to go." He was personally disappointed in
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the frequent second-guessing of his decisions, especially bv parties who did not have the 
requisite technical knowledge.
Frank, who subsequently left the public sector, found a lack o f excitement in 
government work: “The critical decisions seem to be taken from you here. Whereas 
when I was in the military. I was always required to make those decisions, right now.'* 
Sam. who also left government during the scope of this study, chaffed under a system 
where the executive gave directives, rather than setting a general direction and allowing 
his department heads implementation authority. Others recognized the uniqueness of 
their military experience and adapted to new challenges. As Ted viewed it:
I think there was more satisfaction in the Navy because there was. most o f the 
time, a real sense of purpose.. . .  There were real lives on the line, real decisions 
made. They were significant.. . .  But I enjoy this job and I enjoy the tasks that 
have been given me, putting them together and seeing them come out reasonably 
w ell. . . and I enjoy working with the guys and seeing them take charge.
Ted has worked to adjust to getting satisfaction from both accomplishing tasks and 
developing his employees. The political and public input process is a reality that public 
sector leaders have to accept and utilize.
Values and Ethics
The military culture is one with shared values of duty, honor, country and service, 
which are instilled from the onset at the academies and in officer training programs. The 
public sector values of efficiency, effectiveness, public good, responsiveness and social 
equity are less clear and sometimes in conflict. Dan. Ted and Paul all stated that they had 
entered the public sector because they wanted to continue their public service. Dan
R eproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
191
viewed local government as having "the same goals or ideals in terms of public service, 
honesty and integrity/’ He did not feel that these values were absent from the business 
world, but that in the private sector "they always work toward the bottom line, the profit 
and I’m not sure they always adhere to ethics the way [government] employees do.”
Paul and Sam both expressed their disapproval of the ethics they witnessed in the 
actions o f colleagues. Paul was disappointed in the values he found at all levels of the 
organization, but especially those displayed by management:
I’ve seen people [holding prominent] positions who were obviously self-centered, 
who felt, "I’m here to make me look good. I’m here to build a power base.” . . .  
[Navy personnel] seemed to have a very strong focus on the goals and objectives 
o f the organization, not personal goals and objectives which I found to be the 
general state [here].
He was particularly disturbed by the history of ethical violations within his agency. One 
deputy director had served jail time for taking kickbacks from a multi-million dollar 
contract. Such actions, he felt, create a cynicism within the staff concerning leadership’s 
dedication to the values of public service.
Sam was disappointed in department heads who, it appeared to him, valued their 
personal status with the local elected officials over the good of their agency and the 
public interest. He was also quite surprised at their non-compliance with directives from 
the executive. He cited the example of a policy on disciplining employees for excessive 
vehicle accidents: "I was the only one o f all of the department directors who enforced the 
policy . . .  It’s part o f the structure of the military [that] if you have these kinds of 
policies, you enforce them.” He viewed such actions as contrary to the public good.
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Values and ethics were not mentioned by a majority of the participants. Their 
importance appears to vary with organizational circumstances. But shallow leadership 
values constituted a disturbing issue to those who found the practices within their 
respective organizations in direct conflict with their military experiences.
Summary: Differences in Organizational Relations between the Military and the Public 
Sectors
The participants identified differences between the organizational relationships 
within the two sectors. The military has formal relationships contained within the chain 
of command structure. The public sector less formal norms, and operates primarily 
within power and influence relationships. These differences are summarized below in 
Table 11.
Table 11: Differences Between the Military and Public Sectors in Organizational
Relations
Subthemes Military Public Sector
Staff Respect comes with position.
Relations Confidence of staff.
Respect is "yours to lose."
Peers Mission is primary.
Relations Camaraderie o f wardroom.
Relations CO has ultimate responsibility,
with manager Role is to support CO.






Praise in public, chastise in 
private. Knows your job. 
Command presence.
Must build own reputation. 
Possible cynicism of staff.
Lack o f camaraderie and internal 
support.
Support boss. Lack of training and 
development opportunities. 
Mundane assignments.
Exec criticizes at meetings and public 
hearings; assigns blame: probably 
does not know your job.
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Table 11. continued
Subthemes Military Public Sector
Political
Relations
Insulated from congress and top 
management.
"Close to the flagpole." 





Trust in judgment. 
Give general direction.
Micro-management. Others don't 
know your job. Multiple questions 




Make life and death decisions. 
Quick decision-making. 
Responsibility its own reward.
Limited authority. Involvement of 




Clear, shared values. Conflicting values. Some individual 
orientation rather than public good.
There are more players in the public sector arena. All the retired officers now had regular 
contact with elected officials and some also had regular contact with members of the 
public. These retired military officers must now operate within an organization where 
they are not automatically granted the respect of their position -  either by their staff, 
peers or superiors. This can surface in such ways as a lack of compliance by staff, 
minimal support from their immediate manager, lack of camaraderie and teamwork with 
regard to their peers, and micro-management by executive staff and elected officials.
This could be one of the more difficult adjustments for retired officers as camaraderie and 
unit cohesion are infused in the military environment. More specific details are contained 
in Table 12.
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Table 12: Organizational Relations: Effective and Less Effective Strategies and
Practices Employed by Retired Officers













avoids chain of 
command.
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Subthemes Context Conditions Effective 





Political Insulated from “Close to the Enjoy Avoid, try to
Relations congress and top flagpole.” influence. insulate self
management. Competition of Build from the process.
department relationships.
heads. Citizen Join political
involvement. committees.
Political Multiple approval Multiple Enjoy Avoid, try to
Process levels. stakeholders. influence. insulate self
Competition Public Build from the process.
among department processes. relationships.
heads. Takes longer. Join political
committees.
Amount of CEO staff doesn't CEO and Develop Become
Discretion know the job. elected relationships frustrated.
Many questions officials' staff and trust.
and information are generalists. Build
requests. reputation.
Decision­ Limited authority. Multiple Accept Become
making Slow, indecisive stakeholders. change. frustrated.






Values & Not always clear. Conflicting
Ethics Some “me" public goals.
orientation.
Some of the more successful strategies cited by participants center around using influence 
rather than positional power. This was effective in both developing successful relations 
and gaining more discretion and decision-making authority -  both traditionally important 
to the job satisfaction of military officers. The other important strategy was in
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consciously developing a personal reputation with staff and not relying on leading by- 
position.
Theme Three: Lack of Policies and Procedures
All but one of the interviewees mentioned the lack or poor quality- of policies and 
procedures in their local government agencies. This is the area where many o f them felt 
they had either made the greatest impact within their workplace or where they found 
considerable frustration. Paul has found the lack of policies and procedures "incredible" 
particularly in the area of planning and managing capital projects. In some cases 
procedures did not exist, in others they were "on the shelf rather than being followed."
He is accustomed to the strict guidelines of federal contracts. In his public agency he has 
discovered what he sees as a disturbing ignorance of contracting law and o f certain 
standard procedures that establish a buffer between the contractor and contract 
administrator.
When joining his agency. Bob found favoritism and inconsistency in the 
application of rules at the airport. He brought over some of the procedures he found to 
work in military air facilities to the general aviation airport he now manages. He initially 
found some resentment by both staff and customers to the structure he created:
I was pretty soundly disliked when I first got to the airport [for] imposing 
structure. I didn’t try to rush it too fast in my mind, [but] to some people it was 
too fast. . . .  I may not be particularly liked by a lot of people but I think I’m well 
respected because of what I’ve accomplished.
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He believes he's built credibility and earned the grudging support of some flight and 
charter businesses because, despite a significant increase in air traffic, he is running a 
safer airport with the same staffing level. Will introduced an integrated budget review 
and streamlined the legislative agenda process within his organization. Ralph instituted 
an improved system for fee collections and computerized certain functions.
Ted reported some success in improving processes where he works. He set up a 
public works preventive maintenance schedule within his department. More broadly, he 
has introduced project planning to many of his fellow department heads. In a example of 
good change management, Ted began by modeling the use o f written plans within his 
own department, then volunteered to do plans for projects that reached across agencies.
He needed to use persuasion, influence and example to convince his fellow department 
heads of the importance of a project plan and of adhering to project schedules: “I have 
no leverage to say ‘You have to do this at this time.' And so I have to be patient [and 
ask] 'When are you going to be able to do it. I can't do my part until you finish yours.'
Or 'Do you need me to help?"' The department heads' attitudes shifted and they now’ 
look to Ted for project planning: 'Tt's now something people expect that I'm going to 
do." He now has developed plans for most of the agencies' annual events. Ted regards 
this as one of his more significant accomplishments in the public sector.
Steve related how he had used an improvement team to lead an initially skeptical 
group of surveyors and regional planning staff through a process of reducing the total 
cycle time of the plan checking procedure by two-thirds. He utilized the TQM processes 
he had learned in the military. He believed that employee involvement was key to both 
the successful strategy and successful implementation.
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Sam believed that he was brought into the agency to help develop processes. He 
did so within his own department but. unlike Ted. did not influence the operation of the 
agency as a whole. He worked directly with the chief executive officer, but felt nothing 
was ever implemented:
He would spend a lot of time talking to me about it. We met weekly, privately, 
the two of us. We talked through issues and he agreed with all of those issues -  
but he never quite ever found time to take direct action on some of it. to make . . .  
[the necessary] changes.
It is difficult to assess the reasons for success or failure in implementing organizational 
change. Perhaps Ted’s approach of modeling and influencing better fit the nature of a 
public sector organization. He successfully won over colleagues he recognized he had no 
control over. Sam described a military-like approach of working through the chain of 
command, expecting that the commander would take action and his officers would follow 
the directives — similar to the military approach. His agency's executive may have been 
reluctant to impose change when, as Sam witnessed, the department heads ignored 
directives they did not want to implement. In contrast to military practice, there wore no 
significant consequences for disobeying a directive.
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Table 13: Policies and Procedures: Differences between the Military and Public
Sector; Effective Strategies and Practices for Public Sector Improvements
Military Public Sector Conditions Effective Less Effective




Exist for Lacking in Lesser priority. Bring in Discuss solelv
everything. many areas. Existing practices from with the chief
Standardized Applied policies and the militarv. executive and
across the inconsistently. procedures are Introduce relv on him/her
organization. Less developed often out of through to implement.
Generally than in federal date or “on the influence and






Every participant cited the lack o f consistent policies and procedures as a difference 
between the two sectors. This is perhaps the area where they experienced greatest 
success in transitioning to the local government. Almost every participant could point to 
tangible improvements they had made to their organizations by introducing some of the 
best practices they had learned in the military. Not all participants described how they 
had successfully introduced new practices into their organization. Those who did. cited 
examples of influence, involvement and modeling processes, rather than implementing 
change from a position of authority.
Theme Four: Encountering Stereotypes of Military Officers
One of the subthemes that emerged during the interviews described the 
stereotypes of military officers that participants encountered when they joined the public 
sector. The stereotypes involved both the assumptions of co-workers about retired
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officers and the filter through which co-workers viewed their actions. Dan reflected that 
increasingly fewer members of the public have had active military experience or 
personally know someone who has served in the military. Thus, for many, the media 
shapes their image of military officers:
I think people tend to think military officers are rigid, possibly alcoholic, not very 
sm art. . .  Captain Binghamton of McHale's Navy, the "Officer and a Gentleman” 
type [from "Emerald Point” or “JAG”] . . .  or the psychotic, pinhead.
Neanderthal. "kill-em-all-and-let-God-sort-‘em-out” mentality.
Dan cited an incident that took place while he was new to the job. An employee asked 
him in apparent seriousness if he had been trained in psychological warfare and was he 
going to use it on the staff. No one else related so extreme an incident, but everyone 
questioned about the issue felt they had encountered stereotypes about retired officers. 
Some have been more successful than others in contending with negative stereotypes. 
George knew there were concerns about whether or not he could work with women and 
with a director who was younger than he. He has worked deliberately to show he could 
team with other organizational members.
Sam found retired officers were perceived as "haughty." "unchangeable" and only 
knowing only how to give orders. When he tried to introduce some improved 
procedures, other department heads saw as him and "bureaucratic and rigid.” Sam felt 
they used his ex-military status as a rational for not implementing his ideas.
Steve believed the "ex-Navy rap” centered on having cliques and "a secret 
handshake of some kind.” The most common misperception he encountered was that 
former military all think alike and "don't know how to deal with civilians.” He had to
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make an effort to relay his experience in managing a civilian workforce. He mentioned, 
as did others, that consciously trying to remove military jargon from his work 
conversations was important to moving beyond the stereotypes. The jargon not only 
interferes with communication, but sets retired officers apart from other staff. Several 
officers using jargon in a meeting for example can reinforce the clique image.
Will felt he had been regarded as a “hatchet man.’’ “stiff." and "set in my wavs." 
His preferred management style is to lead by example, but he felt that the stereotypes 
“make that a little more difficult for me." His practice of thoroughly reviewing all 
correspondence was perceived as a failure to delegate. His attempt to revise an existing 
dress code to incorporate the organization's practice of “casual Fridays" backfired on 
him, he believed, because o f his ex-military status: “I defined . . .  some things that were 
inappropriate [e.g., bare midriffs, shirts with improper language] and suddenly I'm  
labeled as the guy who's trying to make everybody dress alike." Putting standard 
practices in writing reinforced his ex-military image and interfered with his attempts at 
organizational change.
Two of the aviators who had difficulties in establishing second careers expressed 
dissatisfaction with their current level of pay and responsibilities. Both felt that the 
public sector did not understand their military experience and what they were capable of. 
Ralph related how his manager had taken him to a briefing she was giving to the assistant 
executive officer of their government entity. “I was supposed to have been impressed," 
he stated. But Ralph, who has been on the staff of four admirals, was not intimidated by 
speaking before local government executives. He was not impressed by the performance
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of his department head, nor did he feel he had been able to persuade his organization of 
his experience and capabilities:
I spent 20 years as a manager in the service. Often that's not understood [nor is] 
the level o f responsibility and expertise that you have . . .  There's no appreciation 
for military officers and what they've done, no understanding of th a t. . . within 
the civilian sector.
In an incident he found particularly humiliating. Ralph had to appeal after his application 
for an executive position was rejected for lack of experience. He was accustomed to 
having a military superior who supported his career development and did not find such 
support in the public sector.
Each participant encountered some stereotypes of retired military officers when 
they transitioned to the public sector, summarized in Table 14.
Table 14: Encountering Stereotypes o f Retired Military Officers: Effective and Less
Effective Strategies and Practices





Stereotypes include: Less public contact Avoiding military Actions that
rigid, bureaucratic. and direct jargon and reinforce
not very bright. experience with the formality. stereotypes, e.g..
clique-ish. trained in military. Conscious efforts to using jargon, issuing
psychological Rely on media counter stereotypes. too many written
warfare. image. Take on higher level policy directives.
Experience of Not given assignments. Rely on superior to
retired military not appropriate Educate co-workers give out
understood or assignments or and demonstrate assignments.
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These stereotypes hampered their effectiveness as public sector leaders. The key to 
handling the stereotypes is to be aware of them and make concerted efforts not to 
reinforce them. Retired officers with managers who do not understand or value their 
background have the option of managing their own development opportunities, 
demonstrating their abilities or seeking a new work environment.
Satisfaction and Disappointments in Public Sector Employment
There are positive and negative aspects to each workplace. The fact that two of 
eleven participants left the public sector during the course of this study and two others 
hinted that they would be looking for other employment, however, suggests that 
satisfaction and disappointment with public sector employment is an area worth 
examining. Most of the areas o f satisfaction mentioned concerned personal 
accomplishments. Nearly every participant in this study expressed disappointments.
Some were stated as personal disappointments in terms of career limitations. Others 
addressed some o f the structures and practices found within the public sector.
Bob and Ralph, both aviators, had difficulty in finding steady employment 
initially after retirement. Bob. who committed to keeping his family in the San Diego 
area, was dissatisfied with his salary and knew he could improve his finances by leaving 
the area. He w as compensated though, by the nature of his job: “I still get to smell jet 
fuel every day." He was also proud of the improvements he implemented in the areas of 
streamlining operations and improving safety. Ralph expressed more bitterness about his 
position. He characterized the leadership style within his agency as ‘'micro­
management,” “insincere" and “unsupportive." While he oversaw a much-needed 
standardization of helicopter flight procedures and improved parking and record keeping.
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he was dissatisfied with the amount of review he faced and with the level of assignments 
he was given. He has witnessed the agency's failure to recognize employees and to 
promote their advancement — including his own. “I don't feel that there's a prevailing 
attitude of helping people that are interested and capable of moving up."
Frank, who left the public sector, enjoyed his staff but missed the excitement of 
the military and the "critical ity o f decisions." He felt that within the political framework 
of government "the critical decisions seem to be taken from you." The slow pace of 
decision-making also frustrated him.
Will was somewhat dissatisfied with the “mundane" nature of his administrative 
functions. His director handled most of the political and legislative work, leaving Will to 
oversee daily operations. He found improving processes and working on two projects -  
developing organizational values and developing a leadership training academy -  to be 
the most satisfying aspects o f his job. He found the daily administrative assignments 
somewhat tedious, and frankly stated, “I wouldn't expect to be doing this the rest of my 
life." In addition, he regretted the lack of camaraderie and socialization in his agency. 
Unlike his experience in the military, the executives and managers separate their work 
and personal life. He also found that stereotypes of military officers hindered staff from 
getting to know him.
Sam also had issues with the lack of camaraderie in the public sector and he cited 
this as one of his reasons for leaving. He did not witness an appreciation of common 
goals, mutual support and teamwork among his entity's department heads. He felt 
stereotyped as rigid and bureaucratic by his colleagues and felt they used his ex-military 
status as an excuse to oppose his ideas. He could not get the needed internal support
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services from other departments and felt it was unfair that they all received the same 
compensation — from a department with five employees, to his public works department 
which was the largest. He was disappointed that the executive did not follow through on 
committed changes and gave specific directives rather than general policy direction. He 
held little hope that the situation would change. He did not mention any areas o f public 
sector employment that brought him satisfaction. He later took a job with a private firm.
Paul was pleased to be in an organization dedicated to public service and felt he 
had a lot to offer. However, he also expressed a series of disappointments with the public 
sector. He was troubled by the lack o f policies and procedures, particularly in technical 
areas such as contract and project management. He viewed the staff as under-trained and 
some as lacking commitment to the goals o f public service. The inflexibility of the 
classification and civil service system hampered his ability to manage staff. He seemed 
most frustrated by the thin support and even public criticism of public managers from the 
executive layer, their level of micro-management, their failure to make timely decisions 
and their lack o f  faith in the judgment of division and department heads. When he 
examined the entire picture, he felt he did not have the same ability to do his work as he 
did in the Navy'. “I look back at the Navy and [realize] we were good. I mean we were 
really good because [of] the policies, the procedures, the skill level o f the people.”
Les was very positive about working for his agency. He enjoyed his high level of 
responsibility and felt that his agency was "on the cutting edge of local government.'’ He 
was comfortable in his new career because the work was similar to his Navy experience.
He found some of the same procedural challenges in both sectors -  "archaic” policies that 
no one had looked at for ages and conflicting policies from different agencies. George
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had no significant disappointments. He believed that his agency could benefit by 
incorporating some of the military practices in the areas of standardizing policies and 
procedures and developing clear communications practices. It is noteworthy that both 
Les and George are working at agencies that are currently fairly stable.
Initially, Ted had a rough career transition, taking classes and doing volunteer 
work in local government until he found a job managing an environmental program and 
was subsequently selected as a department head. He expressed no disappointments with 
the public sector and had sought to work in an area o f public service. He contrasted his 
two careers and reflected that the military experience was striking because it involved life 
and death decisions. But in his view. ‘"That career is over and fm  satisfied it happened..
. .  This is my new career and it has its own goals.” He stated that he enjoyed the 
challenges of running his department, and has worked to build good relationships with his 
colleagues and staff. He was proud that the overall conditions of public facilities had 
improved under his direction. He has also successfully introduced project planning to his 
peers.
Steve was also satisfied with his new career. He began as a program manager and 
received a significant promotion to department head. Steve could point to his 
accomplishments in improving the plan checking process (reducing cycle time by 75%). 
a renewed agency focus on customer service and an expanded training program. His main 
disappointment was with the chief executive officer and his staff. He was disturbed by 
their willingness to chastise departmental staff in public and found some of their practices 
as counterproductive to building teamwork. Both Ted and Steve advanced rapidly once 
entering government employment.
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Dan was pleased to be working in an agency that shared his commitment to public 
service and found that he especially enjoyed operating within the political arena. His key 
disappointment was in his entity’s failure to take care of its people by establishing career 
paths and upward mobility programs which he tried to address in a recent reorganization. 
He found the human resources practices frustrating, especially the classification and 
discipline systems. When he joined the public sector, there existed what he viewed as an 
"archaic" bonus system that "pitted worker against management." It has since been 
replaced. Finally, he critiqued a new public agency diversity initiative as "20 years 
behind the Navy’s."
A summary of the areas o f satisfaction and disappointment participants 
encountered in public sector employment is summarized in Table 15.
Table 15: Disappointment with Public Sector Employment: Description o f Areas of 
Satisfaction and Disappointments with Public Sector Employment
Fictitious
Name
Satisfaction with the Public Sector Disappointments with the Public 
Sector
Bob Accomplishments: improved airport 
operations and safety.
Climate: Still gets to smell jet fuel.
Compensation: Poor salary 
compared to other areas of the 
country7.
Dan Political arena is exciting. 
Accomplishments: reorganization, 
creating career path.
Values of public service.
Human resources, classification, 
civil service systems: lack of career 
mobility; worker vs. management: 
shallow' diversity program.
Frank Enjoys w'orking with staff. Political structure: slow decision­
making; critical decisions made by 
others. Job lacks excitement.
Fictitious
Name
Satisfaction with the Public Sector Disappointments with the Public 
Sector
George Accomplishments: improved 
administrative procedures.
None









Organisation is “on the cutting 
edge.” Similar nature of work to the 
Navy; responsibilities are exciting, 
important to local area.
Has skills needed by organization. 
Values of public service.
None
Accomplishments: standardized 
helicopter flight procedures; 
improved parking and records 
procedures.
None given.
Lack of policies and procedures. 
Some staff untrained or lack 
commitment to goals and values. 
Inflexibility of civil service system. 
Executive level micro-manages. is 
critical, non-supportive. indecisive, 
lacks faith in staff.
Low salary. Executive micro­
management; low level 
assignments. Lack of support for 
career development, recognition and 
mobility.
Lack of camaraderie, common 
goals. & teamwork. Stereotypes of 
ex-military blocked initiatives. 
Compensation system. Executive is 
directive, lacks follow-through.
Executive criticizes staff publicly.Accomplishments: improved plan 
checking procedures, customer 
service and employee development. 
Promoted to position with 
considerable authority.
Accomplishments: public facilities 
are in better shape, improved plan 
project planning. Values of public 
service. Promoted to position with 
considerable authority.
Accomplishments: improved budget Mundane assignments.
None.
and agenda procedures and 
improved training.
Lack of camaraderie.
Stereotypes o f ex-military affect 
work and relationships.
Most of the areas of satisfaction expressed centered on accomplishments, which is 
consistent with the goal and outcome orientation of the military culture. The fact that two
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of the eleven participants have left public employment and two others said that they 
intended to apply for other jobs suggests that the level o f dissatisfaction with public 
employment ran high among this group. The areas of dissatisfaction included inadequate 
compensation, a cumbersome civil service structure, centralized decision-making, micro­
management. lack o f leadership support for career development, lack o f peer 
camaraderie, lack of mobility and mundane, routine assignments. With the exception of 
poor compensation, these are all areas that run contrary to military culture. Among those 
who have left or stated they were considering seeking other employment, the following 
areas were cited as the most disappointing in their current jobs: the task assignments, the 
amount of discretion, the public sector decision-making process, their relationship with 
their manager, peer camaraderie and salary. It is also noteworthy that Frank and Sam. 
who both left government employment, did not cite any concrete accomplishments in 
their public careers.
Perhaps the ability to separate one career from the other is a significant 
contributor to the success o f taking on a leadership role in a new organization. One 
observation made during this research concerned the way participants decorated their 
government offices. Most displayed vestiges of their military career. Some had most of 
their wall space dedicated to their military memorabilia. A fewr displayed tour books and 
one even had an anchor in his office. Ted. Steve and Dan had nothing from their military 
days in their offices. As Dan stated. "That is the past. This is where I work now."
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Data Analysis: Approaches to Change
Almost universally, the retired military officers interviewed identified a number 
o f differences between the military and public sectors, summarized in Appendix F. In the 
area o f leading staff, participants cited differences in: the nature of the staff they led. 
communication styles accepted, the flexibility of the classification system, expectations 
and practices related to staff retention, commitment to training and development, 
organizational structures that promoted teamwork and camaraderie and the approach and 
structures for managing performance. In the area of organizational relations, participants 
noted differences in their relations with elected officials, executive leadership, their own 
manager, their peers and their subordinates. There were also differences in the amount of 
discretion allowed, the breadth of decision-making and the extent shared values 
permeated the organization. Finally, there was a difference in the extent and role of 
standard operating procedures between the military services and the public sector.
During the course of the interviews, some participants volunteered strategies and 
shared experiences, which demonstrated their success in adapting to and improving their 
new organizations. These data are summarized in Appendix G. In the area of leading 
staff, successful strategies included: expanding organizational communications: 
changing to a more indirect communication style: eliminating military jargon: following- 
up on directives; working within the restrictions of the classification/civil service system; 
promoting mobility and staffing changes; expanding training: developing teamwork by 
clarifying goals, granting authority to staff, promoting social events and recognizing team 
efforts; and committing to honestly evaluate and recognize staff. Strategies that were not 
successful were: issuing information bulletins rather than direct contact, assuming staff
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would follow directives, using a direct communication style and military jargon, 
accepting and criticizing the status quo and developing an inner circle.
In the area of organizational relations participants found that consciously building 
their reputation, holding events, taking charge of their own development, building 
influence and political relationships, and accepting the limitations of their authority and 
decision-making were successful strategies. Less effective actions were failing to follow- 
up with staff, accepting the status quo, waiting for managers to initiate developmental 
opportunities and becoming frustrated with the involvement of multiple parties in 
decision-making and the limits o f personal authority in public organizations.
In the area of policies and procedures, participants who proactively introduced 
relevant practices from the military, particularly by utilizing influence and modeling 
programs were successful. Relying solely on the chief executive to take action was not 
effective. Participants also found they had to be aware of the stereotypes held about 
military officers and had to consciously work to counter those stereotypes, to educate 
their co-workers and to demonstrate their abilities.
Initially there were some participants who stated that they had not faced any 
transition issues in leaving the military and entering public sector leadership positions.
Yet the participant data revealed that there were some areas where retired officers needed 
to make adjustments from the practices they learned in the military' to respond to 
organizational differences in the nature o f the staff, communication styles, the civil 
service/classification system, employee retention, training and development, building 
teamwork, managing performance within the civil service system, organizational 
relations at all levels, the political process, the amount of discretion, decision-making.
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values and ethics, and policies and procedures. In addition, each encountered stereotypes 
of retired military officers that affected their image and capacity to influence their 
organization.
The officers utilized various strategies and practices to adapt to the unique aspects 
of the public sector. The variety of answers recorded presented does not represent the 
entire range of approaches, nor indicate the most effective approaches. They do indicate 
a breadth of experiences. In the next chapter, this data will be triangulated against other 
writings and studies concerning military and public sector leadership. The data will also 
be examined for their implications for the military, for retiring officers entering public 
sector careers, for public sector organizations and for the study of leadership.





This study is organized into six sections. The first chapter provided a general 
overview, outlined the background o f the problem, stated the purpose o f the study, 
described military and public sector organizations, life transitions and contemporary 
change issues in government agencies. The third chapter discussed approaches to 
qualitative and grounded theory research and described the specific methodology used in 
this study. The fourth chapter contained the research data pertaining to military 
leadership and the fifth chapter contained the data related to applying military leadership 
behaviors and strategies within local government organizations. This chapter contains an 
overview o f the entire research project, describes the research findings, triangulates these 
findings against other literature in the field, and describes the study's implications for 
military organizations, for retiring officers entering public sector employment, for local 
government agencies and for the field of leadership studies. It also contains 
recommendations for future research.
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Review of the Study: Its Purpose, Related Literature and Methodology
Purpose of the Studv
During 15 years o f working in local government, this researcher has observed the 
prevalence of retired officers holding government leadership positions within the San 
Diego area. As discussed in the first chapter, there are both personal and financial factors 
that draw retired military personnel to local government employment (Gordon. 1997: 
Jacobsen. 1990; Savino & Krannich. 1995; TROA, 1996). Data show that many retirees 
settle in areas where they once served (Barnes. 1994). San Diego County has the third 
largest retired military population in the country (Snyder. 1994). Areas with a large 
military presence such as San Diego County, therefore, would expect to find larger 
numbers of retired military in government employment. Because o f their extensive 
military experience in directing large-scale operations, many retired officers qualify to 
move directly into high-level positions in local public sector organizations. In entering 
local government, these individuals are leaving a unique organization, which has 
generally dominated both their work and social life for twenty or more years, while 
encountering a new organizational culture with many differences.
Some retired officers interviewed for this study moved to their new careers with 
only a few days of transition. None received assistance or orientation that addressed 
transition issues from either the military sendees or local government organizations 
(U. S. Department of Labor. 1998: Veterans’ Employment and Training Service. 1995).
It appears that retiring military officers largely rely on themselves or personal contacts to 
assist in this transition. This researcher has observed both officers who do well and
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succeed in translating the knowledge and experience they garnered in the military to their 
new organizations, as well as others who are less successful.
The purpose o f this research is to examine the key military leadership strategies 
and behaviors learned by retired officers and determine their applicability to leadership 
situations in local government. As stated in the introduction, the research focus o f this 
dissertation (emerging from a pilot study done in the spring of 1998) centers on 
identifying: the key leadership strategies and behaviors learned and practiced by military 
officers: the strategies and behaviors that are transferable and those not easily transferable 
to leadership situations in local government; the adjustments that assist retired military 
officers in transitioning to local government leadership positions; and the implications for 
assisting newly-retired officers entering local government organizations and for future 
research.
Summary of the Literature Review
The second chapter contained a review of the literature relevant to this study. The 
literature showed parallel historical trends in the development of military and public 
sector bureaucracies in this country. Both sectors have faced ongoing concerns over the 
scope of their role and authority, and have had legislative bodies use funding limitations 
and regulations to restrict their power. There were parallel developments in the growth 
of their professionalism and of the complexity of their missions. Finally, they continue to 
share similarities in their formal, organizational cultures, particularly in their personnel, 
budgeting and procurement systems.
The literature on military organizational cultures revealed differences in the 
cultures and subcultures of the service branches. The naval culture includes an element
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o f independence, flexibility and autonomy which springs from its seagoing mission 
(Hadley, 1986; Halperin. 1974; Wilson. 1989). The Marine Corps is a self-described 
unique, elite force which regards itself as the branch willing to take on the most 
dangerous duty in battle (Krulak, 1987; Ricks. 1997).
The military services also have a shared culture. The military culture contains 
deeply-rooted values and traditions, which are primarily camaraderie, unit cohesion, 
loyalty, chain o f command, adherence to orders, strong organizational identity, defined 
roles and moral responsibility (Henderson, 1985; Hubbard. 1899; Montor. et al. 1987). 
The military is facing challenges as it transitions from a traditional, institutional culture to 
a more occupational culture (Moskos. 1977. 1986, 1988). Changes within the military 
are also being forced by advanced technology, more humanitarian and peacekeeping 
missions, increasing diversity, all-volunteer forces, the issue of gays in the military and 
the broadening role of women (Demchak. 1991; Dunivan. 1994; Stillman. 1996). The 
traditional, informal organizational culture of the military services is evolving within a 
climate of some uncertainty.
Government organizations share centuries-old bureaucratic roots with the military 
sendees (George. 1972; Rickover, 1971) as well as the organizational features of 
centralized functions, standardized practices, defined roles, set boundaries, centralized 
decision-making and unity of command (Weber, 1946). They differ largely in their 
informal culture.
The public sector is characterized by multiple and conflicting values which 
include efficiency, the public good, effectiveness, ethics, responsiveness and social 
equity. The missions o f government agencies change with political trends and they
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strive to attain social goals which are difficult to define and measure. By contrast, the 
military's mission has traditionally been to protect and defend the nation. Military 
missions are often specific and achievable, while the government arena, with its 
conflicting stakeholder interests, leave public leaders with merely a hope o f “saticficing" 
these needs (Simon. 1947). By design, administrative government embraces multiple 
agencies with overlapping jurisdictions, promoting interagency competitiveness (Dahl. 
1956; Dilulio. et al, 1993; Yates. 1982). While there is some competition among the 
service branches, military organizations share the common mission o f national defense.
Public employees also have more independence within the civil service system 
than do members of the armed forces. Government administrative leaders operate in the 
public arena, and deal regularly with elected officials, citizens groups and the media -  all 
of which constrict their authority, independence and ability to make decisions.
The literature on career change addressed the stress of these transitions (Golan. 
1981). which are further compounded when occurring at mid-life (Erickson. 1982; 
Levinson et al. 1978). Role ambiguity is a key change faced when moving to a new 
organization. One positive and effective reaction to career transition is to seek assistance 
from those within the organization (Klauser & Groves. 1994). Individuals can also react 
to transitions by attempting to recreate the past (Kahn, et al. 1964; Marris. 1974) or by 
becoming dissatisfied with their new situation (Kahn, et al. 1964)
Finally, the literature on contemporary public sector organizations identified the 
current change trends of adopting more businesslike practices, introducing market forces 
into government services, privatizing and/or developing more public partnerships with 
businesses and nonprofits, changing to a customer service orientation, broadening citizen
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involvement and reforming the civil service system (Ban. 1995: Dilulio et al. 1993: 
Eggers & CTLeary, 1995; Goldsmith. 1997: Gore. 1993: Kettl. 1993: 1994: Osbourne & 
Gabler. 1991: Osbourne & Plastrik, 1997.)
Change in the public sector, though, is difficult because of multiple stakeholders, 
a proliferation o f agencies with overlapping jurisdictions, power dynamics, short term 
political concerns of some elected officials, risk-aversion to attempting change within the 
public view, legal concerns and lack of rewards for innovation (Golembiewski. 1985).
In the view of this researcher, the public sector requires transformational leadership 
which will inform and involve organizational members, use influence rather than 
coercion, lead from a base of strong missions and values, seek collaboration and value 
diversity in order to face such profound change within the constrictions of the public 
environment.
Summary o f the Methodology
As discussed in the third chapter, a qualitative approach was selected as best 
suited to examining social processes such as military and public sector leadership 
(Geertz. 1983). Grounded theory methodology is viewed by some scholars as a better 
way to examine leadership (Conger. 1998: Parry. 1998) and can. at times, generate a 
theory which is generalizable outside the group of participants (Glaser. 1978; Strauss & 
Corbin. 1990). The validity, reliability and generalizibility of the theory generated was 
enhanced through the use of field notes, verbatim transcripts, peer review and by seeking 
triangulation of the data in other qualitative and quantitative studies. There is no 
apparent rationale for concluding that the retired military population in the San Diego
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area has any unique characteristics, which would prevent the results from being 
generalized outside of the group of participants.
The research questions and core interview questions used in this study evolved 
from a pilot study done in the spring o f 1998. That pilot study involved only four 
participants, and revealed that some differences could exist between the leadership 
strategies and behaviors successful in the military and those that were successful in local 
government organizations. In this study, all local cities, the Port District, the County and 
all water districts within San Diego County area were contacted to ascertain if they had 
any mid-managers or executives who were retired naval or marine officers who had 
served 20 or more years, had achieved the pay grade o f 0 -4  or above and had been retired 
less than six years. In all, 90% o f the agencies cooperated in the search for participants, 
as did local veterans offices.
Eleven participants were found who met the criteria. All were interviewed and 
tape-recorded. Their transcripts were coded verbatim and these data generated the theory 
of military leadership and its applicability to the public sector.
Discussion and Triangulation of the Findings
This section summarizes the findings o f this study and examines those findings 
against other related studies and writings. The purpose of triangulation is to examine if 
the findings are unique to the participants of the study or if they are sufficiently supported 
to offer a theory generalizable to the larger population o f retired officers. Unfortunately, 
there has been little research done on officer leadership outside o f the Army and the Air 
Force. No definitive rationale could be uncovered for this, though it is thought by some
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to be related to the tradition that naval officers are developed at "the school of the sea." 
Some studies done in other service branches that may lend some insight are referenced. 
Grounded Theory o f  Military Leadership
The fourth chapter examined the data gathered concerning the leadership 
perspectives and practices learned in the military and proposed a construct o f military 
leadership based on grounded theory methodology. (See Appendix E.) The research 
revealed that the phenomenon of military leadership is shaped by the possibility of 
combat. This continual preparation for combat has formed the organizational culture and 
led to the development o f specific structures, practices and strategies within military 
organizations. There were five specific subthemes identified by participants: military 
leadership development, leading people, leading processes, decision-making, and leading 
change.
Leadership Development.
Two key organizational factors affected leadership development -  the possibility 
that an officer might need to quickly assume command in a combat situation and the 
youthfulness of many junior officers. Both created the need to rapidly develop leaders 
which is done through education and training programs, mentorship and developmental 
experiences. A review o f relevant literature revealed that the services utilize basic 
training or other forms of orientation to instill organizational identity and values into its 
members (Janowitz, 1960; McCloy & Clover. 1988; Ricks, 1997). The training, 
experiences and mentoring continually strengthen and reinforce the military way of life 
(Montor, McNicholas. Ciotti, Hutchinson & Wehmueller, 1987; Peck. 1994). The Navy.
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in particular, has traditionally held that the true development of officers happens on 
assignment, via mentorship and experience.
All participants were mentored by senior officers. In the experiences of some -  
particularly those who had their first command in Vietnam -  a veteran chief petty officer 
also played a critical role in their development. These role models assisted the young 
officers in learning how to lead a crew, developing critical thinking and decision-making 
skills, building their self-confidence and developing a command presence. The regular 
assignment rotation gave the participants the opportunity to serve under many different 
CO's and XO’s, allowing them to witness a wide variety o f leadership styles and their 
effectiveness. Two recent studies confirm the importance of mentorship. In a survey of 
junior officers in surface warfare, respondents cited mentors as one o f the most important 
factors in their development and in their decision to continue in the service. Another 
survey of nearly 700 retired flag officers found that 67% reported having significant 
mentors, with a fifth of those relationships lasting over 20 years (Johnson. Huwe.
Fallow. Lall. Holmes & Hall, 1999).
Typically in the military, officers are immediately given broad responsibility- far 
more than they would generally receive in the private sector -  then are coached and 
guided into handling increasing levels of responsibility (Ulmer. 1998). The participants 
observed that those who are not comfortable with broad responsibility do not remain in 
the service. Each interviewee mentioned his own dislike of micro-management. This 
dislike of micro-management was confirmed by the Navy's recent attitudinal survey of 
surface warfare officers in 1999 (Crawley, 2000). Accordingly, those interviewed
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experienced the importance of leadership development and of mentorship for 
communicating and continuing military leadership strategies and behaviors.
Leading Staff.
The subtheme “leading staff’ was the most detailed of the study. The context or 
conditions which affected leading people included: whether the officer was leading in an 
administrative or operational environment, the youthfulness of most enlisted members, 
the variance in education backgrounds, the continual staff rotation, and the need to know 
that members of the unit would put themselves in harm’s way.
Most participants stated that they had adopted a contingency style of leading staff. 
In an operational environment, they expected that orders would be obeyed, they were 
more demanding, they expected high technical performance, and they felt they could 
adopt a more direct, severe tone with the crew if required. In an administrative setting, 
there was more opportunity to use a coaching style, to spend more time explaining and 
informing members and giving the rationale for decisions. No study was found 
addressing this issue with naval or marine officers, though this contingency approach was 
confirmed by the Center for Creative Leadership's work with Army generals (Ulmer, 
1998). In his writings. Ulmer, a retired lieutenant general, also critiqued the Army’s 
performance reporting system for placing too much focus on operational leadership at the 
expense of developing administrative leaders.
The youthfulness and variance in education levels of the staff led to both the 
practice of weeding out those who did not fit in with military life while working intensely 
to develop those who remained in the service. According to participants, those who do 
not fit the military are culled through boot camp, or through the appraisal, discipline or
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re-enlistment processes. The paternalistic structures within the military also give officers 
more control over their members. Participant data identified a military communication 
style characterized as very direct to ensure orders are clear and easily understood. Smith- 
Jentsch. Johnston, and Payne (1998) in their research on tactical communications for the 
Navy's identified the following elements of appropriate operational communication: 
proper phraseology, clear meaning and elimination of excess "chatter." confirming the 
teaching of a direct style of military communication.
There is also a strong emphasis on training and development and standard 
operating procedures to accommodate staff rotation, compensate for uneven educational 
backgrounds and ensure consistency. The lessons learned are that discipline and honest 
evaluations are important, that communication should be clear and direct, that continuous 
training is critical and that training can help the individual fit the position.
The potential for combat necessitates that crews must be willing to place 
themselves in harm's way. The data revealed that this hinges on shared values, trust in 
and loyalty to the leadership and camaraderie within the unit. As previously noted, 
military organizations instill shared organizational values in boot camp that are 
reinforced continually by the structures, traditions and their commanding officers. 
According to former Secretary of Defense James Webb, "A leader who does not have the 
respect of his people, whose peopie do not believe he is operating from a system of 
values, will find that his words are considered meaningless by the people he is leading" 
(quoted in Montor. et al, 1987. p. 10).
The phenomenon of command presence -  which participants defined as 
presenting an image o f control, self-confidence, proper demeanor and technical ability -
R eproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2 2 4
contributes to the trust members have in their leader to protect them. This concept is 
echoed in the writings of Carrison and Walsh (1999) who addressed the “moral 
authority" of Marine Corps leadership:
While all officers have the legal authority to command, the moral authority to lead 
is not granted by a diploma from Officers Candidate School. Moral authority is 
developed in private, with one's conscience, and on display in public, in the day- 
to-day dealing with the men under one's command.. . .  The officer with moral 
authority may find that his men will go far beyond the call o f duty, perhaps to 
their deaths, upon his order, (p. 122)
Thus, an officer cannot depend on rank alone, but must be conscious of developing a trust 
and reputation with the crew. Being involved on a personal level, disciplining in a firm 
but fair manner and rewarding people for their performance were cited as behaviors that 
also build loyalty. Unit camaraderie -  a principal well recognized in military tradition 
and discussed in multiple works on military sociology (Henderson, 1985; Ricks. 1997) -  
was raised as another critical component o f leading staff. Officers interviewed felt that 
camaraderie was enhanced by many of the military organizational structures such as 
foreign deployment, unit competitions and social events.
In summary, military officers learn the importance of leading by values and by 
example which includes developing a command presence. They learned the importance 
of taking care o f the staff as a group and as individuals and of developing unit 
camaraderie and teamwork.
Leading Processes.
As previously mentioned, standard operating procedures (SOP's) are the strategy
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used by the services to provide consistency in the work product and to accommodate the 
inexperience and youth of many of the new recruits as well as the continual rotation o f 
personnel. SOP’s are strictly adhered to in an operational setting. It is a leadership 
decision as to when or if to go around or against SOP’s. Almost every participant could 
cite an instance where he had knowingly violated a procedure or directive. Participants 
related that such actions were justified when it was necessary to take care of your people 
or for the sake o f the mission.
No corroborating hard data could be found on this subject, though Colonel Phillip 
A. Johnson, a military judge advocate, wrote in an essay on the topic:
There is not one among us who has served any appreciable time in the armed 
forces without personally witnessing numerous violations of published orders and 
regulations. I daresay we have not always reported such violations. I would even 
venture to say that in our day most of us have committed a few. (Johnson. 1987. 
p. 126)
Thus, others shared the experiences of the participants with regard to SOP’s in the 
service.
Decision-making.
Because the leader may need to be replaced quickly, it is important that officers 
develop decision-making abilities early in their careers. Internal structures such as early 
command assignments and mentoring both develop these skills and establish the need for 
increased authority as a group norm. This desire for autonomy was confirmed in the 
recent attitudinal survey of surface warfare officers where they named micro­
management as their primary dislike (Crawley, 2000).
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Participants described the chain-of-command. decision-making structure within 
the armed forces, where input is often sought, but command decisions are final and 
obedience expected. The need to display a command presence to the crew also 
encouraged some of the participants to value quick, definitive decisions. In their works 
on recent developments in tactical decision-making. Cohen. Freeman and Thompson 
(1998) and Kozlowsi (1998) noted that the Navy previously taught a classical form of 
decision-making stressing problem solving and statistical probability in finding the 
optimal tactical decision. Newer naval technology requires officers to process large 
amounts o f information at rapid rates. New decision-making models are focusing more 
on emergent problems, continually changing situations and adaptive skills (Cannon- 
Bowers & Salas, 1998).
Many of the military officers interviewed described a personal decision-making 
style based on the classical form. Barber (1990) and Ulmer (1998) looked at separate 
data from the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator Measure, but both found that over 70% of 
military officers were in the thinking-judging (TJ) grouping, compared with 31.5% 
among men nationally. The TJ group tends to favor rapid, analytical decisions 
(McCaulley, 1990). Both groups were largely Army officers. Ulmer concluded that these 
data and others gathered from the Center for Creative Leadership, suggest that 
operational experiences create "expectations for prompt, discernible, measurable results" 
(p. 19). Officers interviewed learned to display decision-making capabilities to their staff 
and to value the authority to make decisions. Some may have learned a disposition 
toward quick, decisive judgments.
Managing Change.
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The participants served during a time that included the post-Vietnam period.
They were part o f significant organizational change in terms o f redefining the mission, 
structures and processes o f the service branches. Large-scale change in the military — 
because o f its size -  is generally directed from central policy-making bodies and then 
passed down through the organization, as in the case of addressing sexual harassment 
after the tailhook scandal (Mason. 1995). The experience of most of the participants 
interviewed was in supporting and implementing top-down change. Their experience in 
implementing change was further characterized by their ability to utilize the controlled 
environment to mandate specific practices and activities. The continual series of 
improvement efforts during their time of service appear to have made some participants 
jaded toward change programs. Others related positive experiences with TQM/TQL 
teams. The lessons learned in the military about leading change include following top- 
down directives, using quality management techniques, using the controlled environment 
and expecting constant changes.
Figure 1 shows a model of the grounded theory of military leadership. The 
behaviors and strategies learned and practiced by military officers, as identified by the 
study's participants, are broken down into the subthemes of military leadership 
development, leading people. leading processes, decision-making, and leading change. 
Several studies are relevant to these findings.
Insert Figure 1 about here
Whiteside (1985) interviewed 750 Navy ship captains, officers and crew about the 
behaviors and practices of junior officers on “well-run ships.” While the term
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"leadership" is not specifically used, the study is tied to the business of commanding a 
ship and offers both superior and subordinate viewpoints. The key factors reported in the 
study were building cohesion, demonstrating loyalty and support o f the captain, raising 
issues, asking questions, giving the captain positive and negative news, taking initiative 
and accepting responsibility for team performance.
Gullickson and Chennette (1984) interviewed 21 senior officers about the 
characteristics of six excellent surface ships. Factors which related to the leadership 
included: good communication up the chain o f command, good discipline with a focus 
on reforming problem sailors and removing those that would not perform, a dedication to 
at least three hours of training weekly, high standards, involvement without micro­
management, common vision and values, intense command interest and continual 
concern for each individual. While not identical in their findings, both these studies 
conform to the data of this study regarding a grounded theory of military leadership.
While there is no definitive source on military leadership, the strategies and 
behaviors identified by the participants are supported by military research and writings. 
Reviewers of this study with military backgrounds -  while not sharing all o f the 
experiences noted in Chapter Four -  confirmed that the data were a credible portrayal of 
military leadership.
Grounded Theory of the Applicability of Military Leadership 
in Public Sector Organizations
The research findings contained in Chapter Five addressed which of the military 
strategies and behaviors were transferable to leadership situations in local government
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and which were not. The intent also was to identify any methods that retired officers 
utilized to adapt to the differences between military and local government organizations 
or to improve the public organizations they joined. The data revealed four key 
subthemes: leading public sector staff, organizational relationships, leading public sector 
processes and encountering stereotypes o f retired military officers.
Leading Staff
The subtheme o f leading staff was the most complex. Participant interviews 
identified the following context factors existing in the public sector which affected 
leading staff: the nature of the staff, communication norms, the classification system, 
concepts about retention, training and development, teamwork and performance 
management systems.
Nature of Staff.
Participants characterized the staff in their public sector organizations as generally 
older, worldlier and more concerned with the details of their compensation and benefits. 
They found the leader-follower relationship complicated by the independence and 
discretion o f staff, in contrast to the more youthful enlisted members who generally 
followed directives. Many witnessed a lack of trust between labor and management in 
government, which at times was compounded by an adversarial approach to labor 
relations. Some found negative and cynical members which confirms the findings of 
Gabris and Simo (1995) in their study comparing public, private and non-profit 
employees. The researchers found that the public sector had the lowest job satisfaction 
rate (at 78%). The public employees in the survey overwhelmingly considered the 
private business as the best employment sector.
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Retired officers interviewed found they needed to spend more time in personal 
communications with their staff members, and recognized that they did not have the same 
trust and reputation that came with their rank in the military. Public sector employees did 
not necessarily follow their directives, and participants found they had to repeatedly 
follow-up to be certain their instructions had been carried out.
Some officers felt there was less commitment to public service among 
government employees than in the military. Service is a core value in the armed forces 
confirmed by Barber's (1990) values study with 270 attendees at the Army War College. 
Participants in the values rank ordering exercise identified “a sense of service” as their 
fourth most important instrumental value.
There is conflicting information on whether the public sector attracts individuals 
with a commitment to service. Perry and Wise (1990) have hypothesized that individuals 
who wish to affect public policy and give service to their community would be motivated 
toward public employment. However, Ting (1997) analyzed data from the Survey of 
Federal Employees (which surveyed 56.767 federal white-collar employees) and found 
no correlation between job satisfaction and commitment to service. Gabris and Simo 
(1990) found that the top reasons for choosing public employment were the challenge 
(55%), the convenience (17%) and the money and job security (nearly 12%). There was 
no evidence o f a service commitment among public employees: “Whatever kernel of 
public motivation exists initially as an independent variable effecting [sic] career choice, 
seems to dissipate rather rapidly among the public employees in our sample” (p. 51). 
These results may not readily be extrapolated to all public employees, however, as the
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sample size was small and taken from agencies in only two cities. In summary, there are 
no hard data on the strength o f public employees7 commitment to government service.
Communications.
Communication norms were another area o f difference. Direct, straightforward 
communication, necessary for clarity and decisiveness in the services, can appear too 
harsh within the civilian world. Utilizing a blunt, direct style offended some employees 
and, in the case of one participant, led to a grievance. Using military jargon clouded 
understanding, reinforced stereotypes and risked separating retired officers from others in 
the organization. Retired officers found that consciously changing to a less direct style 
and abandoning jargon and military formalities -  like saying “yes sir* -  improved 
communication in their new jobs. Retired naval and marine officers in a study by Webb 
(1990) also responded that military communication hindered them in transitioning to 
civilian organizations.
The issue of communication is o f critical importance to leadership. Schein (1992) 
identified language as one o f the four key factors in defining and creating organizational 
cultures. It helps to construct, interpret and disseminate the mental modes within an 
organization. Language is key to communicating vision and managing meanings within 
the organization (Bennis, 1989:Senge, 1990).
Classification. Retention and Staff Development Systems.
There were three systems discussed by participants that affected their ability to 
lead staff. The first, the civil service classification system, restricted their ability to freely 
assign tasks and to compensate individuals for duties actually performed. The retired 
officers interviewed, accustomed to an organization where members did what needed to
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be done, found the system hampering and frustrating, particularly when challenged by 
employees that an assignment given was not their job. Some participants met with 
success by trying to improve selection, through reorganization efforts and by working 
within the constraints of their human resources system.
The second system identified was the norm of lifetime employment in 
government. Some participants found their new organizations largely composed of long­
term employees with little career mobility -  conditions they felt contributed to 
organizational stagnation. Some also found existing attitudes that turnover was negative 
and practices which paid individuals more simply for remaining with the organization. 
They contrasted this to the military where continual staff rotation was normal and, they 
felt, renewed the organization and brought in fresh ideas. Successful strategies in this 
area were to change the organizational norm to see the benefits of turnover, to promote 
upward mobility and career ladders — regardless o f whether it led people to move outside 
the organization -  and to set pay rates based on the worth of the position. The 
participants' experiences with the civil service system and the culture o f lifetime 
employment are consistent with scholarly and historic writings (Ban. 1995; White. 1935) 
and are addressed in detail in Chapter Two.
Almost all the participants found inadequate training programs, few career ladders 
and a lack ofleadership development and succession management programs. This was 
one of the areas where their military background provided models that were easier to 
transfer to the public sector.
In all three o f these areas, resigning oneself to accepting and criticizing the 
existing situation was ineffective.
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Teamwork.
The military has established structures that support the development of 
camaraderie, morale and teamwork. Maintaining unit cohesion and camaraderie is a 
daily priority for officers (Montor et al, 1987). None of the participants found any- 
existing structures within their government agencies for building teamwork, and those 
operating in a downsizing environment found ever-greater challenges. Several 
participants utilized their military experience to establish and communicate clear goals, 
trying to assist their new organizations in working better as a unit. Defining tasks and 
roles, then granting more authority at the supervisory and front line level helped some 
work units develop a sense of ownership. Other retired officers used team recognition 
strategies and social gatherings to develop teamwork. Creating an inner circle as an elite 
team within the work unit was a practice that may have promoted more separation than 
camaraderie.
Managing Performance.
Civilian managers have less control over staff than do military officers. Many 
participants criticized the civil service system and the public sector rewards system as 
ineffective for managing performance. They were now restricted to focusing solely on 
the work performance issues, whereas within the paternalistic systems of the military, 
they had the authority to work with the whole person, including their families. They felt 
the multiple steps and long processes of the discipline system allowed problems to grow 
before they could be effectively dealt with. The rewards system limited the incentives 
and merit awards they could offer employees. Participants commented that some 
established public managers were reluctant to use the discipline system because o f its
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ineffectiveness and consequently tolerated poor performance, a point confirmed in Ban's 
examination o f the federal service (1995). Some retired officers, however, stated that 
they were establishing standards, documenting and disciplining those with poor 
performance, regardless of whether their managerial peers chose not to. One used 
reorganization to eliminate poor workers. Retired officers expressed that they found it 
important to use the rewards available to them creatively.
Organizational Relations
The second key subtheme identified by participants was organizational relations. 
This encompassed relations with staff, peers, one’s manager, executives and within the 
political arena. These relationships affected their level of decision-making authority and 
raised differences in approaches to values and ethics.
Relations with Staff. Peers. Managers. Executive Leadership and Elected Officials.
In the military, respect, to some degree, accompanies rank. The participants 
transitioned from an organization where status and reputation were “yours to lose” to one 
where reputation had to be earned. Most experienced having their decisions questioned 
and their instructions disobeyed. Some subordinates used open door policies to 
circumvent their authority or looked for reasons to find fault with them. A few retired 
officers characterized their staff as cynical toward change efforts. Effective strategies for 
working with staff were to consciously develop a positive reputation with individuals, to 
communicate directives carefully and to follow-up with staff. It was problematic for 
retired officers to assume they had a positive reputation and the automatic cooperation o f 
their employees.
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Many of the participants missed “the camaraderie of the wardroom" -  close peer 
relations and internal support. Some experienced this as part o f the separation and 
competition of agencies and programs in the public sector noted by Dahl (1956). Dilulio 
and associates (1993) and Yates (1982). They also observed more o f a separation of 
work and social life in the civilian world. Some successfully built peer relations and 
hosted social events. Retired officers in Webb's study (1990) also reported that the 
civilian sector was less collegial and trusting than the military. Some participants faced 
situations where there was little support or cooperation from other managers. One retired 
officer cited this as his reason for eventually leaving government service.
The military services place a high priority on continual development and the CO 
takes an active role in providing developmental assignments and in broadening the 
authority o f capable officers. Most of the participants found a dearth of training and 
career development in the public sector. Those who were successful sought their own 
opportunities. Some found their assignments were mundane compared to the military 
and that critical decision were made elsewhere in the public environment.
In the military, the executive officer is familiar with the technical operations he or 
she oversees. It is fairly common for the chief executive of a public organization to have 
little technical knowledge concerning most of the operations. Consequently, success for 
high-level administrators relies on building strong relationships with the CEO. 
Nonetheless, some retired officers experienced public criticism by the CEO. Accustomed 
to the "praise in public, criticize in private" norm within the military, they were shocked 
and disappointed at this feature of public organizations.
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Some o f the study participants objected to the continual questions and requests for 
information received from the offices of the CEO and elected officials that disrupted their 
workflow. In addition, the “second guessing” and failure to support the agency's 
recommendations were termed frustrating and often counterproductive. Retired officers, 
accustomed to broad authority expressed their disappointment with micro-management 
by those with positional authority, but without technical expertise.
Little individual decision-making authority existing within a public political 
system characterized by multiple stakeholders, competing agencies, slow processes and 
incremental rather than decisive action (Golembiewski. 1985; Yates. 1982). Critical 
decisions are made by elected officials or by the chief executive. This reflects the 
historic tension about the role of the public administrator, and whether this role should be 
that o f a neutral administrator or a partner in policymaking (Lindbom & Woodhouse.
1993; Lowi. 1979; and others). CEOs and elected officials may use strict oversight to 
curb administrative power (Rourke. 1984; Selden, Brewer. & Brudney, 1999).
Recent research confirms that elected bodies in some jurisdictions are becoming 
increasingly involved in the detailed aspects of programs. Nalbandian (1999) studied a 
group of local city and county managers in 1988 and again in 1999. The public 
administrators reported that elected officials were becoming more involved in the 
programmatic and implementation details. Nalbandian's study also found that many 
governing councils contained special interest and anti-govemment members.
Bressner (1999) surveyed city managers and mayors in over 300 communities in 
the United States between 1994 and 1998. Respondents identified two trends of
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particular concern: an increasing tendency by councils to micro-manage. and the 
inexperience and poor caliber o f their some council members.
Schafer & Toy (1999), in their study of 225 city managers in California, identified 
"the amount o f independent authority” as having the most significant correlation (reverse 
correlation) with the ability of managers to thrive in the stress-filled climate o f public 
management. Council members who focused too much on the program details was the 
fourth most important source o f stress. Twenty-eight per cent o f those interviewed were 
negative about whether they w'ould again choose their public sector career. These studies 
confirm the micro-management reported by many of this study’s participants.
Having close dealings with elected officials was a new experience for all of the 
participants as officers in most assignments are not to have direct contact with elected 
officials. According to General Louis Wilson, USMC. “Our business is that we 
understand conflict and we take an oath that we will protect our country and not make 
policy” (Quoted in Montor et al, 1987). Some found it exciting to be a player in the 
policy arena, while others were more frustrated by a process featuring multiple 
stakeholders, shifting political winds, time-consuming public processes and interagency 
competition. Those who were more successful became involved in building influence 
relationships with elected officials and becoming involved in political committees. This 
is an area where retired officers had to find satisfaction from being a part o f the process 
rather than the decision-maker, or find satisfaction in another aspect o f  public service.
Authority. Values and Ethics.
The final area in the subtheme o f organizational relations is that of values and 
ethics. Some participants were disappointed in joining organizations where there was
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little sense of strong purpose. Those retired officers expressed strong commitment to the 
role of ethics and values in leading organizations. Leaving a gemeinschaft military 
organizational culture, they were disappointed in the occupational orientation of many of 
the high-level public administrators in their organizations. They questioned how to lead 
in an organization where others modeled behavior that was more designed to promote a 
career than the public good.
Ban (1995) wrote that public sector organizations generally fostered a "culture of 
control" whereby they gained employee compliance by focusing on rules and external 
controls. There is little ethics and values development evident in public sector employee 
development efforts and little agreement about which ethic should guide public agencies 
(Skidmore, 1995).
Leading Processes
Some of the areas where the retired officers interviewed expressed their greatest 
success was in improving procedures, strengthening the planning component and 
standardizing processes in their public agencies. Those who had the most success in 
introducing such changes used influence and modeling. Those who proposed 
improvements but relied on their executive or CEO to implement plans generally saw less 
change actualized.
Stereotypes of Military Officers
All of the participants interviewed encountered some stereotypes o f military 
officers. These varied by individual, many saw officers as rigid, bureaucratic, not very 
bright, having little experience with civilians and clannish. Some of the people they now 
supervised had little experience with the military; their impressions may have been
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shaped by the media. Some retired officers had managers who did not appear to 
understand their background or what they were capable of. The experience of facing 
stereotypes was also shared by retired officers in a focus group study done by Webb 
(1990) and in contemporary media pieces (Cohn, 1997). Hadley (1986) also discussed 
the existence of “The Great Divorce,’' a growing gulf between the military' and civilian 
sectors o f the country which may be perpetrated by negative media images.
Participants who recognized and deliberately countered these stereotyped images 
and avoided using military jargon and communication styles expressed less frustration 
about the effects of these images. By educating others in their organizations regarding 
their experiences and by demonstrating their abilities, they felt they had begun to change 
perceptions and to gain the types of assignments they knew they were capable of. Those 
who retained their military communication style and relied on their managers to direct 
their career voiced more disappointment and negativity over their situation.
A summary of the theory of the applicability of military leadership to public 
sector organizations is found in Figure 2 and the grounded theory' is summarized in 
Appendix F.
Insert Figure 2 about here
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What do the findings sav about military leadership?
The portrait of military leadership revealed by the interviews contains elements of 
a variety of leadership theories. The contingency view of leadership, expressed by 
almost all participants, fits several different theories where the nature o f the subordinate 
and the context determine what style of leadership is used — Fiedler's notion of 
contingency leadership (1967). House's path-goal theory (1971) and Hershey and 
Blanchard's notion of situational leadership (1988). A few participants described a more 
extreme, dualistic view (i.e., KATN versus coaching leadership) which approached 
McGregor's authoritarian/participatory Theory X, Theory Y (1960). A contingency 
approach to decision-making is supported in the work of Vroom and Yetton's (1973) 
continuum of autocratic, consultative and group decision-making.
Many writings on military leadership are drawn from the great man/woman 
concept of leadership, with a particular focus on examples from the operational and 
combat achievements. As Janowitz (1960) related, the organization depends upon 
technical and administrative talents, but has a special reverence for it heroic leaders. 
However, in Ulmer's view (1998). the focus on tactical decision-making skills and on the 
personal style/presence of those in command, can shift the focus away from the skills 
needed in a non-combat or operational environment:
The ''operating" situation requir[es] standard procedures and crew "drills." with 
expectations for prompt, discernible, measurable results. The linkage between 
cause and effect is clear. Hard data are usually available for decision-making.
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Reflection or contemplation is out of place. The typical general officer or CEO 
personality fits well into this situation. Any [tendency] toward immediate action 
is reinforced in the junior leadership years when prompt, aggressive control of the 
tactical situation represents laudatory behavior. The other type of situation gives 
the general officer or CEO personality more trouble. It requires contemplation 
before action, patience with ambiguity, and an appreciation for broad participation 
in the decision-making process. This is the '‘building” or “improving" situation, 
(p p .19-20)
Ulmer, as a retired general and former head of the Center for Creative Leadership, has 
been in a unique position to study military leadership. He wrote that military practices o f 
short-term assignments have made it difficult for senior officers to contribute and lead in 
situations requiring long-term change. “In effect, everything about the current system 
moves leadership style relentlessly toward the ‘operating’ end of the spectrum." (Ulmer. 
1998, p. 20)
There are certain aspects of charismatic leadership contained in notions of 
military leadership, particularly in the phenomenon of command presence. Conger and 
Kanungo (1989) defined charismatic leadership as involving: a vision shared by 
followers that is distinct from the status quo. innovative and unconventional means to 
accomplish that vision, a realistic assessment of the external supports and restraints and 
the process o f inspiring followers to pursue the vision through communication and 
influence. Bums (1979), however, said that charismatic leaders were not true leaders 
because their followers’ actions were based more in a personal attraction to the leader: 
“Idolized leaders are not, then, authentic leaders because no true relationship exists
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between them and the spectators -  no relationship characterized by deeply held motives, 
shared goals, rational conflict, and lasting influence in the form of change." (p. 248). 
Bums identified two types o f leadership: 1) transactional, wherein rewards and sanctions 
are used in an exchange relationship to gain the cooperation of the followers, and 2) 
transformational leadership, where “persons with certain motives and purposes mobilize, 
in competition or conflict with others, institutional, political, psychological and other 
resources so as to arouse, engage and satisfy the motives of others'" (p. 18).
Bernard Bass and his associates have done quantitative research on 
transformational leadership in naval officers for over a decade (Bass. 1990; Bass. 1996; 
Waldman & Bass. 1990; Yammarino & Bass, 1990; Yammarino. Spangler & Bass. 1993. 
and other works). Bass's (1985) original theoretical work on the subject described 
transformational leadership as including an appeal to a vision, inspiring confidence, 
empowering followers and creating inspirational activities. His later field research on 
naval officers was based on data from subordinate ratings of the leader using his 
Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire (MLQ) (Bass & Avolio. 1989). and. in some 
studies, incorporated ratings from formal performance appraisals. Bass has sought to 
identify and quantify transformational leadership within individuals by measuring their 
subordinates' assessment o f their charismatic behavior and the personal attention they 
show to followers, as well as the resulting motivation and intellectual stimulation 
experienced by subordinates. A problem with Bass's work in this area is that the MLQ 
may be measuring factors that contribute to a leader's effectiveness and improve 
organizational performance, but it is not clear that it measures a key aspect of 
transformational leadership as defined by Bums and others — working toward significant
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change. The issue with Bass's research confirms Rost's (1993) view on the problems of 
studying leadership without a definitive definition.
Transformational leadership — as defined by Bums (1979). Conger and Kanungo 
(1989), Rost (1993) and others is uplifting to both the leader and follower -  which goes 
far beyond the factors Bass is measuring. The notion of transformational leadership 
incorporates the idea of challenging, complex change, and asking those involved to both 
commit and change themselves in order to realize the vision. Bass measured the views of 
subordinates and factors in the ratings of superiors, but does not capture whether the 
individuals are involved in adaptive rather than technical changes -  a distinction central 
to the work of Heifetz (1994). This is unfortunate, as Bass has published the majority of 
the publicly available research on leadership in naval and marine officers, and his MLQ 
has been used in other military research studies (Clover. 1990: Dorfman. Howell. Cotton 
& Tate, 1992; and other works).
There are multiple examples o f transformational leadership in the military'. The 
armed forces have instituted numerous innovations, many of which involved painful 
organizational changes that included: creating a vision, involving internal stakeholders 
with competing interests, creating commitment and synergy in a diverse, multi-function 
team and making personal sacrifices to make the vision a reality. The military has been 
at the forefront —sometimes painfully in the public view -  o f many race and human 
relations struggles. Many projects — from digging wells in Africa to peacekeeping and 
nation building missions have involved culturally complex, politically sensitive issues.
The potential for military officers to exercise transformational leadership is evident.
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Some military officers may be drawn to see adaptive challenges as technical 
problems (Heifetz, 1994), particularly because, as a group, they are strongly oriented 
toward rational/logical approaches (Barber, 1990; Ulmer. 1998). Taking a strict technical 
approach may limit views o f the problem, restrict potential solutions and obscure 
outcomes. The technological focus of military jobs, along with the hard-science 
educations o f most officers may pre-dispose some toward technical analyses and 
solutions. The officers who have the most to bring to the public sector have both the 
competencies and the commitment for technical and adaptive change.
Military officers as change agents in the public sector
Retired officers have the potential to play positive, activist roles in facilitating the 
kind of change needed in the public sector. Selden and associates (1999) used a Q-sort 
test with government administrators from Georgia to identify how they viewed their 
roles. They found that respondents who took an activist, values-based approach 
identified themselves as those most likely to look for a different job within five years. 
Those who sought no activist role in policy, voiced no strong values about their jobs and 
had no strong commitment to efficiency improvements, rated themselves as the most 
likely to remain with the organization (Selden. et al. 1999). It is unfortunate that the 
group which is the least change-oriented is the one most interested in staying in public 
employment. Government needs leaders instead of caretakers in its administrative ranks.
Public administration faces another challenge from the influx of outside 
executives recruited to bring business practices to local government. Some o f these 
executives focus solely on efficiencies and budgets at the expense o f policy. This influx, 
coupled with the trend toward more anti-government sentiment on elected councils and
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boards, may shift the balance of policy-making toward the legislative branch. The danger 
is that public policy — which has for centuries found balance in the struggle between 
bureaucracy, the legislature, the courts and special interests -  will move too far toward 
short-term political responsiveness and away from the administrators' focus on long-term 
implications. The public sector needs administrators who are willing to do the painful 
political work o f regaining and retaining this critical balance. Retired officers who enter 
the public sector need to be willing activists and not caretakers.
The retired military officers interviewed had different experiences with the job 
transition process. Some found jobs before they left the military, while others had painful 
searches with multiple rejections before successfully obtaining a job. Once stepping into 
a leadership position in the public sector, they had to rely largely on themselves to 
identify these military strategies and behaviors that would successfully adapt to their new 
organizations and which were unique to the Navy or Marine Corps. The armed services 
should improve transition assistance programs for retirees, who have given 20 or more 
years in service. Such transition assistance should include sessions in organizational 
theory and culture with emphasis on how civilian organizations differ from the military; 
leadership assessments with individual coaching on how to capitalize on one's strengths 
and compensate for areas of weakness; and assessment centers with such components as 
leaderless groups to provide individual feedback on communications and leadership 
issues.
Implications for Retired Officers Working in Public Organizations
It is hoped that this study will help retired officers enter careers in local 
government with their eyes open. Realistic expectations of the rewards and drawbacks in
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the public sector will help retiring officers determine if local government is an 
appropriate second career and allow them to better prepare for the transition. Two of the 
eleven participants left local government before the end of this study and others 
interviewed expressed some deep disappointments. Holland (1985) in his work on career 
choices, identified six different organizational environments. He wrote that each 
individual develops personal dispositions toward specific environments and that they 
seek environments that are congruent with their preferences. It may be that retired 
officers my find more satisfaction in what Holland described as a “realistic" environment.
Retired officers need to assess whether they can find individual satisfaction in an 
environment where they exchange technical challenges for adaptive challenges with 
uncertain goals, decision-making authority for facilitating multiple stakeholders, 
independence for political input, and close, defined relationships for a loosely coupled 
and independent workforce.
French and associates (1983) specifically focused on the transition o f 23 retired 
Navy officers, surveying the group during three separate intervals during the first three 
months of their career transition. They concluded that the primary transition stresses 
were lack of job complexity (not finding the work as exciting as their military 
assignments), role ambiguity (not understanding the organizational expectations and 
norms) and the under-utilization of their abilities (French. Doehrman, Davis-Saks & 
Vinokur. 1983). These were the same issues important to members o f this study.
Campbell has been gathering data since the 1970s contrasting Army generals with 
their CEO counterparts in the business world. He found the generals were more 
conventional in their problem solving and were more dominant, competitive and action-
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oriented than the business leaders. This action-orientation. if  true across the serv ices, 
may prove a challenge to those working in the public sector where true resolution of 
issues is rare and action typically slow (Cited in Ulmer, 1998).
A few of the participants displayed an approach o f resigning themselves to the 
ineffectiveness of public systems. In the military bureaucracy, core systems such as 
human resources are far removed from the control of the individual officer and their 
administrative policies are generally accepted and worked with. There are far fewer 
paths for challenging, lobbying and influencing these overarching systems as compared 
to local government. Local agency leaders have more opportunity to change these 
systems if they have the commitment and will to do so.
Some participants who addressed public sector inefficiencies related negative 
experiences with federal processes and federal employees. Experience with or biases 
about the federal sector should not shape a new leader’s view of local administrative 
government. To approach a new organization anticipating dysfunctional systems and 
under-functioning staff will color the experience and limit what a manager or an 
executive perceives as possible. Retiring officers can bring transformational change by 
refusing to accept mediocrity and challenging counterproductive systems and attitudes.
It is possible that some of the military leadership behaviors and practices can be 
interpreted differently in the public sector. Displaying decision-making abilities, a bias 
toward quick, decisive action, and portraying control, self-confidence and decisiveness -  
so important in military leadership — can appear to employees as if the leader is not 
seeking participation and involvement. Many public employees may not be looking for
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an individual who has the answers, but may be more comfortable with one who asks the 
questions.
The balance of constructively disagreeing versus obeying directives of superiors 
shifts in the public sector. There is less of a need and less o f an expectation to "carry a 
message to Garcia" without question (Hubbard. 1899). (See Chapter Tw'o.) There is a 
greater need for implementation challenges and ethical issues to be brought forward and 
even argued with superiors. A few participants in the study appeared to take the position, 
in the words of one. that “the boss is the boss." This is not a leadership perspective. 
Military officers need to recognize that there is generally a greater expectation that they 
disagree, even aggressively disagree with their manager, over important issues in a 
responsible manner.
The public sector is not for everyone and it was clear that some of the officers 
interviewed were not enjoying their work. Given the difficulty some participants had in 
finding their first job. it is important that they enter a field where they will find 
enrichment and success.
Implications for Local Government
None of the public organizations involved in this study provided any orientation 
for its mid-managers or executives (outside o f generic sessions that addressed such issues 
as benefits). Government agencies should have a multi-session orientation for all its 
leadership staff entering from external organizations. Such an orientation should include 
components on the human resources, budgeting, fiscal and civil services systems. It
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should include practical aspects such as how to write and docket proposals going before 
the elected body and the nuances of the political system.
Anyone entering a new organization needs to learn new roles and discover new 
organizational norms as well as unlearn behaviors that are not a fit with their new 
organization. Klausner and Groves (1994) wrote on the importance o f mentors or 
"buddies'’ in helping new members learn the organizational culture. Local government 
would benefit by assigning mentors or team members to assist with orienting executives 
and managers, particularly in the actual processes, shortcuts, political minefields to be 
avoided, etc. An assigned resource colleague or mentor could teach them the 
organizational norms, structures, language and meanings, facilitate connecting them with 
resources and answers and model an activist orientation toward public leadership. This 
would assist all new mid-managers and executives entering the agency from outside the 
public entity, but would especially help retired officers who have worked in a unique 
organizational culture for over 20 years.
What will help military officers succeed
Participants revealed some suggestions for assisting military officers in 
transitioning into the public sector in a way that positions them to meet the current 
challenges facing government: 1) recognize there are differences; 2) focus on adaptive 
change; 3) be prepared to build your own learning organization; and 4) build influence 
relationships at every level.
Recognize there are differences.
Nearly every participant initially denied having transitional issues. Yet. during 
each interview, stories were told that revealed confusing, challenging and sometimes
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painful transitions. Why were these issues difficult to identify at first? There may have 
been an initial unwillingness by some to discuss the topic with a stranger. It may also be 
that the similarities between aspects of the formal culture o f  the public sectors and the 
military masked many of the informal cultural differences. It can be easy to focus on 
similarities and minimize differences. Officers need to realistically expect that there will 
be transition issues.
Focus on adaptive change.
In the midst o f the unknown, it is easy to fall back on what one knows best, and it 
is more comforting and safer to focus on making technical changes. Many of the changes 
implemented by the retired officers in their new organizations were technical changes 
focused on standardizing procedures and processes. What is truly needed in the public 
sector though, is adaptive change that takes place within an environment o f uncertainty 
and unclear goals. Public sector leadership involves both collaboration and consensus 
building with multiple stakeholders and, at times, involves the building and use of power 
relationships. Successes discussed by some o f the participants such as empowering line 
staff and creating teams to identify organizational values demonstrate the broader 
outcomes possible when leaders focus on significant change.
Be prepared to build vour own learning organization.
Public managers and executives face challenges from public sector systems (civil 
service, discipline and rewards systems), existing group norms (rigidity o f assignments 
and expectation o f lifetime employment) and some staffing issues (older, savvy, cynical 
workforce) that hinder the potential for implementing real change. Learning 
organizations must be built despite these challenges and, at times, in the midst of a larger
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organization in stasis. By developing and presenting a clear vision, continually 
developing individual members, creating systems that reward and reinforce that vision 
and by creating trust with members, leaders can begin to recreate the organization.
Build influence relationships at everv level.
Public sector managers and executives operate in an internal environment of 
interagency conflict, competition, conflicting long and short-term visions and values 
conflict. To be successful, influence relationships must be built with staff members, 
peers, managers, the CEO, elected officials, labor representatives and involved citizens. 
Relationships in the public sector are strikingly different than in the military. The mutual 
experiences, shared beliefs and common technical background that built camaraderie in 
the service are rarely found in the diverse services environment o f government. 
Relationships will be built on influence, mutual interest and sometimes on power. These 
relationships may be less personally satisfying than the relationships of the wardroom, 
and retired officers may need to seek close relationships outside of work.
Implications for the Study of Leadership
The overwhelming majority of writings on military leadership focus on combat. 
As an example, one literature search on the topic "military leadership" performed during 
this study, revealed over 60% of the references involved battle-related topics such as 
tactics. Nearly all of the remaining references discussed military leadership from the 
"great men" theoretical standpoint. The field of leadership studies has not done an 
adequate examination o f the strategies and practices of military leadership, particularly in 
view o f its lessons for military and civilian sectors regarding administrative settings.
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Most of the studies on leadership in military organizations involve easily 
accessible populations such as military academy candidates. This is a convenient 
population, but not necessarily the group most likely engaged in transformational 
leadership. A quantitative approach that utilizes data from officer candidates is not 
necessarily measuring transformational leadership as it is not addressing the intent or 
effort to affect real change. The military — and the Navy and Marine Corps in particular -  
need to do more significant research within the senior and flag/general officer 
populations and make this data available to civilian researchers.
A feature of this study is that the researcher is from outside the military. There 
are theorists who hold that research performed from the perspective o f an outsider is. by 
its nature, seen through a lens that obscures the true meaning of the data. This research 
topic was pursued with full knowledge that the process relied on the input of readers and 
reviewers from the military to ensure that the voices of the participants were heard in the 
text. It was also endeavored with the belief that the distant standpoint of the “other" was 
important in examining transition issues and differences in the organizational cultures.
The appropriate role of qualitative research from the standpoint of the “other" needs to be 
further discussed and clarified, especially as the nature of leadership research involves 
the multiple perspectives of both leaders and followers. Finally, there is a need for more 
research on military officers which is available to civilian researchers and, in particular, 
research that involves 360 degree feedback.
Recommendations for Future Research
This research began as a class project. The lack of existing research on military 
officers transitioning to second careers spurred the pursuit of this topic. Clearly much
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more research needs to be done. Some o f  the areas needing further examination include: 
the transition experiences of retired military officers that will assist retirees in finding 
satisfying and productive second careers; comparisons of the organizational cultures of 
the military, public, private and non-profit sectors which would facilitate the cross- 
pollination o f managers and executives already occurring; public sector leadership issues 
such as leadership behaviors, administrative decision-making, leader-followership and 
employee motivation that would give government the type of information that has long 
been available to the private sector.
This study involved eleven Caucasian males who were identified after an 
extensive search o f local government organizations. These participants are reasonably 
reflective of their cohort. It is expected that a more diverse population will be accessible 
for research in the coming years as the retiree population of higher-ranking officers will 
reflect more gender and racial diversity. It would be beneficial to investigate if any 
addition perspectives are found among a more diverse group. Nine of eleven participants 
were naval officers. It is recommended that more research be done comparing transition 
issues unique to naval officers and marine officers and any differences in the subcultures 
of aviation, surface and submarine warfare and staff core specialties such as engineering 
and supply.
Closing Thoughts
At the end of Chapter Two contained some essential elements for public sector 
leadership. It is fitting that this research close by examining those elements in view of its 
findings.
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1. The public sector is experiencing profound change requiring transformational 
leadership.
Retired officers who can offer transformational leadership are those with: a 
vision that may be outside the standard way o f doing business, a comfort level for 
ambiguity, the presence to communicate through their actions and words that they believe 
and live the vision, the ability to inspire and motivate others toward the vision, and the 
passion to carry it out. Those focused on finding a technical solution to these public 
problems cannot adequately lead organizations toward addressing complex challenges.
2. The public sector faces change directed bv the political structure and special 
interest groups requiring leadership that will honestly inform employees of 
coming change.
The officers interviewed all displayed a concern about taking care of their people.
It is important that any desire to protect one's people and any vestiges of restricting 
information on a “need to know" basis do not hinder the flow of important facts. Public 
employees have access to much more information within the organization and from the 
media than do military personnel. Information which is not shared with staff may surface 
in rumors or be released in public statements by elected officials, blind siding staff 
members. The leader must achieve a delicate balance between the need to pace the 
change and information employees receive, with the need to ensure they are not blind to 
political events.
3. Successful leadership in the public sector must involve influence rather than 
coercion.
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Retired officers who are proficient coaches and implemented change successfully 
in administrative environments, know that complex change cannot be ordered to occur. 
Influence is more than persuasion by logic; it involves modeling success, living the vision 
(i.e., walking the walk) and presenting a concept worth committing to.
4. With a history of competing values and shifting political directions, the public 
sector needs leadership that defines, articulates and lives the mission and 
values of the organization.
One of the strengths of military officers entering the public sector is that they 
contribute a much-needed commitment to leading by values. In a public culture of 
competing values, retired officers bring a commitment to public service, which will 
enhance any organizations they join.
5. Successful public sector change needs collaborative leadership and a belief in 
the value of diversity.
Experiences with collaborative change and working in a diverse organization 
were provided to military officers in the guise o f TQM efforts and in the training and 
self-examination done by the military services in response to their increasing multi- 
culturalism. In any organization, collective experience does not necessarily translate to 
individual commitment. If an individual views leadership simply as providing the 
answers and appearing in control of situations, she or he will discourage opportunities for 
collaborative efforts. The commitment to broad involvement from diverse sectors is an 
important and an individual one.
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The potential for retired officers to bring needed skills to the public sector is 
substantial. The capabilities and commitment of individuals will determine whether or 
not they are ultimately successful.
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APPENDIX A: THE INSTITUTIONAL/OCCUPATIONAL CONTINUUM
Military Social Organization: Institutional vs. Occuoational
-- Charles C. Moskos
Variable Institutional Occupational
Legitimacy Normative values Marketplace economy
Role commitments Diffuse Specific
Basis of compensation Rank and seniority skill level and manpower
Mode of compensation much in non-cash form or 
deferred
Salary and bonus
Level of compensation Decompressed; low recruit 
pay
Compressed; high recruit pay
Residence Adjacency of work and 
residence locales
Separation of work and 
residence locales
Spouse Integral part of military 
community
Removed from military 
community
Societal regard Esteem based on notion o f 
service
Prestige based on level of 
compensation
Reference groups "vertical” -  within 
organization
"horizontal” — external to 
organization
Evaluation of performance Holistic and qualitative Segmented and quantitative
Legal system military justice Civilian jurisprudence
Post-service status Veteran’s benefits and 
preference
Same as civilian
First published in: Moskos. C.C. (Fall. 1977). Trends in military organization. Armed 
Forces and Society. 4. 41-50.
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APPENDIX B: GUIDING RESEARCH INTERVIEW QUESTIONS
Overview/Grand tour
1. Can you give me a b rie f summary o f  your military career?
2. What kind o f education and training did the Navy/Marines provide for you?
Leadership
3. Can you think o f  som eone you watched in the military who was a role model, or a mentor 
for you? Someone who was a leadership model for you?
4. Can you think o f  a tim e when you were working under someone's command when they 
displayed great leadership?
5. Do you see a leadership style difference between a combat situation and a military' 
bureaucratic organization?
6. Can you think o f  a time you were tested a leader and were proud o f  how you handled the 
situation?
Processes
7. The military has to do everything on such a large scale. What are some o f  the techniques 
you relied upon to accomplish your mission?
8. The military is known for its bureaucratic processes. Tell me about a time when you 
became really frustrated with an order or a process. [Did you ever have to challenge or 
question a process because it conflicted with the mission or could potentially harm your 
people?]
9. Looking back, what are some o f the things you learned about organizations in the 
military that helped you make the transition to government? What are some o f  the things 
you brought with you?
10. You came to the [public organization] after [number] o f  years in the military. During 
those early transition days, what were some of the things that you w eren't accustomed to 
in the civilian work sector; some o f the things you had to consciously think about to be 
successful?
People
11. What were some o f the methods you would use to motivate people in the military?
12. How did you build unit cohesion in the military?
13. What was it that enabled you to build loyalty between you and your staff in a military 
setting?
14. How- did the structures and practices o f  the military compare to government in terms of
how you work with people? In terms o f  building loyalty and comraderie?
15. How can you build teamwork in a government setting?
16. When you joined the public sector, what were some o f  the things you found didn 't work
in managing people? W hat did you find you had to do differently?
Summary
17. How would you compare your military and government careers? [Probe for differences in 
excitement and satisfaction.]
18. What are some o f the principal ways your military experience shaped you as a leader?
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APPENDIX C: CONSENT FORM
University of San Diego, Doctoral Thesis Project -  Military Leadership Influences
I understand that the focus of this project is to research the influence of military 
background on those in leadership positions in local government.
I understand that the procedure for this project will be as follows:
• I will be interviewed about my working experiences inside and outside of the 
military.
• The questions asked will relate to my professional experiences.
• I am free to decline to answer any question, without providing justification to the 
interviewer.
• No names o f my staff will be sought or used in any published materials relating to 
this project, including transcriptions of my interviews.
• My participation is voluntary, and I understand that I am free to stop participation at 
any time. At any time I can ask questions about the project and receive answers.
• There will be no expense involved in participating in this project.
• My identity as a participant will not be revealed. Details about me will be masked to 
avoid identification.
The interviews will take place during 1999-2000. I will have the opportunity to review 
the portion o f the transcript utilized in the research project for accuracy. No further 
participation in this project is expected of me.
I understand and give permission for the project data to be incorporated into published 
writings and professional presentations.
I, the undersigned, understand these statements and I give consent to my voluntary 
participation in this project.
Signature of the Participant Date
Interviewer
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Human Resources Manager 
City of Escondido 
201 N. Broadway 
Escondido, CA 92025
Dear [Name],
I am a doctoral student in Leadership at the University o f San Diego. I am writing my 
dissertation on the transition issues o f retired military officers moving into high level 
positions in local government. I am trying to identify what aspects of their military 
experience translate well into public sector leadership positions.
I am trying to locate individuals who:
• are working in local government in mid-management or executive positions;
• served 20 or more years in the Marines or Navy as a senior officer; and
• have been retired less than six years.
I would like to contact you about how I might locate any such individuals working at the 
City of Escondido to see if they would be willing to participate in an interv iew.
I will contact you later in the week and look forward to speaking with you.
Yours truly.
Lynn Eldred 
Work: [phone number] 
Home: [phone number]
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APPENDIX E: SUMMARY OF GROUNDED THEORY OF THE 
PHENOMENON OF MILITARY LEADERSHIP
Context Conditions Strategies Consequences: 
Leadership Lessons
Theme: Leadership Development
















CPO's and sr. officers 




seen as a reward. 
Included in decision­
making.
Instili values, beliefs, 
behavior norms, 
leadership principles.
Guide, role models, 
















KATN style Demanding, possible 
threats.
Set & expect high 
standards.
Demand orders are 
followed.
High mental & 
physical
performance, handle 
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Summary o f Grounded Theory of Military Leadership 
Theme: Leading Staff: continued


























People can be hurt.
Be honest in appraisals. 
"Make the tough calls" 










go into harm's 
way.
Willingness to 
go into harm's 
way; to follow 
leader.





















Make up for poor 
education. Consistency 
despite rotation.
Instill at orientation. 
Leader models & 
reinforces.
Perception: leader is in 
control, knows job and 
will keep staff safe.
Bui id c rew 's  confidence 
in leader.
Perception: we are in 
good hands.












Display abilities: work 
along side staff; stay 
fit.
Respect is yours to 
lose.
If people trust your 
judgment they will 
obey.
Take care o f your 
people.
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Summary of Grounded Theory of Military Leadership 
Theme: Leading Staff, continued___________




Be fair & apply to all. 
Take action to protect 
crew.
Set high expectations; 




People need to be 
pushed.
Recognize individually. 
Reward & promote on 
merit.
Willing to place 
self in harm's 
way for the unit
Camaraderie and 
unit cohesion
Values of unit identity. 
Structures: deployment, 
social events, sports, and 
competition.
Be visible; demonstrate 
support for staff.
Use events and 
structures. Demonstrate 
support.
Work along side staff.
Theme: Decision-Making
Leader may 







Responsibility is a 
reward
Final decision is CO's. 
















Follow & implement 
organizational change. 
Variety of programs 
can be seen as “flavor 
of the month.
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APPENDIX F: DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE MILITARY AND PUBLIC
SECTORS
Theme: Leading Staff 4
Subthemes Military Public Sector
Nature of 
Staff
Diverse, many young, inexperienced. Many older, more experienced, 
concerned with pay. benefits & 
retirement.
Trust between officers & enlisted. Labor/management relations.





‘‘Need to know” principle.
Negative reactions to straightforward 
communication; jargon; formal style.
Classification
System
Staff will “Do what needs to be done.” 
Flexible job duties.
Established (sometimes out of date) 
job titles, job descriptions, pay rates. 





Use induction, performance reports 
and re-enlistment system to “weed 
out.” Move staff every 2-3 years;
Organizational stagnation: lack of 
mobility.




Training a top priority; continuous 
development: stay current in field.
Mixed levels of training -  some very 




Built into system -  overseas 
deployment, dependency, paternalistic 
system, cross-department shipboard 
teams




Work with whole individual; NJP; 
making the tough calls; fair & 
consistent discipline creates loyalty.
Limited focus; performance problems. 
Limited effectiveness: cumbersome 
civil service system; not all managers 
enforce rules.
Wide variety of recognition options. 
Rewards based on merit.
Some delayed, undeserving, and 
blanket awards.
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Differences between the Military and Public Sectors 
Theme: Organizational Relations, continued
Subthemes Military Public Sector
Staff
Relations
Respect comes with position. 
Confidence of staff.
Respect is “yours to lose.”
Must build own reputation. 
Possible cynicism o f staff.
Peers
Relations
Mission is primary. 
Camaraderie of wardroom.








CO has ultimate responsibility'. 
Role is to support CO.
CO is in charge of officer 
development.
Praise in public, chastise in private. 
Knows your job.
Command presence.
Support boss. Lack of training and 
development opportunities.
Mundane assignments.
Exec criticizes at meetings and public 
hearings; assigns blame; probably 
does not know your job.
Political
Relations
Insulated from congress and top 
management.
“Close to the flagpole.”





Trust in judgment. 
Give general direction.
Micro-management. Others don't 
know your job. Multiple questions 




Make life and death decisions. 
Quick decision-making. 
Responsibility its own reward.
Limited authority. Involvement o f 




Clear, shared values. Conflicting values. Some individual 
orientation rather than public good.




Standardized across the organization. 
Generally adhered to.
Lacking in many areas.
Applied inconsistently.
Less developed than in federal 
contracting.
Not always consequences for non- 
compliance.
R eproduced  with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2 9 2
APPENDIX G: LEADERSHIP IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR: EFFECTIVE AND 
LESS EFFECTIVE STRATEGIES EMPLOYED BY RETIRED OFFICERS
Theme: Leading Staff










concern for pay, 
benefits & 
retirement.



















































o f date) job 
titles, job 
descriptions, pay 
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Leadership in the Public Sector: Effective and Less Effective Strategies Employed by 
Retired Officers,
Theme: Leading Staff, continued_____________________________________________

















turnover is good; 
promote mobility; 























































Work with on 
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Leadership in the Public Sector: Effective and Less Effective Strategies Employed 
by Retired Officers,
Theme: Organizational Relations, continued__________________________________






Staff No established Less control Consciously Assume you
Relations reputation. over staff. build reputation. have a positive
Leader is Cynicism of Communicate reputation and
questioned. 
“Open door” 











Focus on own 
department.
Outreach. Accept status 
quo.
Relations Support boss. Multiple Find own Don’t question
























not know your 
job.
relationships.
Political Insulated from “Close to the Enjoy influence. Avoid, try to
Relations congress and flagpole.” Build insulate self
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Leadership in the Public Sector: Effective and Less Effective Strategies Employed 
by Retired Officers
Theme: Organizational Relations, continued






Political Multiple Multiple Enjoy influence. Avoid, try to
Process approval stakeholders. Build insulate self










Amount o f CEO staff CEO and Develop Become




































in the work 
itself.
frustrated.
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Leadership in the Public Sector: Effective and Less Effective Strategies Employed 
by Retired Officers, continued
Theme: Policies and Procedures






Policies and Lacking in Lesser priority. Bring in Discuss solely
Procedures many areas. Existing policies practices from with the chief
Applied and procedures the military. executive and
inconsistently. are often out o f Introduce rely on him/her
Less date or “on the through to implement.
developed shelf.” influence and







Stereotypes Stereotypes Less public Avoiding Actions that
include: rigid, contact and direct military jargon reinforce
bureaucratic, experience with and formality. stereotypes,
not very the military. Conscious e.g., using
bright, clique- Rely on media efforts to jargon, issuing
ish, trained in image. counter too many
psychological Not given stereotypes. written policy
warfare. appropriate Take on higher directives.
Experience o f assignments or level Rely on
retired commensurate assignments. superior to give
military not pay. Educate co­ out
understood or Barrier to workers and assignments.
recognized. implementing demonstrate
change. abilities.
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